The commodification of violence in the Niger Delta (original) (raw)
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Oil: Niger Delta and The Making of Militia Capitalists: a theoretical assessment
As democracy returns to Nigeria in the late 1990s, novel forms of militia agitations and struggle re-emerged and took a different turn which deepened in the decade. The paper is a theoretical and descriptive analysis set within the period 1999 to 2014 which conceptualizes the post amnesty Niger Delta leaders operating within the State orbit as militia capitalists to differentiate them from the brand of struggle instituted by Isaac Boro in 1966 and environmental activism of Ken Saro Wiwa in the early 1990s .A shared historical memory of Boro and Saro Wiwa is built to define, mediate, and construct an ideological leaning at variance with contemporary militia in the region. The aim is to demonstrate the strategies adopted by the militia capitalists and understand how and why such proclivities as resource capitalism may not chart the much expected collective and equitable transformation of the impoverished Niger Delta rather results to inequality, economic empowerment of the few in the guise of militancy and disempowerment of the majority,leading to a more glaring parody best alluded to as resource militia capitalism. Urgent policy intervention is sought to redress this development gap.
2011
This article examines how multinational corporations, recognizing the symbolic value of oil pipelines, flow stations, and platforms as ancestral promises of wealth to subject populations, work with NGOs and communities (sometimes in collaboration with the latter, but sometimes in a more adversarial manner) in setting up governance structures that often compete with, and sometimes oppose, the state in struggles over territorial control and resource extraction. These forms of contestations, it argues, create new sites of power in which NGOs aid multinational oil corporations in negotiating new sites of governance that in themselves create new structures of power.
Militancy in the Niger Delta and the Deepening Crisis of the Oil Economy in Nigeria
Africa Development, 2013
The area known as the Niger Delta spans over 70,000 square kilometers. At the geographical and ecological levels, it is regarded as one of the foremost wetlands in the world, and rated as the ninth vastest drainage area in the world. In 1957, when oil was discovered at Oloibiri in today’s Balyelsa State of Nigeria, the British enacted the Mineral Ordinance Act which vested all the minerals in Nigeria in the British Crown. This Act paved the way for the continued denial that has characterized the relationship between the oil-bearing communities and the central government of Nigeria, leading to the Resource Control agitation by the peoples of the Niger Delta. This article argues that the Nigerian state, true to its colonial origins tightened its grip on the instruments with which to allocate profitable opportunities in the burgeoning oil economy of Nigeria at the expense of the oil-bearing communities. This condition has led to complaints, agitations, and finally to militancy whi...
Revisiting 'Militancy': Examining Niger Delta
This paper tells the stories based on empirical evidence in Niger delta. It reveals the process and structure of the conflict which started from the rights to self-determination and resource control by 'militant groups' in that region. We examine the narratives around this aspect in the words of dominant elites and 'militia activists', to argue that 'militia actions' that appear to challenge the legitimacy and authority of the Nigerian state over control of natural resource (Oil), is embedded in complex web and porous boundary of informal and formal interactions with politicians and 'military' leaders. These provided the opportunity for the elites to maintain their control over oil and for some 'militia leaders' to bargain and negotiate with the authority often motivated by self-interest.
Imperial oil: the anatomy of a Nigerian oil insurgency
Erdkunde, 2008
Alternative non-Persian Gulf sources of oil-supply are central to American geostrategic interests in the period since 2001. Vice President Cheney's National Energy Strategy Report in 2001 bemoaned a dependency on foreign powers that "do not have America's interests at heart". Africa has emerged as one of the major new sources of US oil and gas supply. If Africa is not as well endowed in hydrocarbons (both oil and gas) as the Persian Gulf states, the West African Gulf of Guinea has nonetheless become the subject of fierce competition by energy companies over the continent's copious reserves of natural gas and its sweet light oil. IHS Energy-one of the oil industry's major consulting companies-expects African oil production, especially along the Atlantic littoral, to attract huge exploration investment contributing over 30% of world liquid hydrocarbon production by 2010. Over the last five years when new oilfield discoveries were a scarce commodity, Africa contributed one in every four barrels of new petroleum discovered outside of Northern America. This article addresses the new scramble for Africa in the context of a new conjuncture of global forces: military neoliberalism and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). I lay out the broad landscape of oil production on the continent and the extent to which, in the wake of a catastrophic two decades of neoliberal structural adjustment, investment in oil and gas dominates direct foreign investment in Africa. I then turn to the specific case of Nigeria-the most important producer of oil and gas on the continent and the petro-state of most geostrategic concern to the US-and use it as an exemplar of the failure of oil-based