The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West, in: Global Policy, vol.8 (1), February 2017, pp.82-91. (original) (raw)

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Global Policy, 2016

The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imaginable: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications • The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security). • Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable.

The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the EU

The Ukraine Crisis has changed European and US security policy. Irrespective of the impact the crisis will have in the short, medium and long term, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent destabilisation of eastern Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences for the following three reasons: It will reduce strategic warning due to Russia’s will and ability to use armed force in its neighbouring area. It is apparently the definitive Russian departure from the idea of a united, free Europe that began with the Helsinki Process and was realised with the integration of economies and societies after the end of the Cold War. An important element in the idea of a united, free Europe is that conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means and not by force of arms. It demonstrates that a number of the partnerships, etc., that have formed the foundation for EU and NATO policies, have been inadequate. Therefore, the crisis creates a need to rethink Western strategy. In the light of this new risk, the West’s existing policy is inadequate. This does not necessarily mean that the policy hitherto has been mistaken, and it absolutely does not mean that we are facing a new Cold War. However, the West must realise that Russian governance does not have the same general goals as those of the West. Although the West can thus in the short term be content to overcome the crisis, the consequences for the European security policy framework in the medium and long term will be appreciable. These consequences will apply not least to the West itself because the crisis has revealed differences in priorities among the Western powers and challenged the world view that the West’s policy has been based on. Furthermore, the West must acknowledge that Russia is willing to use military means to accomplish its goals. This presents EU foreign policy in particular with a number of fundamental challenges and means that NATO must rethink and thoroughly reconsider its obligations under Article 5, especially with regard to the East European member states, where the Baltic States are particularly vulnerable.

NATO'S PROSPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE WAR

Annuaire de la Faculté de Philosophie, 2022

The war on Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022 with the invasion of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, is an event with a potential to cause tectonic changes in the current political, security and economic international order, including the possibility of a nuclear conflict. As it is the case with the other international and regional organizations, NATO too is enforced to reconsider its position in the multipolar world. The research problem of this paper is delimiting the reality from the myth of NATO that has rested for decades. It focuses on the search for the Alliance's real power in a multipolar international system, as well as seeking answers about the future of the European security order (especially through the prism of NATO-EU relations). The key hypothesis is that the course of events (in Ukraine but also the definite rise of multipolar international system) has been predictable. The reasons for the war were deeply embedded in the foundations of the hybrid international system. The preliminary conclusion is that NATO (albeit seemingly strengthened and expanded) will likely face with its irrelevance in a multipolar order. The thesis of a "global NATO" is just a veil that covers the restricted NATO mission primarily as an instrument of the US policy in Europe. Due to the Ukraine, EU (but also OSCE) is likely to see the shattered dreams of its own security system. It means it will be economically, politically and militarily completely dependent on Washington. NATO enlargement is reaching its peak, along with its primarily European reach. Globally, the United States will rely on its own forces and on alliance of the willing, now referred to as the "Collective West."

NATO in Europe: Between Weak European Allies and Strong Influence of Russian Federation

Croatian International Relations Review, 2017

After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO’s deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe’s security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia’s new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a tr...

"The Future of NATO After the Ukraine War: The Emperor’s New Clothes"

Dušan Proroković and Ekaterina Entina (eds.), Euroasian Security After NATO, 2023

The article aims to envision the prospects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Examining the historical and practical aspects of the issue, the starting premise is that NATO has become an obsolete and dangerous alliance. Ever since the end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of socialism and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the Alliance has been in a perpetual search for new enemies, i.e., a raison d'être, at the expense of global peace and security. During this process, NATO has tried to conceal its genuine interests in sustaining American hegemony and preserving its bureaucratic existence. The war in Ukraine is a direct consequence of NATO's "cosmopolitan militarism" on a global scale. The concept of a "global NATO" or "globalised NATO" lies at the core of this study. The article presents tentative conclusions, outlining possible scenarios for NATO's position in the aftermath of the Ukraine War.

