The Ways of Scepticism (Then and Now) (original) (raw)
Related papers
THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT
KRITERION (Revista de Filosofia. Publicación de: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG), 2023
It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.
Cartesian sceptical scenarios are traditionally understood as posing problems in epistemology. For example, if I cannot know I am not a brain in a vat, all empirical knowledge comes under threat. In this study, I argue that the problematic nature of Cartesian sceptical scenarios cannot be understood in epistemological terms alone; whereas both ancient and Cartesian sceptical arguments pose a global threat to empirical knowledge, the latter also pose a threat to the idea of engagement with the world. I explain this idea in terms of agency, self-constitution, social relations, and ethical life (chapter 1). In chapter 2, I argue that contemporary epistemology is by and large ill-equipped to deal with this threat, and that as a consequence it has not been given systematic treatment by contemporary philosophy. Finally, I adumbrate an alternative response, drawing on disjunctivist ideas in the philosophy of perception (chapter 3).
Ancient Scepticism And The Contra Academicos
2008
Are we ever justified in being convinced we know something and in acting accordingly? Does our happiness depend upon the possibility or impossibility of certain knowledge? Does the good life require a stable relationship to the truth or can it be had apart from this? Is the desire to apprehend truth our central concern as rational beings, the basis of our authentic existence? Is it rather an impediment to happiness, an illusory desire which we must dispel or condemn ourselves to a life of frustration and anxiety? One might simply dismiss this as a dead issue. After all, is not certainty a discredited concept in our supposedly post-philosophical era? Have not we all learned the finite and contingent character of all human discourse? Yet the signs of discomfort with these conclusions are evident in our culture as well. Certain foundations for our beliefs and actions, whether grounded in reason or the authority of revelation, can seem necessary antidotes to the pervasive loss of meanin...
The Case against Scepticism: Part 1
The meaning of life is the attainment of knowledge regarding what is true and what is false. One of the longest surviving obstacles to the discovery of knowledge is an ideology that is known as scepticism. This ideology masquerades itself under the cover of various perspectives that pretend to have nothing to do with scepticism but really affirm its' existence after the masks of these perspectives are uncovered. Before we can uncover the existence of various forms of scepticism and refute scepticism as a false ideology, we need to have a clear grasp of the meaning of this ideology. A Google search comes up with the following definition of scepticism. Scepticism: In philosophy, this is the theory that certain knowledge is impossible.1 Anyone who is committed to a true search for the nature of reality would ask the question of how it is possible for certain forms of knowledge to be unattainable. Questions naturally arise regarding the boundaries of human knowledge and the kind of evidence that could be used to prove that certain forms of knowledge are impossible to attain. Another question arises. Who are the sceptics? In this modern era, very few people who secretly adhere to scepticism are willing to accept the label of being a sceptic. As a result of this denial, they do not actively campaign against the forms of knowledge that they reject. I have a strategy for three hidden forms of this ideology to be uncovered in three separate sections and then refuted. Firstly, this strategy involves a clear knowledge of self identification regarding the human condition. As modern scepticism is a denial of the existence of certain forms of knowledge, it eventually involves a refusal to admit to the existence of certain factors that are necessary for us to obtain self identification in regard to the concept of essence which will be explained later on. The concept of essence will be used as a factor that is essential in exposing and refuting scepticism. Secondly, I will explain the three classical laws of thought and demonstrate how a clear knowledge of them is an effective means of exposing the absurdities of scepticism. In parts two and three of this argument, I will show how an awareness of both secular and theological approaches to scepticism is beneficial to our understanding of how scepticism can be defeated. Before we can make a valid challenge to the strength of scepticism as an ideology, we need an historical example of what it is. In my opinion, the scepticism that was espoused by David Hume regarding the theory of induction provides us with an example of how strong scepticism can be as an argument. I will briefly explain what inductive reasoning is first, and then give an explanation of Hume's sceptical position on it, soon afterwards. Induction is a form of reasoning which advocates the view that we can draw a conclusion regarding an
Stéphane Marchand, Le scepticisme: vivre sans opinions. Bibliothèque des philosophies
Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2019
Preview Although there are already a number of good historical introductions to ancient skepticism (in French, the classical one by Victor Brochard; in Italian, the magnificent but also ancient monograph by Mario Dal Pra; and more recently in English, those of Maria Lorenza Chiesara and Robert J. Hankinson),1 it is certainly not inappropriate to return to this attitude-it is not a school-to investigate its central figures and most relevant ideas.
The Mystery of Skepticism, 2019
It is by now well known that ancient Pyrrhonism was intended to be a way of life rather than a doctrine. Various objections to Pyrrhonism as a way of life have been raised—that it is psychologically impossible and that it makes life grind to a halt. While there are answers to those objections, I’ll argue that there are aspects of Pyrrhonism that make it nonetheless an unappealing way of life and unsuitable in modern circumstances. One crucial change from ancient times is that the Greek skeptics found themselves puzzled by disagreement, while modern philosophers have been worried by doubt. This helps to explain why skepticism is now seen as a challenge to be overcome rather than as a possible way of life. I argue, however, that a deeper understanding of the nature of doubt and its relation to knowledge will allow us to move past the current stalemate between skeptical and anti-skeptical arguments, recover a more accurate history of epistemology, and identify the best sort of epistemic lives available to us. In particular, I argue that a life lived in accordance with a Neo-Academic form of skepticism is more attractive than one guided by dogmatism.