Husserl and Heidegger on the Transcendental 'Homelessness' of Philosophy (original) (raw)
Related papers
Hegel and Phenomenology, 2019
In this paper I trace the revival of Hegel in France and Germany in the early twentieth century and point especially to the crucial role of phenomenology (both Husserl and Heidegger, as well as their students, e.g. Fink, Landgrebe and Marcuse) in incorporating Hegel into their mature transcendental philosophy. Indeed, Martin Heidegger was responsible for a significant revival of Hegel studies at the University of Freiburg, following his arrival there in 1928 as the successor to Husserl. Similarly, Husserl's student, Fink characterised Husserl's phenomenology in explicitly Hegelian terms as "the self-comprehension of the Absolute". The late Husserl seems to embrace the Hegelian vision when he presents his approach in the Crisis itself as a "teleological historical reflection".
The Origins of the Husserl-Heidegger Philosophical Dispute in Twentieth-Century Phenomenology
Maynooth philosophical papers, 2018
This paper investigates the different 'scientific' methods of enquiry that were proposed by Brentano, Dilthey, and Husserl in late nineteenth-century philosophy as background to understanding the philosophical dispute that later emerged between Husserl and Heidegger regarding the definition of phenomenology in the twentieth century. It argues that once Heidegger accepts both Dilthey's approach and hermeneutic method of enquiry into human experiences, he is unable to follow Husserl in his development of Brentano's idea of a descriptive science of consciousness and its objectivities into an eidetic science of pure intentional consciousness. 5. This is a revised and elaborated version of a paper entitled 'Different Scientific Methods in 20th Century Phenomenology' , which I first presented at a conference on 'The Idea, History, and Institutional Foundations of Science' at Maynooth University, December 9, 2017. I would like to thank my colleagues Dr Amos Edelheit for his reading and comments on the original draft and Prof. Philipp Rosemann for his reading, careful editing, and comments on the paper that have helped me greatly clarify some important points.
Husserl and the Crisis of Philosophy
Analecta Husserliana, 2006
What follows is a meditation on the crisis of philosophy as it manifests itself in the work of Edmund Husserl. If this meditation is to hold us onto the appropriate path to this crisis it has to be itself a philosophical meditation. Moreover, if philosophy is indeed in a state of crisis the meditation itself, in so far as it is philosophical, is in a state of crisis. It also means that since philosophical meditation is itself in a state of crisis, the way it holds onto the appropriate path to the crisis of philosophy is itself in a state of crisis. In so saying, we do not intend to burden Husserl's work if only because it is already burdened. His work, in so far as it is attentive to the crisis of philosophy, is itself symptomatic of this crisis. As a philosopher, he cannot but be affected by this crisis, and neither can we to the extent that we are philosophers. It is a crisis in the community of philosophers. Thus, we are a part of the crisis that is the subject of our meditation. The crisis of philosophy is the crisis of our existence. The inquiry into the crisis of philosophy, for Husserl, was an essential, if not, the essential theme of philosophy. This theme occupied him up to the time of his death and, to my knowledge, at the time of his death, he had not succeeded in fully articulating let alone rescuing philosophy from this crisis. He died the same way that Socrates died: leaving the task of philosophy unfinished. Perhaps, this is the manner in which all philosophers are destined to die. Our forerunners in philosophy have left this task unfinished not because, as individuals, they were incapable of bringing philosophy to a completion, but because it is in the very nature of philosophy to be unfinished. Just as Socrates left the task of philosophy unfinished, so did Husserl. We, too, should not have any illusion about the task ahead of us. We, too, will die with our philosophical task unfinished, and if there are others after us, they, too, will inherit the task and die in the same condition. To philosophize is to be a part of this relay race. We are called forth to play our part. Every generation must play its part, for no generation can play the part of any other generation. The fact that every generation must play its part does, not, however, mean that each generation stands in isolation from other generations. Each generation is anticipated by the previous ones, and anticipates future generations. That is, each generation remains extended into the past and into the future. The crisis of philosophy is what it is in the 439 A.-T. T ymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana XC, 439-450.
Phenomenology as Understanding of Origin: Remarks on Heidegger's First Critique of Husserl (2010)
Heidegger und Husserl im Vergleich, ed. Friederike Rese, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010
This article offers an interpretation of Heidegger's early Freiburg lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology, delivered in the winter term of 1919/20. Its purpose is twofold: First, I aim to show that Heidegger's fragmentary remarks on Husserl indeed fashion a unified and systematically distinctive critique of the basic peril of constructive grounding, which haunts Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a deep and unyielding ambivalence; next, I provide an account of the early Heidegger's central notion that in order for phenomenology to become a truly phenomenological philosophy, it must take the form of a radical understanding of origin.