Relation and object in Plato's approach to knowledge (original) (raw)
Theory of Knowledge According to Plato
Knowledge in its general sense being understood as an ultimate truth in its totality not merely dressed by definition. But then how can we know "Knowledge" or even argue on it without being defined? Philosophy is a surge for truth(Knowledge) and he who clime the ladder to surge he is not only seeker of the truth, but becomes the lover of truth. this paper will aim at critical philosophical investigation on the concept of truth and clarifying it with the notion of Perception according to Plato.
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018
Several contemporary epistemologists have been intrigued by the discussion of the distinction between knowledge and correct opinion in Plato’s Meno (97a–98b); a number of them have suggested that Plato is appealing to the idea that to know a proposition one must be ‘safe from error’ regarding that proposition. In fact, although there is evidence that Plato assumes that knowledge requires something like safety, this passage in the Meno imposes a different requirement on knowledge—namely, what Robert Nozick called ‘adherence’, the requirement that knowledge must resiliently ‘adhere’ to the truth. Adherence is much more controversial than safety, but it seems that Plato accepted both, and it is argued that he was right to do so. Both adherence and safety can be understood in a ‘contextualist’ manner, but it seems that Plato rejects contextualism in favor of understanding both conditions in their most demanding form.
The Development of Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Philosophy
Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, 2015
The aim of this paper is to examine how the Greek motto γνῶθι σεαυτόν plays a central role in Plato's philosophy in order to show how ethics and knowledge go hand in hand in his model of παιδεία. The question of self-knowledge is a practical and theoretical task in life which is developed implicitly in his dialogues, it is for this reason that i examine some passages of the Charmides, Alcibiades I, Phaedo and Republic in order to show how Plato discovers the human interiority (Phaedo) and how self-knowledge is refined and articulated with the tripartition of the soul in the Republic.
Plato and the Classical Theory of Knowledge
Folia Philosophica, 2019
In the paper the notion of the classical theory of knowledge is analyzed with reference to its source – the philosophy of Plato. A point of departure for the analysis is the characteristic of the classical theory of knowledge by Jan Woleński in his book "Epistemologia", (but it can be also found in the works of other researchers devoted to epistemology). His statements about Plato are weighted in the context of Plato's thought. The dialogues "Apology", "Gorgias", "Meno", the fragment, of the "Republic", "Theaetetus", "Timaeus" and the testimonies about the so-called agrapha dogmata are especially taken into consideration.
Plato, Hermeneutics and Knowledge
trópos: RIVISTA DI ERMENEUTICA E CRITICA FILOSOFICA, 2017
The dialogue “Theaetetus” has once again become famous due to discussion on the concept ‘knowledge’ in analytic philosophy. In my paper, I provide a novel interpretation of this dialogue and demonstrate how it can be applied for a specification of hermeneutics. For this, I revisit this dialogue and argue, against the dominant view, that Plato achieves a positive result concerning the concept of knowledge. I show that this kind of knowledge can be interpreted as a special kind of ‘practical knowledge’ and used for the reconstruction of a hermeneutic tradition à la Dilthey. I then demonstrate the main characteristics of this kind of knowledge analysing the relationship between the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief ’ and between the concepts ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’, and challenging the standard definition of knowledge as a true justified belief from the hermeneutic perspective. One methodological implication of my paper may be to challenge the dominant and sometimes eliminative projects assuming that all knowledge can be somehow reduced to propositional knowledge.
Plato on Knowledge in the 'Theaetetus'
This article introduces Plato's dialogue the Theaetetus (section 1), and briefly summarises its plot (section 2). Two leading interpretations of the dialogue, the Unitarian and Revisionist readings, are contrasted in section 3. Sections 4 to 8 explain and discuss the main arguments of the chief divisions of the dialogue. Section 9 provides some afterthoughts about the dialogue as a whole. One of the most challenging issues in this dialogue, as in all Platonic dialogues, is the comparison with Plato's other writings, and especially the understanding of its chronological and theoretical placement within the corpus of Plato's works. Alongside the numerous significant themes present in the dialogue, there are bibliographical references to the extensive secondary literature on the Theaetetus. These references will point to the most important and recent studies.