NATO's Interference in the Ukrainian-Russian War: International political considerations

Jogelméleti Szemle. Law Working Papers, 2022

The new Ukrainian-Russian war, provoked at length by the United States, has brought to our attention a previously overlooked aspect of regime change in Central and Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer 2014). After the collapse of the Soviet empire, in the joy of liberation from it and in our desire in Eastern Europe to join the Western half of Europe, the fact that the NATO led by the Americans against the Soviet forces had lost its function with the collapse of the latter was not even mentioned in the debates of the domestic public in Hungary. However, this huge war machine, which had lost its function, simply sought new functions out of inertia, and the war machine, already strictly controlled and led by the U.S., became more and more a front for the U.S. to strike anywhere in the world for its own goals. The French, who had left NATO in 1966, if not formally, then in fact, raised the idea in 1991 of replacing NATO, which had become functionless, with a separate military alliance for Europe to counter, among other things, the remaining nuclear power, Russia, but this did not resonate with the other Western European countries, which were steeped in the dominant U.S. globalists. However, when the U.S. attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 and then on Iraq in 2003 was carried out against the opposition of the Franco-German pair under the NATO flag - and in retrospect with precision bombing of French and German interests on Yugoslav territory - the demand of this pair of great powers for an independent European force to replace NATO was reinforced. Nothing came of it, and in 2009, our country's less than glorious French descendant, President Sárközy, even invited France back into NATO. It was therefore gratifying to see that now one of the candidates for the French presidential elections, Ms. Le Pen, has included withdrawal from NATO in her program, and even if the opinion polls do not favor her victory, the European sovereign governments and their intellectual background should reflect on the importance of this agenda item. Especially since in 2016 the U.S. government made an about-face from a globalist to an isolationist position, which itself envisaged the dissolution of NATO. This was interrupted by President Trump's departure in 2020, but the growing strength of the Republicans he dominates in Congress and his plans for reelection in 2024-whose chances are supported by current polls-make it necessary to think theoretically about abolishing NATO in Europe and to discuss this across Europe with the intellectual support of Le Pen's party.

NATO and the European Union

NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory

Since the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the European Union (EU) have evolved along with Europe's changed strategic landscape. While NATO's collective defense guarantee remains at the core of the alliance, members have also sought to redefine its mission as new security challenges have emerged on Europe's periphery and beyond. At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign policy and a defense arm to improve EU member states' abilities to manage security crises, such as those that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s. The evolution of NATO and the EU, however, has generated some friction between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations. U.S.-European differences center around threat assessment, defense institutions, and military capabilities. Successive U.S. administrations and the U.S. Congress have called for enhanced European defense capabilities to enable the allies to better share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO's post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. policymakers, backed by Congress, support EU efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provided that it remains tied to NATO and does not threaten the transatlantic relationship. Most EU member states support close NATO-EU links, but also view ESDP as a means to give themselves more options for dealing with future crises, especially in cases in which the United States may be reluctant to become involved. A minority of EU countries, spearheaded by France, continue to favor a more autonomous EU defense identity. This desire has been fueled further recently by disputes with the United States over how or whether to engage international institutions, such as the United Nations, on security matters and over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving international crises. This report addresses several questions central to the debate over European security and the future of the broader transatlantic relationship. These include What are the specific security missions of NATO and the European Union, and what is the appropriate relationship between the two organizations? What types of military forces are necessary for NATO's role in collective defense, and for the EU's role in crisis management? Are NATO and EU decision-making structures and procedures appropriate and compatible to ensure that there is an adequate and timely response to emerging threats? What is the proper balance between political and military tools for defending Europe and the United States from terrorism and weapons proliferation?

Whither the Euro-Atlantic Space? Redefining Euro-Atlantic Security in a Post-Post-Cold War Era

The Ukraine conflict has exposed the fragility of both Ukrainian sovereignty and, more broadly, of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture as a whole. Western powers’ collective inability to effectively counter Russian aggression in Ukraine and along its periphery is a blow to the efficacy of the European post-Cold War era. Western retrenchment, meanwhile, only serves to effectively countenance Russian demands for spheres of influence and leaves Ukraine, as well as other periphery states such as Georgia and Moldova, isolated and vulnerable to Russian coercion. This strategy ultimately only undermines interstate norms and serves Russian neo-imperial designs. To restore the integrity of the Euro-Atlantic system, Western powers must play a more proactive role in defending periphery states’ sovereignty and revitalize predictable, realistic pathways for expansion into Euro-Atlantic structures.