Ideology, property, and groundwater resources (original) (raw)
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Journal of Political Ecology, 2018
Theories of ownership have long focussed on the institutions governing resource stocks such as land, and largely neglected the ownership of resource flows such as the crops that flow from that land. Originating among early modern legal scholars, the assumption that the paradigm form of ownership was of land has been inherited by later theorists. The 'tragedy of the commons' thesis, for example, conflates the absence of stock ownership with the absence of flow ownership, and several commons scholars have now started to move away from a stock-centric conception of ownership. The same assumption has also been inherited by theorists applying Heinsohn and Steiger's 'property economics' to theories of degrowth. Here, I recast their theory to include ownership of flows as well as stocks, answering critics who point out that their theory cannot account for unsecured debts. This recasting places greater focus on the different ways in which ownership institutions not only assign an owner to a resource, but also motivate the transfer of resources between individuals. This prompts a new way to frame a key question for theorists of degrowth: in a nongrowing economy where fewer transfers can be motivated by the likelihood of receiving returns on loans, will this result in more possessive behaviours, in more communal ownership norms of reciprocity, or in more command ownership through coercion and status? Existing theory, focussed on stocks, groups these different institutions together as 'private' or 'nonproperty' ownership. This article suggests that disambiguation of the different 'nonproperty' institutions that govern the ownership and transfer of resource flows is key to better understanding the political and institutional implications of degrowth. Depuis longtemps, les théories de la possession ont été centrées sur les institutions régissant les stocks de ressources telles que la terre, et ont largement négligé la possession des flux de ressources tels que les récoltes qui en découlent. D'origine parmi les premiers juristes modernes, la supposition que le paradigme de la possession était la possession de la terre a été héritée par les théoriciens qui ont suivi. La thèse de la «tragédie des biens communs», par exemple, confond l'absence de la possession des stocks avec l'absence de possession des flux, et maintenant plusieurs chercheurs des biens communs ont commencé à s'éloigner d'une conception stock-centrique de la possession. La même supposition a également été héritée par des théoriciens appliquant «l'economie de la propriété» de Heinsohn et Steiger aux théories de la décroissance. Ici, je reformule leur théorie pour inclure la propriété des flux ainsi que des stocks, en répondant aux critiques qui font remarquer que leur théorie ne peut pas prendre en compte les dettes non garanties. Cette reformulation met davantage l'accent sur les différentes manières dont les institutions de possession attribuent non seulement un possesseur à une ressource, mais motivent également le transfert de ressources entre individus. Ceci suggère une nouvelle façon de poser une question clé pour les théoriciens de la décroissance: dans une économie qui ne croît pas, où moins de transferts peuvent être motivés par la probabilité de recevoir des rendements sur des prêts, cela entraînera-t-il des comportements plus possessifs, des normes de réciprocité relatives à la possession communale, ou plus de possession de commande par la coercition et le statut? La théorie actuelle, axée sur les stocks, regroupe ces différentes institutions en tant que «privés» ou «non propriétaires». Cet article suggère que la désambiguïsation des différentes institutions de «non-propriété» qui régissent la possession et le transfert des flux de ressources est essentielle pour mieux comprendre les implications politiques et institutionnelles de la décroissance. Las teorías sobre la posesión se han centrado durante mucho tiempo en las instituciones que gobiernan las recursos stock, como la tierra, y han descuidado en gran medida la posesión de los flujos de recursos, como la cosecha que fluye de esa tierra. Originada entre los primeros eruditos legales modernos, la suposición de que la forma paradigmática de posesión era de la tierra ha sido heredada por teóricos posteriores. La tesis de la 'tragedia de los bienes comunes', por ejemplo, confund la ausencia de posesión de stocks con la ausencia de posesión de flujo, y ahora varios investigadores de los bienes comune han comenzado a alejarse de una concepción de posesión centrada en stocks. La misma suposición también ha sido heredada por los teóricos que aplican la "economía de la propiedad" de Heinsohn y Steiger a las teorías del decrecimiento. Aquí, reformulo su teoría para incluir la propiedad de los flujos así como las stocks, respondiendo a los críticos que señalan que su teoría no puede explicar las préstamos no aseguradas. Esta reformulación pone mayor énfasis en las diferentes maneras en que las instituciones de posesión no solo asignan un propietario a un recurso, sino que también motivan la transferencia de recursos entre individuos. Esto genera una nueva forma de formular una pregunta clave para los teóricos del decrecimiento: en una economía que no está en crecimiento, donde menos transferencias pueden ser motivadas por la probabilidad de recibir rendimientos de los préstamos, ¿esto resultará en comportamientos más posesivos, en normas de propiedad más comunitarias de reciprocidad, o más propiedad del mando a través de la compulción y el status? La teoría actual, centrada en las acciones, agrupa a estas diferentes instituciones como propiedad 'privada' o 'no propiedad'. Este artículo sugiere que la desambiguación de las diferentes instituciones 'no privadas' que gobiernan la posesión y la transferencia de flujos de recursos es clave para comprender mejor las implicaciones políticas e institucionales del decrecimiento.
