Are there unconscious perceptual processes? (original) (raw)
Related papers
Brain Sciences
Although subjective conscious experience and introspection have long been considered unscientific and banned from psychology, they are indispensable in scientific practice. These terms are used in scientific contexts today; however, their meaning remains vague, and earlier objections to the distinction between conscious experience and unconscious processing, remain valid. This also applies to the distinction between conscious visual perception and unconscious visual processing. Damage to the geniculo-striate pathway or the visual cortex results in a perimetrically blind visual hemifield contralateral to the damaged hemisphere. In some cases, cerebral blindness is not absolute. Patients may still be able to guess the presence, location, shape or direction of movement of a stimulus even though they report no conscious visual experience. This “unconscious” ability was termed “blindsight”. The present paper demonstrates how the term conscious visual experience can be introduced in a log...
Consciousness of the first order in blindsight
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2010
At suprathreshold levels, detection and awareness of visual stimuli are typically synonymous in nonclinical populations. But following postgeniculate lesions, some patients may perform above chance in forced-choice detection paradigms, while reporting not to see the visual events presented within their blind field. This phenomenon, termed "blindsight," is intriguing because it demonstrates a dissociation between detection and perception. It is possible, however, for a blindsight patient to have some "feeling" of the occurrence of an event without seeing per se. This is termed blindsight type II to distinguish it from the type I, defined as discrimination capability in the total absence of any acknowledged awareness. Here we report on a well-studied patient, D.B., whose blindsight capabilities have been previously documented. We have found that D.B. is capable of detecting visual patterns defined by changes in luminance (first-order gratings) and those defined by contrast modulation of textured patterns (textured gratings; second-order stimuli) while being aware of the former but reporting no awareness of the latter. We have systematically investigated the parameters that could lead to visual awareness of the patterns and show that mechanisms underlying the subjective reports of visual awareness rely primarily on low spatial frequency, first-order spatial components of the image.
Attention without awareness in blindsight
Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 1999
The act of attending has frequently been equated with visual awareness. We examined this relationship in`blindsight'öa condition in which the latter is absent or diminished as a result of damage to the primary visual cortex. Spatially selective visual attention is demonstrated when information that stimuli are likely to appear at a speci¢c location enhances the speed or accuracy of detection of stimuli subsequently presented at that location. In a blindsight subject, we showed that attention can confer an advantage in processing stimuli presented at an attended location, without those stimuli entering consciousness. Attention could be directed both by symbolic cues in the subject's spared ¢eld of vision or cues presented in his blind ¢eld. Cues in his blind ¢eld were even e¡ective in directing his attention to a second location remote from that at which the cue was presented. These indirect cues were e¡ective whether or not they themselves elicited non-visual awareness. We concluded that the spatial selection of information by an attentional mechanism and its entry into conscious experience cannot be one and the same process.
Consciousness and modality: On the possible preserved visual consciousness in blindsight subjects
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011
In a recent paper, Brogaard (2011) presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR's preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard's argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Brogaard's argument, her argument misconstrues necessary criteria to decide whether a conscious experience is visual or not visual.
Pattern of neuronal activity associated with conscious and unconscious processing of visual signals
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1997
Following striate cortex damage in monkeys and humans there can be residual function mediated by parallel visual pathways. In humans this can sometimes be associated with a ''feeling'' that something has happened, especially with rapid movement or abrupt onset. For less transient events, discriminative performance may still be well above chance even when the subject reports no conscious awareness of the stimulus. In a previous study we examined parameters that yield good residual visual performance in the ''blind'' hemifield of a subject with unilateral damage to the primary visual cortex. With appropriate parameters we demonstrated good discriminative performance, both with and without conscious awareness of a visual event. These observations raise the possibility of imaging the brain activity generated in the ''aware'' and the ''unaware'' modes, with matched levels of discrimination performance, and hence of revealing patterns of brain activation associated with visual awareness. The intact hemifield also allows a comparison with normal vision. Here we report the results of a functional magnetic resonance imaging study on the same subject carried out under aware and unaware stimulus conditions. The results point to a shift in the pattern of activity from neocortex in the aware mode, to subcortical structures in the unaware mode. In the aware mode prestriate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (area 46) are active. In the unaware mode the superior colliculus is active, together with medial and orbital prefrontal cortical sites.
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews, 2005
Blindsight broadly refers to the paradoxical neurological condition where patients with a visual field defect due to a cortical lesion nevertheless demonstrate implicit residual visual sensitivity within their field cut. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, through a selective review of the blindsight literature we propose a new taxonomy for the subtypes of residual abilities described in blindsight. Those patients able to accurately act upon blind field stimuli (e.g. by pointing or saccading towards them) are classified as having 'action-blindsight', those whose residual functions can be said to rely to some extent upon attentive processing of blind field stimuli are classified as demonstrating 'attention-blindsight', while finally, patients who have somewhat accurate perceptual judgements for blind field stimuli despite a complete lack of any conscious percept, are classified as having 'agnosopsia'--literally meaning 'not knowing what one sees'....