Purposes and degrees of commodification: Economic instruments for biodiversity and ecosystem services need not rely on markets or monetary valuation (original) (raw)
Related papers
2009
In this paper we review a number of methodological challenges of evaluating and designing economic instruments aimed at biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services provision in the context of an existing policy mix. In the context of the EU 2010 goal of halting biodiversity loss, researchers have been called upon to evaluate the role of economic instruments for cost-effective decision-making, as well as non-market methods to assess their benefits. We argue that costeffectiveness analysis (CEA) and non-market valuation (NMV) methods are necessary, but not sufficient, approaches to assessing the role of economic instruments in a policy mix. We review the principles of "social-ecological-systems"(SES) (Ostrom et al. 2007) and discuss how SES can complement economic cost and benefit assessment methods, in particular in policy design research. To illustrate our conceptual comparison of assessment methodologies, we look at two examples of economic instruments at different government levels-payments for ecosystem services (PES) at farm level and ecological fiscal transfers to municipal /county government. What conceptual problems are introduced when evaluating policies in an instrument mix? How can the SES framework complement CEA and NMV in policy assessment and design? We draw on experiences from Brazil and Costa Rica to exemplify these questions. We conclude with some research questions.
The Contradictory Logic of Global Ecosystem Services Markets
Commodification and transnational trading of ecosystem services is the most ambitious iteration yet of the strategy of ‘selling nature to save it’. The World Bank and UN agencies contend that global carbon markets can slow climate change while generating resources for development. Consonant with ‘inclusionary’ versions of neoliberal development policy, advocates assert that international payment for ecosystem services (PES) projects, financed by carbon-offset sales and biodiversity banking, can benefit the poor. How- ever, the World Bank also warns that a focus on poverty reduction can un- dermine efficiency in conservation spending. The experience of ten years of PES illustrates how, in practice, market-efficiency criteria clash directly with poverty-reduction priorities. Nevertheless, the premises of market-based PES are being extrapolated as a model for global REDD programmes financed by carbon-offset trading. This article argues that the contradiction between de- velopment and conservation observed in PES is inevitable in projects framed by the asocial logic of neoclassical economics. Application in international conservation policy of the market model, in which profit incentives depend upon differential opportunity costs, will entail a net upward redistribution of wealth from poorer to wealthier classes and from rural regions to distant centres of capital accumulation, mainly in the global North
Market-Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services: Institutional Innovation or Renovation?
Society & Natural Resources, 2013
Since the mid-1990s, the concept of ecosystem services has become increasingly popular in academic circles and among decision-makers. Because of its inclusive character, this concept has given rise to different interpretations in economics. Since its inception, it has been associated with the development of market-based instruments (MBIs) in conservation policies. From this perspective, the sustainable provision of ecosystem services is hindered by market failures (e.g., public good attributes, externalities) and prices that do not capture the full value of the natural assets. MBIs are therefore recommended. According to their promoters, they provide powerful incentives to conserve the environment while at the same time offering new sources of income to support rural livelihoods. Our paper contends that
Journal of Environmental Management, 2018
A B S T R A C T Biodiversity offsets (BO) are increasingly promoted and adopted by governments and companies worldwide as a policy instrument to compensate for biodiversity losses from infrastructure development projects. BO are often classified as 'market-based instruments' both by proponents and critics, but this representation fails to capture the varieties of how BO policies actually operate. To provide a framing for understanding the empirical diversity of BO policy designs, we present an ideal-typical typology based on the institutions from which BO is organised: Public Agency, Mandatory Market and Voluntary Offset. With cross-case comparison and stakeholder mapping, we identified the institutional arrangements of six BO policies to analyse how the biodiversity losses and gains are decided. Based on these results, we examined how these six policies relate to the BO ideal types. Our results suggested that the government, contrary to received wisdom, plays a key role not just in enforcing mandatory policies but also in determining the supply and demand of biodiversity units, supervising the transaction or granting legitimacy to the compensation site. Mandatory BO policies can be anything from pure government regulations defining industry liabilities to liability-driven markets where choice sets for trading credits are constrained and biodiversity credit prices are negotiated under state supervision. It is important to distinguish between two processes in BO: the matching of biodiversity losses and gains (commensurability) and the trading of biodiversity credits (commodification). We conclude that the commensurability of natural capital is restricted in BO policies; biodiversity is always exchanged with biodiversity. However, different degrees of commodifi-cation are possible, depending on the policy design and role of price signals in trading credits. Like payments for ecosystem services, the price of a biodiversity credit is most commonly based on the cost of management measures rather than the 'value' of biodiversity; which corresponds to a low degree of commodification.
