The hard problem of 'educational neuroscience' (original) (raw)
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Transdisciplinary epistemological foundations of education and neuroscience
sophia, 2019
Abstract The emergence process of the new area of knowledge, product of the convergence between the fields of neuroscience and education, is still in its consolidation stage. At this point of disciplinary evolution, it is essential to define a multidimensional framework for creation of knowledge, in order to support the consilience between the academic fields involved. In this paper, a critical review of the literature associated with the epistemological questions is carried out, which underlies the attempt of communication between disciplines, providing a theoretical framework that starts from basic epistemic questions, to finally base the synergy between the sciences of education and the brain sciences. In the set of reviewed literature, the state of terminological undefinedness of the area referred to as “educational neuroscience”, “neuroeducation”, or “mind, brain and education” emerged explicitly. This inconsistency in the nomenclature is correlated in the epistemological ambiguity of the different proposals, as well as the need to overcome unidirectional models of communication. In conclusion, this type of relational model, located in the interdisciplinary framework, could be demanding an evolution towards a transdisciplinary approach: with the establishment of an effective bi-directionality that incorporates professionals and educational researchers as active agents in knowledge construction processes of this new field.
The Philosophical Framework for Understanding Neuroscientific Research
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2013
New tools and methods for investigating the brain have given neuroscientists a chance to examine the working brain and placed neuroscience as the central discipline in cognitive science. My main goal in this article is to examine theoretical and philosophical assumptions on which different understandings and interpretations of neuroscientific research are based and to show why philosophical reflection on neuroscience is needed. I first discuss different roles philosophy potentially plays in cognitive science. After a short presentation of Descartes' position concerning the mind body problem and cognitive science approaches to answer his challenge, I examine different theoretical frameworks for neuroscientific research.
Neuroscience and Education: A Philosophical Appraisal (Routledge, 2016)
This volume makes a philosophical contribution to the application of neuroscience in education. It frames neuroscience research in novel ways around educational conceptualizing and practices, while also taking a critical look at conceptual problems in neuroeducation and at the economic reasons driving the mind-brain education movement. It offers alternative approaches for situating neuroscience in educational research and practice, including non-reductionist models drawing from Dewey and phenomenological philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. The volume gathers together an international bevy of leading philosophers of education who are in a unique position to contribute conceptually rich and theoretically framed insight on these new developments. The essays form an emerging dialogue to be used within philosophy of education as well as neuroeducation, educational psychology, teacher education and curriculum studies.
Can the Differences Between Education and Neuroscience be Overcome by Mind, Brain, and Education
Mind, Brain, and Education, 2009
ABSTRACT— The new field of Mind, Brain, and Education (MBE)—sometimes called educational neuroscience—is posited as a mediator between neuroscience and education. Several foundational concerns, however, can be raised about this emerging field. The differences between neuroscience and education are many, including differences in their histories, philosophies, and epistemologies. Historically, science and education have demonstrated separate, but interwoven, influences on society; philosophically, the values by which they operate are often in opposition; and epistemologically, the fields have relied on different conceptualizations of knowledge. Discussion about these differences has been largely absent in attempts to promote MBE. Two steps are proposed to respond to this omission. First, encouraging discussion about disciplinary differences and assumptions may enable better understanding between disciplines and facilitate the establishment of a more collaborative research community. Second, a transdisciplinary framework that focuses on salient issues of interest across disciplines should be considered. Transdisciplinarity aims for the creation of an inclusive research environment that transcends traditional disciplinary approaches to complex problems. This article initiates an exploration of disciplinary differences and proposes commitment to transdisciplinarity as a guiding principle that may increase the viability of MBE as a mediating field between neuroscience and education.
The Philosophy of Neuroscience
Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly "local." Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest ways that "naturalistic" programs might develop in detail, beyond the abstract philosophical considerations in their favor. The literature distinguishes "philosophy of neuroscience" and "neurophilosophy." The former concerns foundational issues within the neurosciences. The latter concerns application of neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions. Exploring various concepts of representation employed in neuroscientific theories is an example of the former. Examining implications of neurological syndromes for the concept of a unified self is an example of the latter. In this entry, we will assume this distinction and discuss examples of both.
