Motives for reforms on civil–military relations in Turkey (original) (raw)

The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)

“The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF),” Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp: 387-403, 2010, 2010

ABSTRACT This article tackles with the question of Europeanization in Turkey’s civil-military relations and the extent and content of democratization that the EU as a factor or an anchor serves in the civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces. We argue that: the EU membership process has necessitated democratization in civil-military relations and has served as an external stimulus in empowering the civilian voices for the civilianization of the 1982 Constitution and the political elite’s standing vis-à-vis the military elite; this external support was not sufficient for a fully integrated democratic control of the armed forces (DECAF) as there are still problems in the democratization of civil-military relations; since the 2000s, there has been a DECAF reform process continuing; but due to historical deficiencies in Turkish polity like the civilian incapacity to change the priority given to the military’s role in the making of the security culture, the European norms of DECAF is formal. The article has four parts. In the first part, we aim to give background information to DECAF reforms in Turkey. We focus on the harmonization packages that Turkey has adopted as part of the requirements for EU membership which pinpoint how close Turkey gets to the norms and values of the EU or in a similar vein how far Turkey deviates from general understandings of DECAF as there are still issues awaiting Turkey’s Europeanization. The second part carries the discussion to the Justice and Development Party (JDP) – Turkish General Staff (TGS) relations between 2002-2007. The first JDP governmental term is significant for DECAF as most of the reforms occurred in this period. Yet, it is the same period when the tension between the JDP and the TGS reached levels that were hard to govern by the politicians. The third part makes an assessment on the civil-military relations in the period since 2007. This part is a political mapping of the contemporary situation as it makes an elaboration of key issues that dominate the agenda of Turkish politics recently. The last section draws a conclusion and identifies the boundaries as well as the shortcomings of DECAF in Turkey. The concluding remarks pay special attention to the significance of the question of a Turkish way to Europeanization especially in the field of civil- military relations.

Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone

European Journal of Political Research, 2004

In the light of the pre-eminent role of the military in Turkish public affairs, this article seeks to assess critically the suitability of the entry criteria that Turkey must fulfil if it is to accede into the European fold. With that in mind, the article takes the idea of the 'democratic control of the armed forces' (Decaf), as conceived of by Western agencies such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the EU (European Union), and unravels its relevance and implications for the Turkish case. The key features of Central and Eastern European systems of civil-military relations, which are targeted by the Decaf measures are contrasted with the Turkish case in order to show that a single-model approach to Decaf is untenable. It is then argued that the way that the strategy that has been used for implementing Decaf is impoverished because it fails to capture the 'real politics' in which militaries are embedded. Based on that, the article reaches the conclusion that one of the central factors preventing Turkey's potential accession into the European fold is the prevailing civil-military relationship. However, the approach being employed by Western agencies fails to adequately recognize and respond to the nature of that relationship.

The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

"The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/7460.pdf, Policy Brief No. 26, Ankara: SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2008, (with Ümit Kurt)., 2008

The armed forces have always occupied a central place in Turkey’s political agenda. The EU reform process is contributing to a more democratic framework of civil-military relations. Nevertheless, although Turkey follows Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DECAF), the military still influences civilian governments through various and innovative means. There seems a Turkish version of DECAF that grants a privileged position to the military in the making of security policy. The presidential elections had been a medium for both the military’s involvement in politics and the civilian reaction against this involvement. Civil society organizations, the media, and business circles alike gave significant support to the ruling AKP in its standoff with the military. It is only recently that resistance to the ‘regime guardianship’ role of the military has emerged.

Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy

Armed Forces & Society, 2008

Democratization scholars argue that Turkey has successfully transitioned to democracy and is consolidating liberal democracy. The political elite and the parties are deemed important factors in crafting democracies. However, the Turkish political leadership has not changed much until recently; therefore, it remains a puzzle why consolidation is taking place. There are two explanations: (1) there is no consolidation of democracy (2) a factor other than the turnover in political elite/change in the political system has led to consolidation. I argue that consolidation is in progress because of the lengthy but persistent transformation of the military in Turkey. I examine previously overlooked changes in Turkish military with respect to its structure and its relations to the society. I find that the change in the military contributes to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, and other transitional democracies. As with any other institutional change, this process is slow and risky.

