8. The great roadmap charade: Electoral issues in post-coup Fiji (original) (raw)
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Fiji's 2014 election was its first in eight years, first under the 2013 constitution, and first using a common roll of electors with proportional representation. In the new parliament of 50 seats, the coup leader of 2006, Frank Bainimarama, emerged triumphant. His FijiFirst Party won 32 seats, with the Social Democratic Liberal Party, a successor party to earlier indigenous Fijian parties, winning 15 and the National Federation Party three. The election of the new parliament marked the end of Fiji's longest period under a military government since independence. How should the significance of these elections be judged in the context of Fiji's history? Do they represent the breakthrough to democratic stability that so many Fiji citizens have wanted for so long? Or are they just another phase of Fiji's turbulent politics, a democratic pause before another lurch into authoritarian government?
2007
Professor Horowitz responds to by caricaturing our position and claiming never to have insisted that the alternative vote system (AV) will inevitably yield pro-moderation outcomes, but then dismisses other alternatives as unworthy of serious consideration. Here we set the record straight, and reiterate that there are at least three distinct types of plausible outcome in four party bipolar settings under AV. There is no a priori reason why the pro-moderation outcome should be deemed the most likely or even probable, as the Fiji debacle clearly shows. We also briefly examine the outcome of Fiji's third election under AV held in May 2006, in which moderates fared even more poorly than they did in 2001. In its wake, in December 2006, Fiji witnessed yet another coup and, a month later, a militarybacked interim government was installed in office. Instead of waiting a further five years for the promised moderation-inducing impact of AV, key moderate politicians joined the new administration, hoping in this unconstitutional way to shift Fiji away from the politics of ethnic division.
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In an attempt to ensure all citizens are equally represented and their interests accommodated in a multicultural setting, Fiji changed its electoral system four times since flag independence. The first three electoral systems used in 1970, 1990 and 1999 were First Past the Post (FPTP), a system of ethnic based rolls and seats using FPTP, and Alternative Voting (AV) respectively. These were systems with communally assigned seats because of the country's ethnic configuration. Leaders then justified their adoption as a way to facilitate fair representation of all citizens. The 2014 election was contested under a new electoral system of proportional representation and eliminated reserved ethnic seats. This paper critically examines the results of the 2014 elections under the new open list proportional representation system. It analyses the intentions of the electoral system under the 2013 constitution and the extent to which its targets were achieved in the 2014 election results. The paper also highlights lessons from constitutional and electoral engineered systems in other Pacific island countries and compares these with Fiji's new electoral and political party system. It concludes with possible future scenarios for the country under the current constitution and electoral system.
CASTING A BLIND-EYE: IS FIJI'S 2013 'ETHNICALLY-BLIND' CONSTITUTION A PATH TO DEMOCRATIC STABILITY
Journal of South Pacific Law, 2017
Fiji has a checkered history with democracy. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1970, its politics have been marked by a pattern of coups and constitutional reform. After the first military coup in 1987, three constitutions designed by political elites have attempted to resolve ethnic tensions and foster democratic stability. Underlying Fiji's constitutional reforms is a struggle for supremacy between two very different conceptions of the nation, namely ethnic and civic. While the 1970 and 1997 Constitutions sought a form of multicultural compromise with the realities of Fiji's demographic make-up, demands for continued ethno-political paramountcy by sections of the indigenous Fijian (iTaukei) population led to the overthrow of the democratically-elected governments in 1987 and 2000. In fact, the 1990 Constitution institutionalized the privileged ethno-political status of indigenous Fijians. Subsequently, the coup of 2006 ushered in a period of political reform that has sought to promote a more civic and 'ethnically blind' set of constitutional arrangements. This article investigates the potential for democratic stability provided by the 2013 Constitution. It argues that while the 2013 Constitution and its provisions do shift the discourse away from previous preoccupations with race and ethnicity, the context of the constitution-making process also indicates that the Bainimarama regime was largely intent on maintaining the status quo.
