VI?Kant on the Identity of Persons (original) (raw)
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Kant and the problem of self-identification
Organon - An international journal of analytic philosophy
Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless self-ascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first – exemplified in the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell – considers the features of the I think according to Wittgenstein’s approach to the I as subject while the second, exemplified by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein in order to interpret Kant’s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant’s reflection on the problem of self-identification lies right here, truly prefiguring some features of Wittgenstein’s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophical horizons.
Kant, I think, and the question of self-identification
Studi Filosofici, 2021
The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant's philosophy that are connected to the representation 'I' and the question of self-identification in self-consciousness. The subjective capacity to represent itself through the representation 'I' will be articulated on the basis of the structure the so-called de se or I-thoughts developed by Perry and Recanati. In this regard, a contrast between Longuenesse's view and my approach on self-identification and the different uses of I as subject will be considered.
Studi Kantiani , 2023
Despite the recent flurry of books or essays on Kant's supposed theory of 'the self', one may wonder whether Kant even has a concept of 'the self'. If he does, what is that concept? Does it differ from 'the I', 'the soul' or 'the mind'? If it does differ, in what ways does it differ? The paper is an attempt at answering some of these questions. I focus on Kant's use of the substantivized reflexive 'the self' ('das Selbst') and its differences, if any, from Kant's use of the substantivized first-person pronoun 'the I' ('das Ich'). I argue that Kant's use of two different terms reflects two contrasting influences. On the one hand, Kant inherits the notion of 'the self' from Locke and the empiricist tradition in psychology (therefore, Kant's term 'das Selbst'). On the other hand, he is the heir of the discussion of Descartes' Cogito argument in the rationalist tradition (therefore, Kant's 'I think' and Kant's use of the substantivized 'das Ich'). The paper defends the claim that from these two contrasting influences, Kant elaborates an original and complex notion of 'the self' or 'being self to oneself'. That notion is expressed in using 'I' as the (logical) subject in the proposition 'I think'. This explains why, in Kant's use of the expressions, the two notions, 'the self' and 'the I' converge. Neither of them is the concept of an object. Both notions refer to the subject of thinking in virtue of the fact that the subject is, in thinking, self to itself. Section 1 of the paper offers and analysis of Locke's idea of 'the self' as an ancestor of Kant's notion. Section 2 offers an analysis of Kant's notion of the self in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Section 3 analyzes Kant's contrast between the 'standing and abiding self' of transcendental apperception and the forever changing consciousness of oneself in the empirical unity of apperception. Section 4 analyzes the relation between Kant's notion of 'the self' and Kant's analysis of the proposition 'I think'. To conclude, the paper takes stock of the original features of Kant's notions of 'the self' and 'the I'.
Kant's Multiple Concepts of Person
Kant on Persons and Agency, 2018
In the Third Paralogism of Pure Reason, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant criticizes what he takes to be the rationalist derivation of the concept of a person from the mere use of "I" in "I think." I argue that Kant's criticism opens up resources for developing another concept of person: that of an embodied entity endowed with unity of apperception and the capacity for moral accountability. This is not, however, the notion of person Kant himself endorses. Rather, he claims that the notion of person that was the target of his criticism in the Third Paralogism can remain, albeit on behalf of the practical rather than theoretical use of reason. I argue that in doing so, Kant falls prey to his own paralogism, one of practical reason. In line with the concept of person (in the psychological sense) I outlined as a possible outcome of Kant's criticism of the Third Paralogism, I offer a concept of person (in the moral sense) which might count as an ancestor of the concept of a person developed by Harry Frankfurt in "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of Person" and "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love."
Philosophical Review, 2010
In “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason” Kant seeks to explain how rationalist philosophers could have arrived at the dogmatic conclusion that the self is a substance. His diagnosis has two components: first, the positing of “Transcendental Illusion”—a pervasive intellectual illusion that predisposes us to accept as sound certain unsound arguments for substantive theses about the nature of the self; second, the identification of the relevant fallacy we commit when we succumb to this illusion. This paper explains how these two elements combine to produce the doctrine that the self is a substance. It is argued that Kant has a novel, ingenious—and even somewhat plausible—account of how the rational psychologist might arrive at this view-- one that involves identifying a fundamental confusion about the nature of conceivability
Kant and Hume on Personal Identity: Its Nature and Employment.