Civil-military relations in Turkey: From military veto power to civilian political control

This article seeks to contextualise the 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey by discussing the historical role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics, and the civilianisation process that has taken place in Turkish civil-military relations over the last fifteen years. It is argued that the coup-attempt can be regarded as a legacy from the traditional 'guardianship' role that the Turkish military used to play in politics, but also as an outcome of the turbulent process of civilianisation.

Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces

Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies, 2017

This chapter shows that external factors as well as strong civilian leadership have affected the trajectory of defense and military policy in Turkey since the earlier years of the republic. Empowered by the EU, sustained electoral support and successful, albeit informal, counter-coup coalitions, the AKP government succeeded in establishing civilian control over security policy and limiting the military’ s political and judicial autonomy. Existing civilian control over military and defense policy is, however, not firmly institutionalized, but based on the popularity of a strong leadership at a time of low military esteem. Coup-proofing initiatives, i.e. coup conspiracy operations and trials and other measures, such as sensationalist coverage of military leaks, wiretaps, and mistakes, have forced the military out of politics, but have also called into question the TAF’ s military effectiveness.

A Healthy and Democratic Civil-Military Relationship in Turkey: Accountability of the both Entities

Until recently the Turkish military was beyond criticism or control, as the self-styled guardians of Turkish Republic the military officers have seen themselves the only source to protect the main principals of the Republic. This self-appointed task, they thought, had given them the right to interfere with Turkish politics when they see fit. Yet, with the latest arrests of some very top-brass generals accused of plotting a military coup against the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) government, it seems that the balance of power has shifted decisively. This paper explores the ways in which how far this balance could be maintained in a healthy civil-military relationship in a democratic country. The author suggests that the circumstances have been changed since the proclamation of Republic and Turkey is becoming a more and more self-confident country as she improves her rela- tionships with neighbors and becoming a wealthier country due to several economic reforms. All in all, the citizens wish to live in a normal democratic country. So, the two enti- ties, the civilians and the military, should be more accountable to each other, especially the military must learn the decisions of the public expressed in ballot polls.

The History of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations: Lessons for the European Union

CMR in Turkey, 2022

Under the scope of the EU, militaries are distinct from civilian power, but they are indisputably subordinated to civilians, as well as completely depoliticized. Because Turkey’s CMR practices do not conform to this outlook, many believe that Turkey cannot acquire EU membership, due to the poor quality of her democracy, especially from the CMR perspective, since the army has excessive political power. On the other hand, most of the Turks believe that Turkey has been governed by a sui generis democracy for almost ninety years. To underpin this view, they refer to her long-lasting memberships to many democratic international organizations, such as her about six-decade-year membership to NATO, which also requires some certain democratic criteria to be met. Besides, some also argue that democracy in Turkey should ineluctably be different from the western practices, as her population is Muslim in 99.8%, and the first condition of democracy, secularism, has not yet been sufficiently internalized by her politicians and people. Because of this, Turkey, like most other Muslim majority countries, is constantly vulnerable to the threat of sharia. With the contributions of her unfavorable geography, they claim that her democracy should be distinct from traditional western democracies in order to contain threats arising from those factors. What makes the issue even more complex and interesting is that this odd model is perceived as normal by not only the military but also the majority of the civilian elites. Although the anti-militarist looking Justice and Development Party has recently gathered about fifty percent of all popular votes, most Turks seem to have no problem with this military flavored democracy, according to public surveys. This is in part because they view their army as the “Founder of the Republic” and “Savior of the Nation,” but also because more educated Turks believe that Turkey has tried a brand new democratization model during a time when the wall separating mosques and politics necessarily erects and the democratic culture of devout people sufficiently flourishes. They also persistently emphasize that unless simultaneous democratization of other civilian institutions accompany the reformation in CMR, as well as a genuine separation of powers, is achieved, Turkey could slide to an authoritarian regime with an Islamist autocracy. As noticed, the role of TAF in Turkish politics and society differs from the traditional roles and liberal-democratic practices outlined by the EU, while its intervention in the political realm differs from the Southeast American, Asian and African Juntas that demonstrate their hunger for power by directly ruling their countries for years. Furthermore, there seems to exist a considerable gap between the perceptions of the EU circles and Turkish Elites, as well as the majority of Turks. Thus, to shed light on all aspects of the problem this dissertation attempted to analyze cultural and historical roots of the CMR that is considered one of the major obstacles that Turkey must overcome to realize her EU membership goal.