Philosophy and Neurosciences: Perspectives for Interaction
RUDN Journal of Philosophy, 2023
The study analyzes modern reductivist and antireductivist approaches to understanding the interaction between philosophy and neuroscience. It analyzes the content and grounds for using the concepts of neuroscience and neurosciences, philosophy of neuroscience, and neurophilosophy. The milestones in the development of neuroreductivism, from Patricia Churchland's arguments in support of intertheoretic reduction through Francis Crick's eliminativism to John Bickle's ruthless reductionism, are described. The ontological, methodological, and epistemic grounds for the reduction to neurosciences of other ways of representing mind and body are analyzed. Drawing on the post-Wittgensteinian paradigm of the philosophy of neuroscience of Max Bennett, Peter Hacker, and Andrew Reynolds, the semantic problems that arise in the neurosciences when epistemic reduction is attempted are described and derive from the inability to eliminate the basic metaphorical level of meaningmaking and transmission rooted in everyday language and its figures, among which metaphors are fundamental. The descriptivist approach to the language of neurosciences is contrasted with neurorevisionism, an attempt to "correct" established ways of conceptualizing consciousness and corporeality, akin to earlier revisionisms, particularly physicalism, and forced to deal with similar problems. Reduction-the operation of the "return," itself understood metaphorically-and antireduction, which resists scientific revisionism and "returns" understanding to the level of everyday language and philosophy to descriptive work, is presented as a circular hermeneutical movement necessary for scientific and philosophical understanding, but not leading to disciplinary hegemony or the "victory" of either side. The study concludes with a sketch of the publications included in the rubric.
The philosophy and neuroscience movement
Mind, 2007
A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about thirty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained to deal with. After sketching the history of the movement, we explore the relationships between neuroscience and philosophy and introduce some of the specific issues that have arisen.
Philosophy of Education 2013, 2013
Recent research in neuroscience has a seductive appeal for quick applications to many everyday phenomena. 1 This research has also attracted educational entrepreneurs, who often create commercial programs that turn neuroscience into classroom practice. 2 Phrases such as "brain-based education" give them an air of respectability and authority, enticing educators to adopt them. However, basic brain research is often superficially understood, and thus translated too quickly into educational practices. 3 The large gap between neuroscience and practice is ignored too often by entrepreneurs selling their programs. They often end up making inflated claims about neuroscience's direct benefits in day-to-day teaching practices. Problematizing this is a good public service for philosophy of education.
Philosophy and the Brain Sciences
Iris, 2009
What are the differences between philosophy and science, or between the methods of philosophy and the methods of science? Unlike some philosophers we do not find philosophy and the methods of philosophy to be sui generis. Science, and in particular neuroscience, has much to tell us about the nature of the world and the concepts that we must use to understand and explain it. Yet science cannot function well without reflective analysis of the concepts, methods, and practices that constitute it. For example, experimental methods and their resulting empirical data are essential for understanding the world, yet such data is not a-conceptual. Understanding how and what theoretical assumptions, conceptual assumptions, and practical knowledge guide the use of experimental methods is relevant to understanding the results of that use. In this way, philosophy -whether done by philosophers or scientists -has a role to play in understanding the world. Neuroscience is typically individualistic in focus; nonetheless, the mechanisms of learning and linguistic ability that some neuroscientists study also have a role to play in understanding communication. Philosophy cannot offer adequate understanding, even conceptual clarity, in isolation from empirical investigation. Yet, this does not require that science or scientific concepts will replace or reduce philosophical concepts, let alone those of ordinary language. 4 For example, neuroscience, as a science, raises all of the problems about explanation, evidence, role of experiment, discovery of mechanisms, etc. that all sciences have. That is, the basic issues in philosophy of science may be raised specifically about neuroscience. In fact, we will argue that much of the debate about the relation of neuroscience to philosophy of mind depends upon how one views philosophy. see, e.g., many of the articles in P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, and R. Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, Pittsburgh: University of