Environmental Policy and Governance, 2017
Policy mix analysis has been applied in research on energy, climate, urban and transport policy, and more recently biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services. However, policy mix analysis has thus far been employed at a high conceptual level, focusing on describing interactions between instrument types. Policy mix analysis rarely describes instrument ‘structure’ or functional characteristics in a way that would answer the question ‘what constitutes an instrument’? We describe how the rules‐in‐use taxonomy of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed for research on common pool resource management, can be used to characterize conservation policy instrument interactions. We demonstrate the approach on the well‐known payments for ecosystem services (PES) program in Costa Rica and cross‐compliance policies, arguing that PES is a policy mix rather than a single economic instrument. Our analysis shows how design features of PES described in the economics ...
Ecosystem Services and Institutional Dynamics
2021
Although many countries have included biodiversity offsetting (BO) requirements in their environmental regulations over the past four decades, this mechanism has recently been the object of renewed political interest. Incorporated into the mitigation hierarchy in three steps aimed at avoiding, reducing and offsetting residual impacts on biodiversity arising from development projects, BO is promoted as the way to achieve the political goal of No Net Loss of biodiversity (NNL). The recent success of BO is mainly based on its ability to provide economic incentives for biodiversity conservation. However, the diversity of BO mechanisms (direct offsets, banking mechanism and offsetting funds) and the various institutional frameworks within which they are applied generate substantial confusion about their economic and ecological implications. In this article, we first analyze the rationale for the BO approach from the welfare and ecological economics. We show that both these frameworks sup...
Nature in the Market-World: Ecosystem services and inequality
Development, 2012
Programmes to address global warming and promote green development, such as Payments for Ecosystem Services and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and [forest] Degradation financed by carbon-offset trading, are framed by a world-as-market paradigm that subsumes social goals within a project of globalized eco-economic management. Because market-based strategies reinforce existing property claims and power relations, Kathleen McAfee argues that they are likely to worsen inequality without yielding net, global environmental benefits. A better approach would build upon positive synergies between climate mitigation, agriculture, and rural livelihoods. KEYWORDS ecosystem services; carbon markets; green economy; development; climate; environment; World Bank Introduction: the market panacea and its problems Green economy transitions face daunting challenges: rising seas and losses in agricultural production due to global warming, the closing of land frontiers, the persistence of hunger, growing unemployment, and economic instability. These trends are intertwined with increasing inequality both within the majority of nations and between the advanced industrialized countries and much of the Global South. International policies to address these problems are often framed by a market-centred paradigm (Le Blanc, 2011; OECD, 2011). In this world view, private initiatives, monetary pricing, and market exchange are inherently more efficient than collective action, public planning, and regulation, and all resources and services are potentially tradable commodities. Advocates of market efficiency in environmental management aim to subsume ecology, theoretically and practically, within a globalized, liberal-capitalist economy. They attempt to quantify and privatize the functions and components of nature and devise programmes to expand this approach from Europe and the United States, where it began, to the Global South. They contend that the use of 'market instruments' can achieve optimal allocation worldwide of the benefits of nature and the burdens of pollution and resource depletion (
Precisely incorrect? Monetising the value of ecosystem services
Ecological Complexity, 2010
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Marketing the Market: The Ideology of Market Mechanisms for Biodiversity Conservation
The emergence of market mechanisms for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services in recent years has been portrayed by most conservation institutions and epistemological frameworks as an unprecedented opportunity for the conservation of nature. This article shifts the focus from the improved effectiveness arguments concerning such mechanisms to examine their institutional and political context and origins. It outlines the field of transnational biodiversity markets and uncovers the normative biases it displays. The regulatory vocabulary of ‘market mechanisms’ is juxtaposed to the more explicit ideological approach professed by the critics of neoliberalism. The argument is that, rather than an inevitable component in contemporary conservation governance, market mechanisms imply a set of contested choices for certain values, a particular economic development trajectory, a particular understanding of the biodiversity problem, and a weak role for legal obligations. Transnational environmental law needs to establish its interest beyond that of the regulation literature if it is to account for the proliferating movements around the world in favour of a reasserted normative guidance for the markets and against the process of marketing the market.