2005
Paper presented to the SAGP at its 2005 meeting with the Central Division o f the APA Socrates and Plato do not speak or write in one voice about wisdom, yet their altogether unique theorizing about it represents the focal point of the West's first philosophy, philosophia as the "love of wisdom." Significantly, then, Plato's differing notions and wordings for wisdom throughout his dialogues must be continually revisited and reexamined. Tentatively, I adopt Gilbert Owen's wording and senses of "univocal" and "equivocal," which he used in relation to Aristotle's philosophy, only as a heuristic guide, to inquire into Plato's own 'equivocal' senses of wisdom.1 Because Plato has no 'univocal' or single-minded sense of wisdom, it is critical to revisit certain claims and assumptions about his contrasting and complementary usage of terms, their meanings, and importance for his overall theory of wisdom. By so doing, his philosophy emerges in clearer sight. By this analysis, some of these claims are re-evaluated and overturned. Of particular interest are those views that have been formerly accepted as developing or changing from Plato's Republic to the Laws regarding the kind of wisdom, hence also the philosophy necessary to guide the State. My interpretation diverges at key junctures from some of the standard interpretations of the meaning and significance of these changes. First, we can agree that clear differences are to be found between Plato's depiction of philosophical wisdom and the philosopher rulers in the Republic and in the Laws. By way of preliminary background for these changes, Plato's depiction of the kind of philosophic wisdom necessary for political leadership, at the same time, also reflects the underlying nature, constitution, and values of their different forms of political society and government. As a result of these Platonic interconnections, Plato's description of the nature of political society, and his characterization of philosophers as political leaders contain further reason and evidence for his making novel developments in the theory of wisdom between the Republic and the Laws. Instead of dividing and breaking away from theories in earlier dialogues, Plato's final views actually serve to advance, broaden, and perhaps unify his overall conception of wisdom and philosophy.
Plato on aporia and self-knowledge
Ancient Models of Mind: Studies in Human and Divine Rationality, 2010
This essay discusses Plato's conception of self-knowledge, technical knowledge, and ethical knowledge in the Charmides. It also analyzes the difference between "expert" and "elenctic" knowledge (deductive vs. aporetic) in the early Platonic dialogues. It argues that Plato also presented a kind of knowledge that differs from these other kinds of knowledge: self-knowledge. This is not elenctic, ethical, or technical knowledge. I also discuss Plato's conception of aporia.
Recovering Plato: A Platonic Virtue Epistemology
Logos & Episteme, 2014
Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new tack and examine a virtue epistemological account grounded in Platonic thought. Taking seriously the distinction between knowledge and opinion found in The Republic, I then draw upon two virtues, humility and, what I call, sincerity, to flesh out this account
A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN PLATO & ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY
*Mahfuza Zannat, **Zhang Longhai, ***Sanjida Forkan , Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, 2020
The paper mainly focused on discovering how Plato and Aristotle's experience differ when both of them dealt with same concepts, such as, body and form, social-political system etc. The immutable point is they both purposed to quest truth. Implying comparative method, the research has been carried out. In 367 B.C.EAristotle took part in Plato's Academy in Athens as a student, where he came to be known as Plato's one of the best students being distinguished himself from Plato's view, eventually he became a mentor himself. Philosophically, Aristotle's research is more pragmatic than Plato, focusing on nature and real world. Plato's experience of 'artistic golden age' has made him more envisioned toward an 'ideal world' and being influenced by his father Aristotle prioritizes a philosophy depending upon rational world. The present study has discovered a comparison and contrast between two cornerstones of philosophy. Albeit Plato was Aristotle's mentor, we notice a number of prominent differences between their ideologies. Being Plato's favourite pupil in Academy, Aristotle has deliberately represented his own views. It seems both these ancient philosophers have put some efforts to enlighten the modern society approaching that two people with different moral perspectives still might be good to each other. Taking considering both of their ethics when one is materialistic, other is idealistic, the study accentuates that if pragmatically things can be done in accordance of Aristotle, Plato's 'ideal world' cannot be placed together because human world cannot be isolated from imperfection.
1996
and relative, ib. 170; how far connected with happiness, ib. 173; must decide a question, Laches 184; knowledge and cour age, ib. 193, 197; Protag. 360; source of true, Phaedr. 247 ; know ledge and success, Euthyd. 281; — knowledge and goods, ibid. ; must use as well as make, ib. 289; the food of the soul, Protag. 313; more valuable than food, ib. 314; peril of buying, ibid. ; highest of hu man things, ib. 352 ; source of true -^pleasure and good, ib. 356 foil.; of the good implies knowledge of the bad, Ion 531, 532 (cp. Rep. 1. 334); o f recollection, Meno 81; necessary to right actions, ib. 97 ; knowledge and true opinion, ib. 96-98; true knowledge, Apol. 29 (cp. Wisdom) ; knowledge and rhe toric, Phaedr. 262; = power of division and composition, Phil. 17; pleasures of, ib. 52 ; parts of, ib. 55 ; absolute, Parm. 134; of ideas, ib. 136 foil.; = the sciences, Theaet. 146; = perception, ib. 15 1; know ledge and perception, ib. 184 ; con sists in reasoning about sensations, ib....
