The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, Chapter 4 (original) (raw)
This chapter deals with weak epistemic accounts of self-knowledge. It starts with Christopher Peacocke's rational internalism, which claims that the simple conscious occurrence of first-order mental states grounds and rationalises one's psychological self-ascriptions. The account is found either circular or unsuited to confer a genuinely rationalising role to the self-ascribed states. Tyler Burge's rational externalism is then scrutinised and the instability of its central notion of " entitlement " is noted. Gareth Evans's so-called " transparency method " is then considered, whereby in order to get knowledge of our own beliefs, we have to direct our gaze outward. One, more epistemically oriented development of this view (due to Jordi Fernández) is criticised mainly for claiming that the evidence which justifies one's belief in P would also justify one's self-ascription of that belief. Another, deliberative development (due to Richard Moran) is found wanting mainly because it identifies first-personal self-knowledge solely with the ability to deliberate and make up one's mind.
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