Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (original) (raw)
Related papers
Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland
Political Studies, 2001
While much attention has been devoted to political efforts to solve the Northern Ireland problem, less attention has been given to the role of political violence in sustaining the conflict. In this paper, we argue that one of the reasons for the intractability of the conflict is widespread exposure to political violence among the civil population. By 1998, thirty years after the conflict started, one in seven of the population reported being a victim of violence; one in five had a family member killed or injured; and one in four had been caught up in an explosion. Such widespread exposure to violence exists alongside latent support for paramilitarism among a significant minority of both communities. Using 1998 survey data, we show that exposure to violence serves to enhance public support for paramilitary groups, as well as to reduce support for the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. Overall, the results suggest that only a lengthy period without political violence will undermine support for paramilitarism and result in the decommissioning of weapons.
See No Evil, Hear No Evil'. Insidious Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland
British Journal of Criminology, 2002
Northern Ireland has been variously described as having an 'imperfect peace' in which 'acceptable levels of violence' persist. Despite the endorsement of the main political parties to the principles of 'democracy and non-violence' enshrined in the Belfast Agreement, an insidious and brutalizing form of paramilitary violence continues within communities. The government has opted to 'see no evil, hear no evil' given what is at stake in the wider political process. According to this approach, one must accept certain violent excesses in the interest of moving forward politically. This, however, creates both conceptual and practical problems around the issue of violence in Northern Ireland. By conceding that paramilitaries 'police' the informal criminal justice system in their areas with political and, in most cases, legal impunity, the government, de facto, defines what is 'an acceptable level of violence'. This paper considers the nature and extent of ongoing paramilitary violence, how it has become enmeshed in the negotiated settlement and the consequences of this politicization of violence. Northern Ireland is synonymous with the word violence, having the unenviable record of some 3,600 deaths as a direct result of the political conflict since 1969. 1 Its worst terrorist atrocity, the Omagh bomb (15 August 1998), in which 29 people died and 220 were injured came only months after referenda in which the people of Ireland (north and south) endorsed the outcome of the multi-party talks on a political settlement. The republican and loyalist ceasefires , the Belfast Agreement and devolved government in Stormont have created circumstances where sectarian killings and bombings are declining. In 1999, for example, seven civilians were murdered, the lowest figure since the 'troubles' began, and the first year ever that no security force personnel were killed (RUC statistics: Northern Ireland Office 2000). Northern Ireland is, tentatively, in a period of transition to a post-conflict era. Such confidence in the new political and constitutional dispensation was buoyed up by statements from Gerry Adams who said 'Sinn Féin believes the violence we have seen must be for all of us now a thing of the past, over with and gone' (Sinn Féin statement, 1 September 1998). Whilst this did not amount to Unionist demands for a declaration that 'the war is over' or show any remorse 164
Since the advent of the Good Friday peace agreement, violence associated with dissident Irish Republican groups continues to present major security challenges. While there has not been a tragedy on the scale of the 1998 Omagh bombing, the level of violent dissident Republican (VDR) activity has risen steadily in frequency since then, and in 2010 reached unprecedented levels. This article presents findings from the VDR Project at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University. The research is based on the extensive identification, collection, and analysis of open source material examining the nature and extent of VDR activity from 1997 to 2010. The project analyses data on VDR activity across this period as well as the individuals taking part in these violent events. The data suggests that while originally recruitment was predominantly southern based it is now more focused on Northern Ireland. Analysis of the data also indicates that the VDR leadership continues to recruit individuals with skill-sets to serve the movement's aims.
War Without End: IRA and Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland.
2000
Paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland has increased dramatically in the wake of the 1994 cease-fires, and is increasingly threatening to destabilise the peace process. Yet despite the long history of vigilantism in Northern Ireland and the unprecedented attention the activity is now attracting, virtually no empirical research has been carried out on the topic. This paper reports findings from a study made of 213 IRA and 132 loyalist vigilante incidents which occurred between 1994 and 1996. The aim of the study was to provide hitherto unavailable demographic information on the vigilantism. Results also show that there are clear differences between IRA and loyalist vigilantism and that the nature of vigilantism is changing over time. The main conclusion is that there is a worrying lack of even basic knowledge about the vigilantism at a time when its importance is increasing dramatically. The findings are discussed in relation to the current situation in Northern Ireland.
Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2018
This article analyses how social movements and collective actors can affect political and social transformation in a structurally violent society using the case study of Northern Ireland. We focus, in particular, on the crucial role played by collective actors within the loyalist community (those who wish to maintain Northern Ireland's place in the UK), in bringing about social and political transformation in a society blighted by direct, cultural, and structural violence both during the conflict and subsequent peace process. Drawing on data obtained through in-depth interviews with loyalist activists (including former paramilitaries), the article demonstrates the role and impact of loyalists and loyalism in Northern Ireland's transition. We identify five conflict transformation challenges addressed by loyalist actors in a structurally violent society: de-mythologizing the conflict; stopping direct violence; resisting pressure to maintain the use of violence; development of robust activist identity; and the measurement of progress through reference to the parallel conflict transformation journey of their former republican enemies. The Northern Ireland case demonstrates the necessity for holistic conflict transformation strategies which attempt not only to stop direct attacks, but also the cultural and structural violence which underpin and legitimize them. In so doing, the article contributes to a broader understanding of how and why paramilitary campaigns are brought to an end.
War without end: Comparing IRA and loyalist vigilantism in Northern Ireland
The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 2000
Abstract: Paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland has increased dramatically in the wake of the 1994 cease-fires, and is increasingly threatening to destabilise the peace process. Yet despite the long history of vigilantism in Northern Ireland and the unprecedented attention ...
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2009
This article explores the Ulster Volunteer Force's (UVF) decision in May 2007 to abandon its campaign of “armed resistance” and pursue “a non-military, civilianized, role” in Northern Ireland. It does so by analyzing the UVF's actions in light of the academic literature on strategic terrorism. The central argument advanced in the article is that the UVF's decision to put its weapons “beyond reach” and re-structure its organization along civilian lines is (a) internally consistent with its stated policy of countering “violent nationalism,” (b) symptomatic of the transformation in the sociopolitical context since the 1994 paramilitary cease-fires, and (c) the logical outworking of the group's lack of popular legitimacy among its core Protestant working-class support-base. The article concludes with an assessment of the risks and possible dividends that the end of UVF terrorism holds for the Northern Ireland peace process.