Learning From Others? Emulation and Change in the Italian Armed Forces Since 2001 (original) (raw)
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How does military change take place in states that are not able to develop autonomous solutions? How does transformation occur when limited resources are available? What are the “sources of military change” for armed forces that do not possess the (cognitive and material) resources that are essential for autonomous development? In articulating an answer to these questions, this article draws from the theoretical debate on interorganizational learning and looks at the mechanisms that drive “learning from others.” We argue that adaptation and organizational learning often had to look for, and then try and adapt, off-the-shelf solutions that required relatively more limited resources. Empirically, the article focuses on the Italian Armed Forces, which have rarely attracted scholarly attention, although it emerged from almost total lack of activity in the Cold War to extended deployments in the 2000s.
The Transformation of Italian Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective Adapt, Improvise, Overcome?
European armed forces have undergone deep changes in the past two decades. Given the breadth of the debate and the size of transformations that took place, it is somewhat surprising that relatively few academic studies have directly dealt with changes in force structure of European militaries, and the Italian armed forces in particular. The focus of this book is the organizational dimension of the restructuring of armed forces through 3 different lenses: doctrine and strategic framework, budget and resource allocation, and force structure and deployment. The key issues addressed relate to how these factors interact in shaping transformation. Of particular interest is the theme of learning, which is how armed forces endogenize change in the short and long run. This study provides valuable insights into the extent to which armed forces manage to adapt to the emerging strategic and operational challenges they have to face and to illustrate the weight of institutional legacies, resource constraints and inter-organizational learning in shaping transformation. Focusing on the Italian case in comparative perspective and based on a large variety of military operations from airstrikes to peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, the book provides an innovative viewpoint on military transformation and significantly contributes to our understanding of contemporary security that is deeply shaped by the lessons learnt in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq and Libya.
Military Transformation, Past and Present (2007). Chapter 1
2 military transformations past and present organizations are flawed, so there has been little coherent thought about the organizational and operational implications of new weapons technologies. 4 This book is written for two very different audiences. First, the officers and civilians who make important decisions now or who may make them soon. Second, the members of the military policy analysis community who try to define and solve problems for the civilians and officers. The latter group is often wrong, because they search for infallible solutions amid unavailable, hidden, ambiguous, and imperfect information, and competing goals and preferences. Physicist John R. Pierce warned against this search for infallibility-a constant in the national security community-when he noted, "Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems."
Military Transformation Past and Present [Chapter 1]
2 military transformations past and present organizations are flawed, so there has been little coherent thought about the organizational and operational implications of new weapons technologies. 4 This book is written for two very different audiences. First, the officers and civilians who make important decisions now or who may make them soon. Second, the members of the military policy analysis community who try to define and solve problems for the civilians and officers. The latter group is often wrong, because they search for infallible solutions amid unavailable, hidden, ambiguous, and imperfect information, and competing goals and preferences. Physicist John R. Pierce warned against this search for infallibility-a constant in the national security community-when he noted, "Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems." My intent in this book is to show these two audiences that while there is no infallible method to achieve innovation, the prospects for successfully implementing innovation in the Department of Defense (DoD) may be enhanced. I shall do so by examining, comparing, and analyzing how previous large-scale changes in military capability-what we now call "transformations"-took place and then drawing inferences from that analysis to current and future questions of military transformation. Public servants charged with the responsibility of designing, managing, and overseeing national security programs are rightly concerned about the prospects for innovation and learning within the DoD. There are real national security threats to the United States, and the costs of failure are high if public servants improperly prepare for and conduct military operations and postwar reconstruction. U.S. military organizations have learned and innovated, and they can do it again. To understand how military organizations can learn and innovate, the reader will have to follow, at times, a complex argument. The unique value of this study is its use of multilevel analysis. Most historians and social scientists studying military innovation examine historical case material at a single level of analysis, that is, by looking at the actions of significant individuals or at the interactions of people within an innovating organization. Indeed, examining innovation from the perspective of an individual or a single organization has generated useful insights. Yet, this perspective has been unable to generate effective broad policy guidelines for future innovation. In the real-life world of people in organizations considering military problems, nothing is simple. People have to deal with "solutions" to previous problems that are proposed for new or poorly understood issues. Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity are constant companions. Individuals and organizations interact in varied and complex ways. Hence, the real key to unlocking the process of innovation is attention to multiple sets of relationships among individuals, organizations, and multiorganizational systems. This book will show that many opportunities exist for strategic leadership-even within an organization as large and complex as the DoD. When properly arranged, interaction among groups of organizations enables effective innovation by enhancing the application of evidence, inference, and logic.
