In Defense of the Mirror Thesis (original) (raw)
Related papers
Moral Saints, Moral Monsters, and the Mirror Thesis
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
A number of philosophers have been impressed with the thought that moral saints and moral monsters—or, evil people, to put it less sensationally—“mirror” one another, in a sense to be explained. Call this the mirror thesis. The project of this paper is to cash out the metaphorical suggestion that moral saints and evil persons mirror one other and to articulate the most plausible literal version of the mirror thesis. To anticipate, the most plausible version of the mirror thesis implies that evil persons mirror moral saints insofar as the characters of each are marked by similar aretaic properties: suffering from extremely vicious character traits—in a sense to be explained—suffices for being evil whereas possessing extremely virtuous character traits similarly suffices for moral sainthood.
Evil and Moral Detachment: Further Reflections on The Mirror Thesis
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterized by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person does so by eliminating moral concerns from her character.
On the Appropriation of Evil as Cooperation with Evil's Mirror Image
Since its publication in the year 2000, M. Cathleen Kaveny's article "Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation's Mirror Image" has had a notable influence upon several scholars who appear to agree with its central argumentnamely, that the theory of cooperation with evil needs to be supplemented by a concept that Kaveny calls "appropriation. " The main point of the present article is that Kaveny misrepresents the traditional theory regarding cooperation with evil and that appropriation, as she understands it, is therefore not the mirror image of cooperation, although it is granted that Kaveny mentions cases that the traditional theory of cooperation with evil is unsuited to deal with-and that they need to be dealt with.
W. P. Franks: Explaining evil: four views
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Besides monographs (whether single-authored or co-authored) and anthologies, a third genre exists in academic publishing: the debate book. Sometimes these debate books feature two authors in debate, often with alternating chapters. More often, it seems, are debate books with four authors, each assigned a chapter in which one of the four presents a case, which the others analyze and critique, and ends with the featured author replying to those critiques. Explaining Evil: Four Views sits squarely within the debate book genre. This volume focuses on the nature of morality and the origin of human wrongdoing, with two authors (Richard Brian Davis, Paul Helm) writing from the theistic perspective (specifically, Christian). Davis presents a theistic perspective emphasizing incompatibilist libertarianism. Helm, a compatibilist theistic view. Both Davis and Helm are moral realists. The other two contributors write from an atheistic perspective (Michael Ruse and Erik Wielenberg). Ruse presents a naturalistic deflation of morality, while Wielenberg seeks to argue for a robust moral realism. The book has a nine-page introduction written by the editor, and then four chapters, running in length of 33 pages to 38 pages, with one of the four contributors as the featured author. The book ends with a four-page list of recommended readings, a bibliography, and an index. The respective chapters provide useful summaries of a theistic approach to morality (whether from a compatibilist viewpoint or incompatibilist); and two non-theistic views. One is a purely naturalistic worldview in which morality lacks the deep structure that commonsense assumes it has. The other is a G.E. Moore-like view of morality in which there are moral facts, none of which are reducible to, or identical with, or constituted by natural facts. One liability of the debate book genre is that as the number of participants increases, the fewer pages each has to develop his or her case. Depth is lost to diversity. The essays in this volume are each interesting, well done, and suggestive. Each is, however, more of a summary of a position, rather than a detailed presentation in which there is space to address in depth various objections and consequences.
Academia. Humanities and Natural Sciences, 2021
This article is a continuation of a two-part engagement with the concept of evil as it has been developed and (mis)interpreted in the history. In the first part I traced the roots and the classical meaning of the axiom of a “lesser evil”. I presented the insights of Pope Gregory the Great, of the Eighth Council of Toledo, and of Gratian which pertain to this topic, as well as the more or less implicit views of Aquinas on evil, on the object of action and on sinful yet non-culpable actions performed in accordance with the conscience. I have pointed out that this principle of lesser evil is not at all as simple as it might look, and that its original application was extremely limited. There was also a shift in word usage – from consentingly tolerating a lesser damage to engaging in choosing a lesser of (usually) two evils. In what follows, I will focus on post-Renaissance thought and consider criticism oriented toward this lesser-evil-thought from the perspective of Catholic moral theology. The numbering of the chapters follows the previous part.
A theory of evil should explain the difference between evils and wrongs. But once a theory of evil has been developed, how do we defend or refute it? The most commonly used method for doing this to provide pro-examples and counter-examples respectively. I argue that this method, by itself, is insufficient. To supplement it I argue that we should also focus on five key theoretical virtues that a theory of evil should have. These are: 1) meshing well with important theories of moral wrongdoing; 2) being based on a plausible moral psychology; 3) explaining the basis of our judgments about evil; 4) being able to alter, revise and expand our judgments about evil; and 5) being pitched at the right level of generality. In order to illustrate these virtues in depth I argue that my combination theory of evil has these five virtues to a high degree.
Academia. Humanities and natural sciences, 2021
People as moral agents are guided by moral principles, either by some intuitive and universal maxims or by culturally conditioned rules that they more or less consciously absorb and apply. While it is true that the goal of most human actions is the pursuit of meaning and good, it is also true that this good exists actually as and in a hierarchy of goods; it has to be discovered, interiorized and concretized by the very individual, and oftentimes there is more than one way to achieve it and maybe sometimes there is not any way to achieve the perfect good. Many actions are led by "gut reactions" and commonsense principles rather than serious logical evaluation, however it is within the human capacity to reflect more deeply on moral reasoning and to approach ever closely the more perfect understanding of good. Especially, it has to be reflected upon whether the greatest good is always to be done, whether some evil can be permitted in order to bring about a greater good or, even more importantly, whether evil as such can be object of a direct volitional action at all. In this paper I claim that, although intuitively and in everyday usage the notion of "lesser evil" has a certain weight, theologically speaking it is unsustainable and nonsensical and can potentially be misunderstood or even misused. Its application is quite limited, finding its place not in moral dilemmas but mostly in the realm of secular and social life. It is not a core principle of Christian ethics at all but rather a provisional way to escape immediately unresolvable situations. This is the first of two parts.