Earth, property, territory: the birth of an economic concept of land
2019
I could not have written this thesis without the encouragement and continuous support of a number of people and institutions. First, I would like to thank the Economics and Social Sciences Research Council, whose generous financial assistance allowed me to pursue this research full-time and for four full years. I want to offer my sincere thanks also to the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick for having provided a favourable material and intellectual environment, as well as numerous occasions for additional training. I am also grateful to those members of the Department, both staff and students, with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss and exchange ideas over the past four years. Amongst these, a very special mention must go to my partner and fellow PhD candidate at Warwick, Clementina Gentile Fusillo. Without her unfailing willingness to engage with my research, and to share in the work of thinking through the various intellectual difficulties it has presented, the task of bringing this thesis together would have been vastly more daunting. Moreover, had it not been for her tireless material and emotional support during the phases of work, this task would have been immeasurably more difficult. Further special thanks go to my mother, Amanda, for her loving care and her excellent food, and to my father, Guy, for his inexhaustible patience in reading successive chapter drafts-always at very short notice-and for his valuable suggestions for improvement. My deepest gratitude, however, is reserved for my supervisors, Professors Matthew Watson and Stuart Elden, for the generosity they have displayed in making available their expertise and their time. Their support has extended beyond the careful guidance, the invaluable advice, the flawless responsiveness and the kindness one would expect from excellent supervisors. Over the last four years, in fact, Matthew and Stuart have never left me without the feeling that my wellbeing, as a student and as a person, was always the greatest of their concerns. I sincerely hope to have deserved their trust, their encouragement, and their exceptional thoughtfulness. iv Declaration This thesis is entirely my own work and no portion of it has been submitted for a degree at another university.
Natural Resource Availability and Social Change
Sociological Inquiry, 1986
Environmental sociology is founded on the assumption that the natural resource base of a society establishes the limits or constraints within which that society must operate. Thus, a change in the resource base on which a society depends will necessitate changes or adaptations within that society. This study attempts to empirically test these assumptions by looking at the effects of groundwater availability in the Great Plains of the United States from 1940 to 1980. Using a model derived from human ecology theory, it was found that irrigation development had major implications on nonmetropolitan counties during the time period studied. Irrigation development resulted in increased agricultural production, variations in the structure of farm enterprises, and in increased retention of both farm and nonfarm populations.
Despite the static image of formal common pool resource institutions (CPRIs), interest communities always attempted to adapt their institutional framework to their particular needs and interests. The hypothesis of Ensminger, that formal and informal institutional environments were steered by the interplay of external socioeconomic factors, ideology and bargaining power, will be tested by a comparative analysis of three regions within the North Sea area, namely the Campine, within the Low Countries, the Brecklands in England and the Geest area in Schleswig Holstein. Due to this scope, we will advance that especially the distribution of power was vital for the evolution of one specific aspect of CPRIs, namely accessibility. Only communities with relatively balanced distributions of power could retain an inclusive access regime throughout the early modern period, while polarised societies evolved towards more restrictive access to the common wastelands. * Email: Maika.dekeyzer@ua.ac.be 517 518 M AÏ K A D E K E Y Z E R institutions, manipulated these same institutions to serve their changing needs remains to be questioned. According to the classical neo-institutionalist Douglas North, institutions, as embodying the rules of the game in a society, structured the incentives involved in human exchange through formal rules and informal constraints . On the other hand, Ensminger claimed that individuals try to shape institutions to their own ends by committing resources to bring about changes in institutional environments . Through the interplay of external socioeconomic factors and evolutions in relative prices, different interest communities would alter the institutions regulating their commons, based on their particular ideology, bargaining power and economic interests. The transformation of the institutions does not, however, always follow the path towards the highest efficiency or economic rationality, but rather evolves according to the needs of those interest groups with the most bargaining power and resources necessary to subsidise the, often costly, campaigns to change institutions . This point of view has been supported by Tobias Haller, who has undertaken extensive research into the floodplains of Zambia. He found that due to commercialisation, monetarisation, the introduction of new technologies and immigration, the old institutions were put under serious strain. As a result, completely new institutions were created, retaining only a minor unchanged basis to justify the continuity of their existence. 'The original content and purpose has been erased completely'. Haller did, however, stress that some particular institutional rules, more specifically the ones favouring those with more bargaining power, remained virtually intact, even though they were not the most rational or sustainable (Haller, 2007: 22). For historical CPRIs, 1 the same issues and questions arise. According to José Miguel Lana Berasain, the very design of the normative structure of the communal organisation could be understood as a point of equilibrium in a complex process of interaction with the natural environment and the powers that subtracted surplus value. The formation of CPR institutions therefore enshrined these disparities while legitimising them .