development. Central to this analysis is the emergence of new forms of armed insurgency in the oil producing Niger Delta that has rendered the entire area virtually ungovernable, increasingly so since the emergence in late 2005 of a new armed group MEND (the Movement for the Emancipation of the Nigeria Delta). I conclude with an account of the dynamics of this ungovernability-a pattern replicated throughout the Gulf of Guinea-and how this instability feeds into an American imperial vision to militarize the region. Zusammenfassung: Imperial Oil: Anatomie eines nigerianischen Öl-Aufstandes. Seit 2001 sind Ölquellen, die nicht am Persischen Golf gelegen sind, von zentraler Bedeutung für die US-amerikanischen geostrategischen Interessen. In seiner 2001 vorgelegten National Energy Strategy bedauerte Vizepräsident Cheney die Abhängigkeit der USA von anderen Staaten, denen "nicht die US-amerikanischen Interessen am Herzen liegen". Afrika ist inzwischen eine der wichtigsten neuen Quellen für US-Öl and Gas. Auch wenn Afrika nicht mit so viel Kohlenwasserstoffenergieträgern (sowohl Öl als auch Gas) ausgestattet ist wie die Staaten am Persischen Golf, so ist doch der westafrikanische Golf von Guinea zum Objekt des harten Wettbewerbs zwischen Energiefirmen geworden, die dort um die Kontrolle über die reichlichen Reserven an Gas und Öl ringen. IHS Energy-eine der wichtigsten Beratungsfirmen der Ölindustrie-erwartet, dass für die afrikanische Ölproduktion, insbesondere entlang der Afrikanischen Küste, riesige Investitionen für die Erforschung neuer Quellen getätigt werden, so dass bis zum Jahr 2010 30% der weltweiten Öl-und Gasproduktion aus diesen Ländern kommen werden. In den letzten fünf Jahren waren neu entdeckte Ölfelder ein seltenes Gut. Dennoch kamen von vier Barrels außerhalb von Nordamerika neu entdeckten Öls jeweils einer aus Afrika. Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit diesem neuen Kampf um Afrika im Kontext von einer Reihe von globalen Tendenzen: Militärischer Neoliberalismus und der "War on Terror" bildeten den Hintergrund für die Ölproduktion auf diesem Kontinent. Zugleich dominieren, nach zwei katastrophalen Jahrzehnten von neoliberalen Strukturanpassungsprogrammen, Investitionen im Bereich Öl und Gas die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen in Afrika. Danach wende ich mich dem spezifischen Fall von Nigeria zu-dem wichtigsten afrikanischen Produzenten von Öl und Gas und dem Ölstaat, der in den Mittelpunkt US-amerikanischer geostrategischer Besorgnis gerückt ist. Ich zeige am Beispiel von Nigeria das Versagen einer auf Öl gegründeten Entwicklungsstrategie auf. Von zentraler Bedeutung für diese Analyse ist dabei das Erscheinen von neuen Formen bewaffneter Aufstände im ölproduzierenden Nigerdelta, das die ganze Gegend praktisch unregierbar gemacht hat, und dies in zunehmendem Maße seit dem Auftreten einer neuen bewaffneten Gruppe, der MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Nigeria Delta). Abschließend betrachte ich die Dynamiken dieser Unregierbarkeit-einem Muster, das sich am Golf von Guinea mehrfach wiederholt-und erkläre wie diese Instabilität in eine US-amerikanische imperiale Vision passt, die vorsieht, die Region zu militarisieren.
Resurgence in the Niger Delta and the Discourse of Terrorism in Nigeria
Studies have shown how over-dependent Nigeria has been on the proceeds from oil thus making oil and gas the lifeblood of the nation's revenue, economy and national survival. Hence, there exists a clear awareness between government and citizens that whatever happens to oil production can have immense effects on the country's economy. To this, militant groups' activities in the Niger Delta region has become a growing concern for both scholars and policy makers. Against this background, it has been noted that while there have been an avalanche of studies on the Niger Delta crisis, most have mainly described this phenomenon from the perspective of 'agitation for self-determination', 'pirate activities', 'insurgency', 'armed rebellion', 'militancy' among others. But considering the motives, targets and methods employed by these groups, in addition to the resurgence of threatening attacks in the region after notable era of relative peace, this study therefore tries to establish compelling arguments on why the Niger Delta crisis can further be understood from the perspective of 'terrorism' largely due to the fact that the eventual employment of violent means in bring home their demands is nothing short of an instrumental technique of political violence. Additionally, considering the nature of a return to violent attacks by the armed groups, brings to mind, how the armed groups have consciously adopted violence as a prolific mechanism for policy change and achieving their goals. Introduction A critical appraisal of the level and dimensions of insecurity in Nigeria tells a compelling story of an increase over time, which constitutes serious threat to lives and properties, hinders business activities and discourages local and foreign investors, all which consequently stifles and retards Nigeria's socioeconomic development (Ewetan and Urhie, 2014). This rising wave of insecurity has not abated but has assumed a dangerous dimension which even threatens the corporate existence of the country as one geographical entity. Amidst the deteriorating security situation in the country, Nigeria is also confronted with daunting developmental challenges which pose serious threat to socioeconomic development of the country. These developmental challenges have for so long been identified as, high rate of unemployment, inadequate physical and social infrastructure, debilitating youth unemployment, unstable and deteriorating exchange rate, high inflation rate, low industrial output, endemic rural