The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009 (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Dutch Counterinsurgency Approach: Political and Military Lessons
2011
In the past, military defeat has led to resignations of Ministers of Defence. But in February 2010, it was the first time that a ruling party in the Netherlands, the social democrat party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), brought down the coalition government, as a protest against extending a military mission. This historical moment even inspired the Taliban to congratulate the social democrats: ‘We congratulate the Dutch for this courageous and independent decision,’ said Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi. The Taliban expressed the hope that other countries would follow the Dutch example. After four years of intensive commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the mission of around 2,000 Dutch soldiers in the Afghan province Uruzgan ended. On August 1, the last troops of Taskforce Uruzgan (TFU) transferred command to American forces. Between 2006 and 2010 The Netherlands were active as lead nation in Uruzgan. Thousands of soldiers and dozens of civilian personnel contributed significantly to ISAF. Initially, rotations of 1,200 to 1,400 soldiers would serve in Uruzgan, a figure that rose to almost 2,000. The Dutch suffered 24 fatal casualties. What exactly did the Dutch troops do in Uruzgan? How was the mission presented, which discussions were held over definitions and terminology? An what happened during these four years? Only rarely did military deployment lead to such intense discussion as did TFU, in the media as well as in politics. The Netherlands invested heavily in this operation. Many more soldiers were deployed than in previous years, and Dutch soldiers did not engage in combat so often since the Korean War. This article analyses the recent history of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, both the political-strategic and the operational and tactical aspects. First, the focus lies on the political discussion and the nature of the mission. Second, some actual TFU operations will be examined.
“Fighting” versus “Reconstructing”. Framing the Dutch mission in Afghanistan, 2006-2010
(forthcoming in George Dimitriu, Beatrice de Graaf and Jens Ringsmose - Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning domestic support for the Afghan War, February 2015). In this chapter, we offer a contribution to the growing literature on strategic narratives in analyzing the importance of a unified “frame production.” We will illustrate how contradicting, fragmented, and politicized frames exert a disruptive force on both the creation and reception of official strategic narratives.The case of the Netherlands is particularly interesting because it provides a better understanding of how strategic narratives, media frames, and public understanding (and support) are intertwined. It will become clear that the failure to produce a coherent and compelling strategic narrative straightaway contributed to the fragmentation of media frames explaining the mission to the public. A plethora of conflicting and overlapping media frames greatly affected public understanding and was one of the key elements in undermining public support for the mission.
A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2012
This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.
The Use and Abuse of 'the Dutch Approach' to Counterinsurgency
The Journal of Strategic Studies , 2013
This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.
A Gentle Occupation: Dutch Military Operations in Iraq, 2003-2005
Amsterdam University Press, 2014
This book analyses the way Dutch forces conducted military stabilization operations in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion in Iraq. It looks at why, in contrast to most allied troops elsewhere in Iraq, Dutch forces in Al Muthanna province met with little resistance and left Iraq self-confident of their ability to deal with this type of military operations. On the basis of extensive archival research and interviews, the authors examine the way the Dutch government consciously framed this mission as different from the American and British occupation and often in contrast to the actual situation on the ground. Furthermore, they unravel the widespread idea of a unique and more effective Dutch approach', by dealing with the Dutch case in detail and by subsequently examining it in the context of the Coalition Forces’ experiences. In the end, they argue that despite effective tactical reflexes by Battlegroup commanders, stability in Al Muthanna was first and foremost conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique approach by Dutch military forces.
This paper assesses the lessons learned by the Netherlands from its ISAF missions in Afghanistan, and to what extent these are transferred to the ongoing deployment to MINUSMA in Mali, assessing whether experiences from one operation can have value to the next. The limited observation from the current status of operations is that though certain lessons learned from the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan have been incorporated into the mission conceptualization in Mali, it is too early to make a complete assessment of the implementation of best practices until the complete Dutch contribution to MINUSMA is deployed. The current state of deployment suggests that the civilian component of the mission, though represented in the conceptualization of the mission, will be underrepresented in the area of operations.
070700 Dutch military power: From Screbrenica to Uruzgan
dark page in Dutch military history, is still alive. For months the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) had been deprived from rations and ammunition and was stuck in an isolated location with decreasing manpower. In preparation for the mission the commander-in-chief of the army demanded that in order to emphasise the peaceful nature of the operation, the heavy guns on the armoured vehicles were to be replaced by machineguns.
Formative Years: Military Adaptation of Dutch Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan
Special Operations Journal, 2016
Between 2005 and 2010, Dutch Special Operations Forces (SOF) carried out three missions in Afghanistan. This article analyses how they, a joint effort of the Korps Commandotroepen and the Maritime Special Operations Forces adapted to operational challenges and examines the factors driving and shaping this process. The development of Dutch Special Operations Forces is analyzed through Theo Farrell's analytical framework of military adaptation, particularly focusing on influences from politicostrategic imperatives, operational challenges, organizational culture, and new technology. Dutch Special Operations Forces successfully improved its performance by adapting to the requirements of the political and military strategic leadership, the directives of the International Security Assistance Force command, the allocation of sophisticated assets and the occurrences on the battlefield. The experience of Dutch Special Operations Forces demonstrates that highly specialized, cohesive, and relatively autonomous units can behave rather unbureaucratically, produce tactical flexibility, and adapt swiftly to operational and tactical challenges when visionary leadership and a learning culture is present.