Land Use Policy, 2001
This paper forms the introduction to a special issue of Land Use Policy based upon a selection of papers presented at the`Using and Shaping the Landa symposium that took place at the conference`Nature, Society and History: Long-Term Dynamics of Social Metabolisma in autumn 1999 in Vienna. This introductory paper o!ers a framework and an analysis of the following questions: What is the relationship between land-use and social metabolism * i.e., socio-economic material and energy #ows? How may speci"c environmental transformations be apprehended, and what have been the dynamics of change over the long haul? Lastly, how does land-use and land-cover change, as identi"ed in the papers, relate to global change? The paper o!ers an ecumenical view of land use change, and points towards a broader framework for analysis.
Introduction: How Can Property Be Political?
Oklahoma law review, 1997
Although the goal of protecting the natural environment has gained increasing importance over the last generation, in recent years it has faced a number of serious challenges, not the least of which is the charge that it is inconsistent with respect for private property rights. At the federal, state, and local levels, advocates for the environment and defenders of property rights have contended with each other in courts, in legislatures, before agencies, and in the arena of public opinion. Thus, the conflict between environment and property has emerged as one of the thorniest political issues of the day, one which is national in scope, but which has immediate meaning for every community. It was with this conflict in mind that legal scholars and practitioners, academics from a range of disciplines, and members of the public came together at the University of Oklahoma on April 26, 1997 for a symposium on Environmental Protection and the Politics of Property Rights. Sponsored by OU's Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Environment program, the gathering provided a forum for exploring society's efforts to negotiate the proper boundary between private rights and public control over important features of the environment. Three invited speakers were heard: Andrew Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel of the California Water Resources Control Board, presented an overview of the takings implications of the famous Mono Lake case; James L. Huffman, Dean of the Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College, offered a defense of private property rights in environmental values; and John D. Echeverria, General Counsel of the National Audubon Society, gave an analysis of the present state of the political battle between environmental advocates and the property rights movement. To provide an interdisciplinary outlook, comments were provided by members of the University of Oklahoma faculty representing three different approaches to the conference topic: Drew Kershen, of the College of Law, showed how the presentations raised legal issues that are also at work in Oklahoma cases; Baxter
Reconstructing the Duty of Water: A Study of Emergent Norms in Sociohydrology
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 2013
This paper assesses the changing norms of water use known as the duty of water. It is a case study in historical socio-hydrology, or more precisely the history of socio-hydrologic ideas, a line of research that is useful for interpreting and anticipating changing social values with respect to water. The duty of water is currently defined as the amount of water reasonably required to irrigate a substantial crop with careful management and without waste on a given tract of land. The historical section of the paper traces this concept back to late 18th century analysis of steam engine efficiencies for mine dewatering in Britain. A half-century later, British irrigation engineers fundamentally altered the concept of duty to plan large-scale canal irrigation systems in northern India at an average duty of 218 acres per cubic foot per second (cfs). They justified this extensive irrigation standard (i.e., low water application rate over large areas) with a suite of social values that linked famine prevention with revenue generation and territorial control. The duty of water concept in this context articulated a form of political power, as did related irrigation engineering concepts such as “command” and “regime.” Several decades later irrigation engineers in the western US adapted the duty of water concept to a different socio-hydrologic system and norms, using it to establish minimum standards for private water rights appropriation (e.g., only 40 to 80 acres per cfs). While both concepts of duty addressed socio-economic values associated with irrigation, the western US linked duty with justifications for, and limits of, water ownership. The final sections show that while the duty of water concept has been eclipsed in practice by other measures, standards, and values of water use efficiency, it has continuing relevance for examining ethical duties and for anticipating, if not predicting, emerging social values with respect to water.