and urban poverty, very large domestic debt, and rising stock of external debt among others. Again, on the economy discourse of Nigeria, so many studies have shown how over-dependent Nigeria has been on the proceeds from the oil industry thus making oil and gas the lifeblood of the nation's revenues, economy and national survival (Ikelegbe, 2005; UNDP, 2006; Orogun, 2010). To this extent, oil is central to the development of Nigeria and constitutes the backbone of the economy. In the early 1990's petroleum production accounted for 25% of GDP, oil exports accounted for over 95% of its total export earnings, and about 75% of government revenue. Petroleum production in fact provides the only immediate hope for the development of the rest of the economy. With this therefore, there is a huge tendency that whatever happens to oil production can have immense effects on the Nigerian economy at large. More so, armed groups' activities in the Niger Delta region has become a growing concern for the Nigerian economy. Since the work of Dike (1956) and Ikime (1969) there have been an avalanche of studies on the Niger Delta region. Among these numerous works, scholars have discussed the activities in the Niger Delta region in different perspectives. For instance, it has been discussed as generally restive, with pockets of insurrection and armed rebellion, Ikelegbe (2005); agitation for self-determination, Ukiwo (2007); mere insurgency, Ukiwo (2007) among others. But considering the methods of operation of the armed groups, which includes kidnapping and hostage taking (with over 200 foreign nationals as victims), blowing/shutting down of oil installations and facilities, setting off of car bombs, and illegal oil bunkering (estimated at between 80,000 and 300, 000 bbl/day) (Nwogwugwu, Alao and Egwuonwu, 2012), it is therefore important to expand our thought on this phenomenon. Additionally, considering the nature of a return to violent attacks by the armed groups after a significant period of relative peace, it is therefore worthy to bear in mind that the Niger Delta armed groups have consciously adopted violence as a veritable instrument for policy change and achieving their goals. It is our aim in this work therefore, to expand the scope of terrorism discourse so as to accommodate some other dimensions such as 'economic terrorism', which we would thereby later critically situate the Niger Delta armed groups' activities and as on the discuss the concept activities of the Niger Delta Militant groups from the perspective of terrorism (since the goal of their activities is simply to draw public and government attention)
This paper studies the oil-violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into consideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource-specific and non-resource-specific causal factors. With regard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political-institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the "oil era." Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, secondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity. systematischer Berücksichtigung von innerstaatlichen und internationalen Kontextfaktoren. Durch die Fallstudie, deren Schwerpunkt auf der Erklärung des Anstiegs der Gewalt seit der zweiten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre liegt, wird ein differenziertes Zusammenspiel von ressourcenspezifischen und nicht-ressourcenspezifischen Erklärungsvariablen untermauert. Die Befunde ergeben erstens, dass zentrale Kontextbedingungen, die zur Gewalt geführt haben -kulturelle Cleavages politisch-institutionelle sowie sozioökonomische Defizite -, bereits vor Beginn der Erdölförderung in Nigeria virulent waren. Erdöl hat das Risiko gewaltsamer Konflikte zweitens durch eine tiefgreifende Verzerrung der Wirtschaftsstruktur indirekt weiter erhöht. Darüber hinaus hat drittens der Übergang zur Demokratie (1999) die Gewaltmöglichkeiten in zweifacher Hinsicht erhöht: auf der einen Seite durch ein Nachlassen politischer Repression, auf der anderen Seite durch die Ausbreitung bewaffneter Gruppierungen, die zunächst von korrupten Politikern herangezogen worden sind. Letzteres hat zur Folge, dass die Gewalt im Nigerdelta verstärkt den Dynamiken einer Ökonomie der Gewalt gehorcht: Dabei trägt die Beteiligung von Sicherheitskräften, Politikern und (internationalen) Geschäftsleuten an illegalem Ölhandel dazu bei die Perpetuierung gewaltsamer Konflikte auf niedrigem Gewaltniveau zu erklären.
Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social …, 2010
. The prevailing precarious situation is examined to ascertain the potency of democracy and its influence in ameliorating the conflict trajectory in this resource rich region. Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions; what are the socio-economic and political factors that account for arms proliferation in Nigeria's Niger Delta? Are there effects, either positive or negative, of arms proliferation on local conditions and the oilbearing communities? How can the situation be improved? What are the civilian government's policy prescriptions to improve the dangerous politico-military situations in the oil delta? Thus, the central argument of this paper is that it is the failure of the social contract (in general and of arms in particular) on the part of the Nigerian government that leads to the challenge, by the people of Niger Delta, of the state's legitimacy and its monopoly of the instruments of violence. The paper concludes by stating that since violence and arms proliferation in the Niger Delta are consequences of the breakdown of the social contract, then the solutions lie in reconstituting the social contract by addressing the root causes of the grievances of the oil-bearing communities.