The Platonic corpus uses the word ἀλήθεια or ‘truth’ to denote not only that fundamental intellectual element we employ to piece together Plato’s thought and work but also, invariably and inseparably, a particular reality that guides us towards a ‘way of life’: something for men and women who strive, from one moment to the next, to become whole as human beings by immersing themselves in truth, living by truth and for it, and defending truth against guile and deceit. To argue this central idea, and to enable the reader to appreciate both the historical context in which Plato’s thought evolved and the innovative nature of his approach to ἀλήθεια at the time in which he lived, the present study begins with a review of the general importance attri- buted to the word in the beginnings of the Greek world and with observations on changes in its meaning during that period of history leading up to Plato’s lifetime in the fourth century BCE. This will help us understand the manner in which Pl...
Wisdom-Knowledge-Belief. The Problem of Demarcation in Plato's "Phaedo"
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia. Supplementary Volume. English Edition 2013
The aim of the present paper is to show how Plato suggested demarcating between knowledge and other kinds of human intellectual activities. The article proposes to distinguish between two ways of such a demarcation. The first, called ‘the external demarcation’, takes place when one differentiates between knowledge and non-knowledge, the rational and non-rational or the reasonable and non-reasonable. The second, called ‘internal’, marks the difference within knowledge itself and could be illustrated by the difference between the so called hard and soft sciences. The analyses lead to the following conclusions. Plato refers to the whole of human intellectual activity as doxa, which is divided into two spheres. The first of them is knowledge proper whose criterion is phronesis. Three other kinds of doxa are derived from knowledge proper: 1) the traditional peri phuseos investigation (called also sophia); 2) popular doxai concerning virtues; 3) wisdom of the antilogikoi. The difference represents the external demarcation. There may be, however, a difference in the scope of knowledge proper (the internal demarcation). If the peri phuseos investigators were able to explain the field of values, the result of their investigation could be acknowledged as knowledge, although it would still be characterized as inferior due to its being based on senses. What is interesting about knowledge proper is that it is not firm and reliable but only hypothetical. It does not determine the skeptical reading of the Phaedo but it indicates that Plato has just begun his own philosophical project (which is still in progress) and the knowledge presented in the dialogue is his first positive suggestion how to solve the problem of demarcation.
The Relationship of Idea and Particulars in Plato: Episteme versus Doxa
The Relationship of Idea and Particulars in Plato: Episteme versus Doxa
In this study, the epistemological approach of Plato is examined through his distinction between episteme and doxa. In this investigation, it is aimed to explain the theory of ideas, which is the concept that whenever a scholar studies on Plato, and their relations with the particulars. In our research, without ignoring the role and the place of the theory of ideas, we tried to understand the concept of doxa in his epistemology. In Theaitetos, which is one of his later dialogues. Plato attempted to answer the question of what knowledge is without using the theory of ideas. By using these data, we could say that Plato shows us what knowledge is not rather than what it is..
The Epistemic Competencies of Plato's Philosopher-Rulers
Eirene: Graeca et Latina, 2021
It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters.
Introduction to the Study of Plato
Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2022
This chapter offers a guide to reading Plato’s dialogues, including an overview of his corpus. We recommend first considering each dialogue as its own unified work, before considering how it relates to the others. In general, the dialogues explore ideas and arguments, rather than presenting parts of a comprehensive philosophical system that settles on final answers. The arc of a dialogue frequently depends on who the individual interlocutors are. We argue that the traditional division of the corpus (into Socratic, middle, late stages) is useful, regardless of whether it is a chronological division. Our overview of the corpus gives special attention to the Republic, since it interweaves so many of his key ideas, even if nearly all of them receive longer treatments in other dialogues. Although Plato recognized the limits inherent in written (as opposed to spoken) philosophy, he devoted his life to producing these works, which are clearly meant to help us seek the deepest truths. Little can be learned from reports of Plato’s oral teaching or the letters attributed to him. Understanding the dialogues on their own terms is what offers the greatest reward.
Man, Paradox, Myth: Plato's Philosophical Pedagogy
Plato’s main pedagogical task is to convey Socrates’ knowledge of virtue (arētē) to others, for he embodied the truth that “the good life, the beautiful life, and the just life are the same” (Crito 48b7). A difficulty immediately presents itself, however, for Socrates’ conception of virtue was paradoxical: he claimed that it was a form of knowledge but that it could not be taught. This paper argues that Plato overcomes this challenge, effectively “teaching” the un-teachable, by creating the “myth of Socrates.” The knowledge of virtue is not a craft (technē), but rather a harmony of word and deed (phronēsis). Through the dialogues, Plato develops the story or myth (muthos) of Socrates’ virtuous life. The myth of Socrates is a mimetic representation of a moral exemplar, in which the student recognizes himself and the knowledge of virtue always already contained in his soul (anamnēsis). This knowledge is transformed into deeds through mimetic participation. The paper closes by making gestures towards the pedagogical strategy of the Republic, as well as its condemnation of mimetic poetry, in light of the analysis of the myth of Socrates. As much of the interpretation of Plato drawn upon in the analysis is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s, the paper can also be read as a condensation of many of his hermeneutical insights, drawn together through the myth motif.