Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market (original) (raw)
European Journal of Social Sciences
This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal con.guration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).
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