Muddled mereology: A Critique of the Atomistic Fallacy of Reductionism (original) (raw)
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Some Comments on The Problem of Reductionism in Contemporary Physical Science
Zygon®, 2003
Is reductionism simply a methodology that has allowed science to progress to its current state (methodological reductionism), or does this methodology indicate something more, that the material universe is determined in full by its smallest components (ontological or causal reductionism)? Such questions lie at the heart of much of the contemporary religion-science dialogue. In this essay I suggest that the position articulated by philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan is particularly suitable for dealing with these questions. For Lonergan, the criterion of the real is simply its verified intelligibility and not its imaginability. Each of the various levels of reality, as studied in sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, and sensitive and rational psychology, consists of an intelligible integration of what on the lower level would be simply random occurrences. The things studied by the various sciences (atoms, molecules, cellular organisms, animals, human persons, and so on) are intelligible unities, and no one level is somehow more real than any other. I argue that such a scheme, while seeming somewhat counterintuitive, is best able to deal with the multilayered reality of the contemporary physical and life sciences and provide an opening to the richness of the social sciences and the achievements of human culture.
The Philosophical Forum, 2008
have developed a form of reductionism, based on advances in quantum physics that is radically different from any type of reductionism discussed by philosophers. Gell-Mann and the Santa Fe Institute have instituted a program for studying complexity and emergence. Both programs undercut presuppositions about the role of physics that are implicitly shared by both reductionists and emergentists. Yet, this work has received virtually no serious consideration from philosophers writing about these issues. Three basic reasons may be assigned for this neglect. First, the reductionist program was originally developed in highly technical papers concerned with the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics and its application to quantum cosmology. The treatment of emergence was developed through a series of specialized studies on various forms of complexity. Second, the new program focuses on structures and dynamics, rather than on entities and their properties. The study of complex adaptive systems (CAS) includes pre-biotic evolution, forest fires, butterfly patterns, human social behavior, ant colonies, the stock market, and leopard's spots, topics foreign to the traditional philosophical debates. Third, the new reductionism is solidly based on contemporary physics. Current philosophical discussions of global reductionism generally replace physics by a metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. This point requires some clarification. Philosophers commonly distinguish three different types of reductionism: epistemological, concerned with knowledge; methodological, concerned with theories; and ontological, concerned with entities. The reduction/emergence debates generally rely on presuppositions about levels. Even without any generally accepted theory of levels, there is a widespread acceptance of relative levels, for example, particles, atoms, molecules, complex molecules, organic molecules,
Understanding the new reductionism: The metaphysics of science and compositional reduction
Journal of Philosophy, 2007
The philosophical emptiness of Nagel reduction… can plainly be seen… [Thus] the antireductionism based on the unavailability of… bridge laws -most importantly, the multiple realization argument of Putnam and Fodor -is irrelevant to the real issue of… reduction… Much of the debate over the past two decades about reductionism has been carried on in terms of an inappropriate model of reduction, and now largely appears beside the point for issues of real philosophical significance. (Kim (1999), pp.12-13)
It is a largely ignored or insufficiently valued thing that the perception of qualities by the human mind in itself provides incontestable natural philosophic arguments against modern materialism based on the mechanistic, quantitative view of matter. The simple fact that in the human perception, there exist for instance green leaves, demonstrates that materialism is false. The present work aims at illustrating, based on the reality of qualities, that modern materialist reductionism is philosophically untenable. Hence, the error of materialism can be shown without reference to any higher -spiritual or ethical -viewpoints, merely on the level of natural philosophy, by that this modern view is incapable of accounting for the qualities perceived in the most casual way by humans .
Reductionism and its heuristics: Making methodological reductionism honest
Synthese, 2006
Methodological reductionists practice 'wannabe reductionism'. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as "reductionist". "Successional reduction" and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism.
On Reductionism (Draft, Philosophy, 53 pp.)
[Draft] An analysis of reductionism in connection with the unity of science. The paper is organized into two parts: the first containing a logical analysis of the concepts of reduction and emergence, in both logical and ontological terms; the second containing an examination of the plausibility of reductionism.
Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical, 2013
My arguments against Polanyi's notions of a layered ontology and dual control of entities were introduced in Margitay 2010 and defended against criticism in Margitay 2013. However, it has become clear from Lowney's and earlier comments that my presentations were not sufficiently clear. So I will explicate some points of my argument against dual control. First, I will contrast the metaphysical thesis of The Causal Closure of the Physical with the semi-empirical thesis I hold, The Completeness of Physical Theories. I have argued that Polanyi's theory of dual control involving downward determination is inconsistent with standard physics because of the completeness of physical theories. I support this claim by what I term the no difference and the completeness counterarguments. Secondly, I shall show these arguments do not involve or entail any sort of reductionism, and they do not question the ontological autonomy, the reality, and the irreducibility of higher level emergent entities and their properties.
Some metaphysical anxieties of reductionism
2007
By now it is a cliché to observe that so-called reductionism is not one mammoth doctrine. There are, as it were, many reductionisms. Needless to say, there are at least as many antireductionisms. Despite the fact that neither reductionisms nor their counterparts are single and unified doctrines, there do seem to be some family resemblances. One, it seems to me, is that both reductionisms and antireductionisms are acute responses to certain metaphysical worries.
The philosophical concept of reductionism involves breaking down a complex system into a sum of its parts and explain the workings of the system in terms of its constituents. It is an explanatory mechanism which seeks to reduce complex theories or phenomena to simpler and more fundamental theories. Under the purview of philosophy, most commonly propounded is the reductionism of all scientific theories to physical sciences, often termed as physicalism or materialism. The distinction between the various sciences is presented in the form of a hierarchy wherein social sciences occupy the topmost position. These include economics, sociology, anthropology and political sciences, with internal hierarchies of their own, followed by psychology which forms the basis of sociology as the most basic social science and is itself based on biology. Next in line are the fundamental branches sciences, biology and geology which are premised on Chemistry which in turn is based on the most fundamental science, Physics. Hence, simply put, all phenomena postulated by the special sciences (which lie above the fundamental sciences) can be explained in the vocabulary of physical sciences.
A compromise between reductionism and non-reductionism
Worldviews, science and us: philosophy and …, 2007
This paper investigates the seeming incompatibility of reductionism and nonreductionism in the context of complexity sciences. I review algorithmic information theory for this purpose. I offer two physical metaphors to form a better understanding of algorithmic complexity, and I briefly discuss its advantages, shortcomings and applications. Then, I revisit the non-reductionist approaches in philosophy of mind which are often arguments from ignorance to counter physicalism. A new approach called mild non-reductionism is proposed which reconciliates the necessities of acknowledging irreducibility found in complex systems, and maintaining physicalism.