Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy edited by Rebecca Kukla (original) (raw)
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The conclusion of the deduction of taste in the dialectic of the power of judgment aesthetic in Kant
v. 36 n. 2, 2013
In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible.
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant introduces the notion of the reflective judgment and the a priori principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature. He claims that the ability to judge objects by means of this principle underlies empirical concept acquisition and it is therefore necessary for cognition in general. In addition, he suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of taste. Kant's account of this connection has been criticized by several commentators for the reason that it leads to the 'everythingisbeautiful' problem. In this paper I argue, contrary to these objections, that both finding an object beautiful and acquiring the concept represent the satisfaction of the same principle of nature's purposiveness, which refers to the same cogni-tive need we have, that is, to systematize experience. I avoid the 'everything is beautiful' problem by arguing that aesthetic reflection refers to the synthesis of object's individual and distinctive properties, while logical reflection refers to the synthesis of object's general properties that it shares with other objects of its kind. Because aesthetic purposiveness is different from logical purposiveness, this allows for the possibility that we can have an object of cognition, without finding this object beautiful.
Revista de Estudios Kantianos, 2024
While in the “Analytic of the Beautiful” of the third Critique Kant establishes an unequivocal distinction between aesthetic and cognitive judgments, in the context of the theory of Genius we find new elements that will enable us to discuss such antagonism between both type of judgments. As a matter of fact, Kant defines genius as the one possessing the “vivifying principle in the mind” which—by setting our cognitive faculties in motion—succeeds in exhibiting certain intuitive representations called “aesthetic ideas”. The latter are intuitions of the imagination that give much to think about, but against which no particular thought seems adequate. In this sense, after analyzing the four moments of the pure judgment of taste, we will develop the notion of “aesthetic idea” within the framework of the Kantian theory of genius, drawing on the most recent interpretations of the subject. Ultimately, we will attempt to show that—although judgments of taste are not cognitive judgments—the third Critique presents important elements in order to evaluate to what extent aesthetic judgments contribute to cognition.
Kant and the Problem of Judgments of Taste
1998
Kant holds that when we judge a thing beautiful, we do so on no other basis than our pleasure in the contemplation of it, while at the same time, we presume to judge with validity for everyone. To explain how this is possible is the task of what he calls the critique of taste. Such a task has three main parts. The first is to describe and analyze the essential characteristics of judgments of this kind. The second is to identify the state of mind from which such judgments take rise, this being, according to Kant, a state of harmonious free play between the cognitive faculties. The third part is the “deduction,” or proof of our right to make judgments of taste. I argue that Kant is unsuccessful in the second and third parts of this task. The main interest of his critical effort, I find, lies in his descriptive and analytical account of judgments of taste, specifically in his attempt to comprehend both their subjective character and their claim to universal validity. The first of these he understands as consisting in the judgment’s being based in feeling; the universality claim he understands as a normative requirement. I argue that no interpretation can be faithful to these basic tenets of Kant’s analysis without also accepting his conclusion that the act of judging in some sense “precedes” the very feeling of pleasure on which it is said to be based. I attempt to make sense of this conclusion in terms of the peculiar kind of consciousness of pleasure involved in such a judgment.
The third critique by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, entitled Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), is divided into two books, one about teleological judgment and the other about aesthetic judgment. The aesthetic judgment is the faculty of judging with the ability to subsume the particular under the universal, and in turn, subsume the universal under the concept of nature where it is possible to know it. However this faculty is not given in all the objects of reality but only in the fine art objects. In order for the cognoscent subject to know the concept of taste and through it, to the metaphysical nature is given an aesthetic process in mind which is possible to vivify through the work of art. In my reading, an epistemic view at the metaphysical-aesthetic process allows us to understand the knowledge in three aspects, i) What is the sensitive knowledge that is given through the aesthetic judgment, ii) How it works among the epistemic framework of apriorism and finally, iii) An epistemic view at the aesthetic judgments. For this, the article is composed by three parts, the reconstruction of the judgment of taste and the knowledge of the sensus communis, aspects to be taken into account when understanding the judgment [of taste] as aesthetic knowledge and its relationship with theoretical and practical knowledge, and finally, an epistemic view at aesthetic judgment.
Trans/Form/Ação, 2013
In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible.
Aesthetic Normativity in Kant’s Account: A Regulative Model
Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, 2020
The notion of normativity has been key to an actualizing reading of the subjective universality that for Kant characterizes the aesthetic judgment. However, in the scholarly literature little discussion is made, somehow unsurprisingly, of what exactly we should understand by normativity when it comes to Kant’s aesthetics. Recent trends show indeed the tendency to take normativity very broadly to the point of nuancing most of its core meaning. Based on how we speak about normativity in aesthetics, we seem indeed to have accepted that every kind of evaluative process is normative. I will argue that the sentimentalist elements of Kant's account call for a revision of its normative interpretations, for a better framing of its subjective universalism, and finally for a reconsideration of aesthetic normativity in favour of regulativity.
Kant’s Aesthetics: Overview and Recent Literature
Philosophy Compass 4/3, Blackwell, pp. 380-406, 2009
In 1764, Kant published his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and in 1790 his influential third Critique, the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The latter contains two parts, the ‘Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment’ and the ‘Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment’. They reveal a new principle, namely the a priori principle of purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) of our power of judgment, and thereby offer new a priori grounds for beauty and biology within the framework of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. They also unite the previous two Critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. Besides contributing to general and systematic aspects within his transcendental philosophy, Kant’s aesthetics also offers new insights into old problems. It deals with feeling versus experience, subjectivity versus objectivity, disinterested pleasure, aesthetic universality, free and adherent beauty, the sensus communis, genius, aesthetic ideas, beauty as the symbol of morality, beauty of nature versus beauty of art, the sublime, and the supersensible. In this article I will limit myself to this critical aesthetics of Kant. But I will also discuss the ugly and the possibility of beauty in mathematics and see whether Kant’s theory can successfully explain or deal with them. I will also compare his theory with philosophical ideas from a very different tradition, namely from Confucius, not only as a challenge to Kant’s theory, but also because there is a growing interest from the Chinese side in combining ideas from Confucius and Kant, an interest that might well become influential in both East and West during the 21st century.