Personal identity as a philosophical enquiry can be considered as a distinctive element within the philosophical enterprise that is indicative of philosophy of mind. As such, specific conceptions of personal identity can have different implications for the whole of one's philosophical enterprise. For instance, a specific conception of personal identity may be employed so as to function as a prior and necessary condition for-the unity of-experience, or as a necessary implication of an empiricist epistemology.
The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant's Third Paralogism
In this paper, I challenge the assumption that Kant's Third Paralogism has to do, first and foremost, with the question of personal identity. Beginning with a consideration of the treatments of the soul's personality in Christian Wolff's rational psychology, I show that, despite being influenced by Locke's novel account of personhood and confessing a dissatisfaction with the Scholastic definition of the term, Wolff maintained the agreement between his account of personality and the traditional conception. Moreover, Wolff did not put this concept to a forensic use but considered its primary application to be in the context of the demonstration of the soul's immortality which, according to him, required that after the death of the body the human soul retained its status personalitatis, understood as its distinct capacity to be conscious of its identity over time. Wolff's account of the soul's personality, and the use to which he put it, proved rather influential for metaphy-sicians like G. F. Meier and Moses Mendelssohn, and Kant's lectures in the 1770's also betray this influence. Considering the Third Paralogism in light of this context I claim that, rather than taking up the question of whether the numerical identity of the soul can be inferred from the meagre resources of the I think, what is at issue is the rational psychologist's account of how we are conscious of our numerical identity in different times. Despite disagreeing with the rational psychologist on this score, Kant nonetheless contends that the way in which we are, in fact, conscious of our numerical identity in all times qualifies us as persons and suffices for that concept's use in the proof of the soul's immortality. This reading thus makes sense of Kant's claim that the soul's personality, even with its transcendental grounding, is " necessary and sufficient for practical use, " and provides a charitable alternative to the recent allegation of a paralogism of pure practical reason on Kant's part.
Subjects of Kant's First Paralogism (2016)
According to the standard interpretation of the first paralogism, its fallacy is based on a confusion between two meanings of the term 'subject', namely that of 'thinking subject' and that of 'subject of predication'. The paper argues that this interpretation is incorrect and that Kant in fact explains the illusion of cognizing ourselves as thinking substances by a misinterpretation of a certain logico-semantical feature of the representation 'I', namely that of non-predicability. This interpretation puts the first paralogism in accord with the other paralogisms, all of which are claimed by Kant to stem from a confusion between 'logical' and 'real' features of the self. It also allows us to relate the chapter on the paralogisms to Kant's views on the connection between the ideas of pure reason and the progress towards the unconditioned in chains of prosyllogisms.
Kant's "Self" as a Being in the World
2014
According to Kant, idealism is a “scandal of philosophy”. unlike hume, Kant is not satis ed to point out that human beings are not capable of abandoning their belief in outer things in practical life. Kant aims to offer a satisfactory proof of the existence of outer things. my claim in this paper is that Kant’s de nitive proof of the existence of outer things is fundamentally connected to his new conception of the empirical self as a being in the world (Weltwesen), a conception that emerges in the second edition of the rst Critique and is fully articulated in re ections from 1788 onward. in order to make my point, i analyse the Refutation of Idealism in the Criticism of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology, the Kantian theory of inferential cognition of existences, Kant’s critical theory of the “object”, and the Refutation of Idealism from 1787 onward.
Transformation and Personal Identity in Kant
Faith and Philosophy 17, no. 4 , 2000
This paper explores how Kant’s development of the idea of the disposition in the Religion copes with problems implied by Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. Since transcendental freedom implies the power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore of absolutely beginning a series of the consequences of that state, a transcendentally free act is divorced from the preceding state of an agent, and would thus seem to be divorced from the agent’s character as well. The paper is divided into two parts. First I analyze Kant’s understanding of the disposition and discuss the ways in which it allows us to understand a person’s transcendentally free actions in terms of that person’s character. I then discuss Kant’s resources for understanding the Socratic injunction to care for the soul in light of his concept of the disposition.