Wrongfulness as a Necessary Cause of the Losses - Removing an Alleged Difference between Strict Liability and Negligence (original) (raw)
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Justifications and Excuses in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law
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The incremental Learned Hand standard is recognized as the main contribution of the law and economics literature to legal practice, as an objective criterion of negligence assessment. Traditionally, negligence gradation has been a factor considered by legal technology to allocate the damages. However, one of the main problems in legal practice lies in the establishment of objective criteria for quantitative assessment of the reduction or increase in the indemnity-damage ratio, considering the degree of negligence of the injurer and of the victim. Withal, is it possible to use the incremental Learned Hand standard as criterion of negligence graduation in order to allocate the damages? Using the theoretical foundations of law and economics literature in conjunction with the traditional legal classification of negligence into severe, ordinary and slight, and considering the Brazilian tort system as analytical basis, the paper shows that the answer is positive. The basic idea is that th...
A Note on the Equivalence Between Contractual and Tort Liability Rules
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The aim of this paper is to conciliate some conclusions of the economic theories of breach of contract and tort law. The main result is that the two efficient alternatives that tort law identifies (negligence rule and strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence) are mirrored by two efficient ways of defining contract damages. The first consists of forcing the debtor to pay expectation damages but limiting the level of the creditor's reliance (rule of damage mitigation). The second consists of obliging the debtor to pay expectation damages only when his breach of contract implies negligence, otherwise using restitution remedies (doctrines of impracticability and force majeure).