The Subjectivity of Experiential Consciousness: It's Real and It's Bodily (original) (raw)

Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2005

The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, Noë, and Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of 'bodiliness' and 'grabbiness' are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness.

A NATURAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

Communication and Cognition, 2001

ABSTRACT (first two sentences added for 2013 upload) This paper focuses on the ontology and intentionality of conscious states (what conscious states are and what they represent). It also gives a critique of reductive physicalism. Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the “physical world”, it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, conscious experiences are really how they seem.

Locating Consciousness: Why Experience Can't Be Objectified

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2019

The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Physicalists who are realists about consciousness generally assume its objectivity: experience is something identical with physical processes or properties, perhaps the intrinsic nature of the physical, or perhaps some micro-physical, neural, or emergent property. I argue that this assumption wrongly reifies consciousness; it expects to find qualitative representational content-qualia-in the physical world as characterized using such content. Instead, we should grant that conscious experience constitutes a mind-dependent, subjective, representational reality for cognitive systems such as ourselves, and that the physical world described by science is a represented objective reality. The former, since it exists only for conscious subjects, won't be found as an entity in the latter. I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the representational relation and the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behavior-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically-instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness on that basis, and suggest that a mature science of representation may eventually help explain why, perhaps as a matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon.

Experiencing Organisms. From Mineness to Subject of experience

Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, (1) to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and that (2) the phenomenological subject of experience, as it is represented in conscious experience, is the organism. While many philosophers agree that the metaphysical subject of experience is the animal, this claim is much less widespread, maybe even counterintuitive. The argument for this claim alludes to the structure of phenomenal consciousness and to recent work in cognitive science concerning the embodied character of consciousness and cognition. To illustrate the problems of current controversies, not only several recent rejections of a subject of experience are critically discussed, but also Hume's famous rejection of a subject is criticized making use of epistemological aspects from Kant's Philosophy of Mind. The final section situates the present discussion in the context of recently popular predictive coding accounts of perception and perceptual experience. Phenomenal consciousness is typically characterized in terms of 'what it is like' to be in a given mental state (Nagel 1974). For example, there is something that it is like for me to see something red, and this differs from the way it feels like for me to have a toothache. Phenomenally conscious experiences differ with respect to their quality. 1 Philosophers from different camps have attempted to explain conscious experiences solely by explaining this feature. For example, representationalists like Tye (1995) provide an explanation for the quality of seeing red in terms of surface features of the object perceived, and an explanation for the quality of feeling a toothache in terms of features of the tooth. He alludes to the alleged transparency of experience to support the notion that his explanation is exhaustive and that there is no remaining explanatory gap. Similarly, proponents of sensorimotor theories of consciousness like Noë (2004) and O'Regan and Noë (2001) provide an explanation for the quality of seeing red in terms of laws governing the contingencies between the sensorimotor capacities of the experiencing agent and the environment; such laws could be different with respect to the different 1 Some philosophers prefer to use the notion of " qualia " in this context, but since this term is more problematic than useful it will be ignored in this paper. See Dennett 1991 for a criticism of the coherence of this notion in contrast to the acceptance of the subjective impression that it feels like something to experience a sound or taste or smell. While there may be widespread disagreement about how to explain this subjective feeling, most philosophers of mind at least accept that there is something to be explained with respect to phenomenal consciousness. This minimal agreement of the majority is the starting point of this paper.

The physical nature of subjective experience and its interaction with the brain

Experience Quantum field Brain information The hard problem Subjectivity A B S T R A C T Penrose and Hameroff assert that brain computations, including quantum computations, involving hydrophobic areas of microtubules whose electron clouds go into orchestrated superpositions and reductions that lead to proto-conscious elements, or "bings" that become orchestrated into conscious experiences. Their assertion, however, like the findings of the neural correlates of consciousness, does not explain subjectivity, but rather describes necessary conditions for it. Many scientists, including Panksepp, Demasio, and Tononi, have each made great contributions to the field, but none explains how material biological processes acquire subjectivity. Yet, the fact is that subjectivity exists and is and of great importance to evolution. Penrose argues that understanding, which involves subjectivity, must be brought into physics, perhaps an undiscovered aspect. Subjectivity is always of or about certain living brain information even though most brain functions do not have subjectivity. Many quantum fields are known to exist and follow Dyson's definition: "a kind of tension or stress which can exist in empty space in the absence of matter. It reveals itself by producing forces, which act on any material objects that happen to lie in the space the field occupies." My hypothesis is that there may be undiscovered quantum fields, which unlike known fields, induce sub-jectivity when they interact with certain brain information. They emit quantum particles that exert force and cause changes to material objects (brain patterns conveying information) with which they interact. Information that transports meaning to living material exerts force through the understanding it conveys. There is a continuous interplay between experience and brain information. Experiences profoundly inform the brain and alter brain structure, function, and behavior, and local and integrated brain functions process information and initiate multiple associated experiences. Most experience is non-conscious, as discussed by Wright and others, like the soundtrack of a movie to which our brains respond continuously and emotionally even though, we are only intermittently consciously aware of it. I will explore how non-conscious experience may relate to the self, and how it might become conscious. I will offer present support and directions for testing this plausible hypothesis, as well as potential clinical applications in psychology.

Two conceptions of subjective experience

Philosophical Studies, 2010

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.

From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience

Hollows of Memory: Featuring Gregory M Nixon's Work with Commentaries & Responses – Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 2010

When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.

First-Person Investigations of Consciousness

2016

This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, which are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements may still be statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism. Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors, minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability. In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides support for a subjectivist account of variance in size experience. In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience that I seem to be looking from here. Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself. I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend.

Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge: Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience

Recalling Thomas Nagel's discussion concerning the difficulties associated with developing a scientific explanation for the nature of experience, Nagel states that current reductionist attempts fail by filtering out any basis for consciousness and thus become meaningless since they are logically compatible with its absence. In this article we call into question the fundamental philosophy of the mind-brain identity hypothesis of Cognitive Theory: 'What processes in the brain give rise to awareness?' and the associated search for 'neural correlates of consciousness' (NCC). The proper scientific manner of posing the query should simply be 'What processes give rise to awareness?'. We begin to formalize the Eccles psychon and summarize one of fourteen empirical protocols to test this putative model. This requires a new science of Unified Field, U F Mechanics, entailing in terms of our current stage of development operationally completed forms of quantum theory, gravitation and cosmology arising from a unique derivation of the M-Theory (string theoretic) vacuum. Until now the quest for psychophysical bridging has typically been in the arena between brain and quantum geometry; and many have wondered if contemporary science is sufficient for the task. Nagel further asks 'what would be left if one removed the viewpoint of the subjective observer' and then suggests 'that the remaining properties would be the physical processes themselves or states intrinsic to the experience of awareness'. We examine a new theoretical framework for introducing and experimentally testing the underlying physical cosmology of these noetic parameters.