The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics, Published in Mind (original) (raw)

Abstract Universals in Metaphysics and Semantics: A Critical Evaluation

Joseph LaPorte, Genoveva Martí and Nathan Salmon have argued that general terms, natural kind terms in particular, are semantically akin to proper names. They have singular reference, they designate individuals. The most plausible candidates for these designata are abstract universals. So the “designation theory” of general terms favours the doctrine of abstract universals. However, in this paper we argue that this preference involves serious metaphysical problems. Both contemporary doctrines of abstract universals, the Russellian and Neo-Aristotelian, suffer from the problem that they cannot give a theoretically satisfactory account of instantiation of universals by particulars. Hence we conclude that notwithstanding its theoretical appeal owing to its elegant simplicity, the designation theory of general terms ought to be reconsidered.

Metaphysics as the Science of Universal Causes

In the beginning of the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that “first philosophy” is both the most universal of all sciences, and the science of first causes. Immediately, the question arises whether the universals are the same as the first causes. I propose that the answer to this question can be deduced from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who distinguishes between three relevant senses of universal: the universal in praedicando, in causando, and in repraesentando. While it is the second, the universal cause, that is the aim of metaphysics, nonetheless the universal in predication (i.e. a concept) is necessary, for this purpose, as an element of a dialectical process – an interplay between universals and particulars – that approaches the universal in repraesentando as an unattainable limit. This latter is a universal concept that is properly possessed only by the First and most universal Cause, namely God Himself, who is “Thought thinking Itself.” To know God as far as humanly possible is, in effect, to approach a mode of knowledge that is itself Divine. Thus I demonstrate how, though not themselves the aim of metaphysics, the universals (in praedicando) play a necessary role in the science of the First Cause.

The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1981

classic tradition in first philosophy, descending from Plato and Aristotle, A and recently reaffirmed by D. M. Armstrong,' proposes two equally essential, yet mutually exclusive, categories of reality: Substances (or Particulars), which are particular and concrete, and Properties (and Relations), which are universal and abstract Material bodies are the most familiar examples of Concrete Particulars, and their characteristics, conceived of as repeatable entities common to many different objects, are paradigms of Abstract Universals. Particular being's distinguishing mark is that it is exhausted in the one embodiment, or occasion, or example. For the realm of space, this restricts particulars to a single location at any one time. Particulars thus seem to enjoy a relatively unproblematic mode of being.

What Is the Problem of Universals About?

Philosophica, 2022

The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no agreement, neither about its explanandum nor about its explanans. What is the most adequate formulation of the problem? And what kind of explanation does it require? My aim in this paper is to offer an overview of these two basic questions in the contemporary debate. I will present the four most important formulations (section 1), discuss their connections (section 2) and how the three most prominent explanantia are related to these formulations (section 3). We will see that, despite the long history of the problem, in recent years new formulations and approaches have been proposed which may open up original perspectives on its solution.

Our Knowledge of Universals A Case for Sense-Perceiving Immanent Universals

2015

universals inhere in their concrete particulars. 3 B. We can have knowledge of concrete particulars by way of sense-perception as a knowledge source. C. While sense-perceiving a concrete particular, we have a cognitive ability to directly recognize a universal inherent in a concrete particular. D. Therefore, not only do universals exist, but also we have direct knowledge (i.e., cognitive access) to a large number of them. 3 John Cook Wilson in Statement and Inference warns philosophers of the concrete and abstract distinction. "Of late years it has been customary to speak of a concrete and abstract universal. These terms are to be avoided. Concrete was originally merely opposed to abstract and should mean a particular existence. Nothing is gained by calling an existence concrete, and the term has the danger of seeming to give an explanation" (1926, p. 714). I recognize Cook's warning, however, I use "concrete" to mean ordinary objects like pots, cows, tables, chairs etc. On the other hand, the term "particular" seems to range over all kinds of entities from tropes to space & time or spacetime, instances of justice or motions or events, minds, souls, angels, God or gods, black holes, bosons, or quantum fields. Furthermore, I also recognize how relations are often thought as a particular or universal. In this work I do not touch upon sense-perceiving universal relations.

The Problem of Universals Reconsidered: Towards a Better Philosophical Understanding of Reality

Universals in this monograph are examined in their original medieval context. From this context the ontological and metaphysical status of universals are re-examined. Idea(l)s, symbols, and objects or matter were reckoned as absolutes or hypostases exclusive or preeminent of one another. This thesis supplies an alternative solution to the problem of universals in which all three elements mentioned above are rendered into a unified philosophical system with axioms, methods, and goals. Church, State, and Academia are denied as the source of authority regarding universals. The veritable efficacy of reality is asserted as the basis all epistemological and metaphysical claims and upon which all reliance should be placed.

The problem of universals in contemporary philosophy

Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior, 2010

The three-day conference opened in the afternoon of July, 5 and, after taking a quick look at the programme and the names of the important thinkers standing out on it, one could have expected to find a crowded audience room. Actually that was not quite the case.