In this paper I use the case of NATO in order to tests structural, bureaucratic and organizational, and elite explanations of military transformation. While the structuralist explanations are primarily associated with the distribution of power across the international system, the bureaucratic and organizational models attribute the transformation to the "organizational routines" and "individual leaders of government that make major governmental choices." The elitist approach, on the other hand, studies transformation in terms of external influences from outsides on the political elites conducting reforms.
Through military lenses. Perception of security threats and jointness in the Italian Air Force
Defence Studies, 2018
The article explores Italian Air Force (ITAF) officers' perceptions of military transformation and of changes in the global security environment. While several studies have addressed the challenges faced by European armed forces in the last two decades, the methods used have been rather uniform, mostly relying on in-depth case studies through qualitative interviews and analysis of strategic documents and budgets. Using data from an original, and unique, survey conducted among ITAF captains (N=286), this article focuses on servicemen's attitudes towards the transformations of the global security environment and the changes occurring (and needed) within the Italian Air Force. After describing the "military view" on these topics, the article provides preliminary statistical evidence on the links between individual experiences, views, and change. The research aims to contribute to the broader debate on military transformation by adding a novel dimension of analysis and providing new insights on the micro-level aspects of learning.
The limits to learning in military operations: Bottom-up adaptation in the
This article – based on interviews with Norwegian PRT commanders and the lessons-learned data base of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war, may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces. ISAF In November 2007, reflecting on the first large-scale combat experience of the Norwegian Armed Forces in northern Afghanistan, Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen summarised an important lesson: 'We know that the key persons behind the rising [insurgency] in the Qaysar-Ghowrmach area kept at a good distance from the fighting, and we know that they will return to the villages and resume their effort to build new groups of warriors.'1 Five years later, the outgoing commander of the last regular Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, northern Afghanistan, when summarising the team's six months of experiences, seemed to have learnt the same lesson: 'Most of the large-scale ANA [Afghan National Army) operations therefore have limited effect, in fact on many
"'Transformation in contact': learning the lessons of modern war"
International Affairs, 2011
The US and British armies have faced intelligent and adaptive enemies in Iraq and continue to do so in Afghanistan. While both armies have proved adept at fighting high-intensity conflict, their initial performance against asymmetric threats and diffuse insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how much each army had to learn about conducting counter-insurgency operations. This article examines one important means by which the US and British armies have transformed themselves into more flexible and responsive organizations that are able to harness innovation at the front effectively. It traces the development of the lessons-learned systems in both armies from the start of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq to today. These changes have resulted in significant development within the organization of both armies. Reform of US and British army learning capabilities offers an important insight into the drivers of military change. The reformed lessons-learned systems have been better integrated into training, experimentation, and doctrine and force development. While there are still challenges to be overcome, both armies have created robust structures that facilitate the movement of knowledge from recent experience at the front to the rest of the organization. As such, these reforms provide us with a useful case study that enhances our understanding of the role of ‘bottom-up’ initiatives in military innovation.
Renew or reload? Continuity and change in Italian defence policy
How do countries adapt their overall defence policy to deal with mutating scenarios? In this paper, as part of a broader research agenda, we try to address these questions focusing specifically on the evolution of Italian defence policy as it evolved since 2001. The focus of the paper is on the evolution of national doctrine as it emerges from the analysis of strategic doctrine. What we look at here is the “process of translation” from the political to the military level, as embodied by key political strategic documents, and its evolution over time. To do so, the paper examines the Italian White Papers on Defence of 2002 and 2015 through qualitative and quantitative (content) analysis.