Coup: Reflections on the political crisis in Fiji
2008
In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, Marx remarks that history repeats itself, so to speak, twice: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. The events in Fiji of May-July 2000 would tend to exemplify this dictum. One coup is bad enough, but three in thirteen years staggers the imagination. This collection is not an academic analysis of these events, their origins, processes and impacts. Rather, the contributors to this volume simply reflect, often in the heat of the moment, on what the coup meant to them. The contributors are Fijians of all stripes as well as others who take an interest in the country. They express themselves in statements, speeches, essays and laments. Many overseas people familiar with Fiji are dismayed and disillusioned with the events in that country. Many contribute pieces to newspapers or the internet. The majority are critical, praying for an early resolution of the crisis. They are moving in their sincerity, eloquent and anguished in their tone. This volume of essays contains a sample, but only a small sample, of these responses. They were written when the Fiji crisis was in full swing. The hostages were still in the parliamentary complex, and George Speight was a regular sight on our television screens. Since then, academic analyses have appeared, focusing on the larger political and electoral issues that underpinned the crisis. More will assuredly come as the dust settles and people attempt to make sense of the madness that so dramatically engulfed their lives. Editors inspect what they get, not get what they expect, a colleague reminded us as we grappled with the balance of perspective reflected in this collection. As it happens, the overwhelming bulk of the published commentary on the Fijian crisis was critical of the events. Our effort ix x to solicit contrary perspectives was not as fruitful as we would have liked. This is regrettable, but that is the way things are. There is enough here to give the reader a fair sense of the issues on all sides of the political divide. The strength of this collection lies in its contemporaneity, catching unprocessed voices as the events were unfolding in Fiji. Many pieces are straight from the heart, expressing bewilderment, frustration, anger and anguish. They are partial, in both senses of the word. As they have to be. Nonetheless, they will form an indispensable building block of a future interpretative edifice. The collection is offered to the readers in that spirit.
Constitutional engineering and the alternative vote in Fiji: An assessment
Electoral systems in divided societies: The Fiji constitution, 2012
The single most important institutional issue for encouraging the development of peaceful multi-ethnic politics in Fiji is the design of the new electoral system. Electoral systems have long been recognised as one of the most important institutional mechanisms for shaping the nature of political competition-first because they are, to quote one electoral authority, 'the most specific manipulable instrument of politics' (Sartori 1968:273)-that is, they can be purposively designed to achieve particular outcomes-and second, because they structure the arena of political competition, offering incentives to behave in certain ways, and rewarding those who respond to these incentives with electoral success. The great potential of electoral system design for influencing political behaviour is thus that it can reward particular types of behaviour and place constraints on others. In terms of ethnically divided societies, for example, where ethnicity represents a fundamental political cleavage, particular electoral systems can reward candidates and parties who act in a cooperative, accommodative manner to rival groups; or they can punish these candidates and instead reward those who appeal only to their own ethnic group. Unfortunately, most academic studiep of electoral systems are largely silent on the potential for electoral systems to produce these kinds of incentives. 1
STIFLING OPPOSITION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACH OF THE FIJI GOVERNMENT AFTER THE 2006 COUP
A day after the military takeover of the Fiji government on 5 December 2006, Commodore Bainimarama proclaimed a nationwide state of emergency that gave wide-ranging powers to the military to enforce the new regime’s agenda. These repressive powers were entrenched in the Public Emergency Regulations (PER) imposed after the 10 April 2009 abrogation of the 1997 Constitution. Early promises of elections by 2009 were not kept; instead, successive decrees were promulgated to restrict human rights, suppress freedom of expression and clip the wings of the judiciary and indigenous Fijian institutions. They were aimed at stifling the capacity and will of the people to demand a return to democracy, and at entrenching the position of Bainimarama’s unelected government.1 The allocation of key government ministries and departments to military officers, and the winning over of specific indigenous communities by the provision of infrastructure projects have strengthened this position. All of these actions, combined with a strategy of sidelining any political or military leader capable of replacing Bainimarama as PM or military commander, suggest that the post-April 2009 authoritarian military regime has become what Geddes terms a ‘personalist’ regime, (in contrast to military or single-party regimes) even if this was not an original aim of the coup. In personalist regimes ‘access to office and the fruits of office depends much more on the discretion of an individual leader’ (Geddes 1999:121). But, despite the high levels of repression, the fragility of Fiji’s economy poses a threat to the current government, adding to the threat imposed by those few still voicing opposition.