Radicalisation and Jihadist Threat in Tunisia: Internal Root Causes, External Connections and Possible Responses (original) (raw)

TRANSFORMATION IN TUNISIA: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

W. Mühlberger (Ed.), E. Cohen-Hadria, S. Gharib, C. Günay, I. Schäfer, S.Torelli
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Published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean

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ISSN: 2462-4500
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January 2017

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs would like to thank the participants of the Dialogue Workshop held in Tunis on 4 November 2016 hosted by CEMI, the reviewer, the IEMed for supporting project implementation and the European Commission for co-financing the project.

CONTENTS

Transformation in Tunisia: The First Five Years

FOREWORD. Wolfgang Mühlberger … 7
TRUST, THE WEAK LINK OF THE TUNISIAN TRANSITION. Emmanuel Cohen-Hadria … 13
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND (YOUTH) UNEMPLOYMENT IN TUNISIA: A DANGER TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION PROCESS? Isabel Schäfer … 43
FROM PERSECUTION TO GOVERNMENT- ENNAHDA’S CLAIM TO POWER. Sherin Gharib, Cengiz Günay … 77
RADICALISATION AND JIHADIST THREAT IN TUNISIA: INTERNAL ROOT CAUSES, EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES. Stefano M. Torelli … 109

Radicalisation and Jihadist Threat in Tunisia: Internal Root Causes, External Connections and Possible Responses

Stefano M. Torelli*

[1]

  1. *Research Fellow, Italian Institute for International Political Studies ↩︎

The political transition process that started in Tunisia in 2011 continues to move forward, albeit against many obstacles. Among the major challenges to the stability of the country and to the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices, terrorism is definitely the most worrisome. The Jihadist threat jeopardises Tunisian security and the country has to adopt new strategies to combat it. Among the objectives of the new counter-terrorist strategies there is certainly that of adapting to new forms of Jihadism. To do this, it is essential to understand the factors and processes that led to the radicalisation of hundreds of young people. This has to be done from both the tactical/operational and ideological points of view. In the first instance, in order to better frame the evolving strategies and objectives of Tunisian Jihadist movements it is necessary to implement an effective response from the point of view of repression. However, it is even more important to intervene on the level of prevention. To do this, the contexts in which new forms of violent extremism arise must be understood and the causes identified, so that action can be taken before the processes of radicalisation occur. Finally, there is a need to focus on de-radicalisation programmes too, to recover and reintegrate into society individuals who have previously chosen the path of extremism. In implementing a comprehensive anti-terrorist strategy, an increased coordination effort between all the stakeholders is required. On the operational level, the army, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior should coordinate with other economic and social ministries. At the political level, there is a need to clarify the responsibilities of the two major institutional actors, the Presidency of the Republic and the Prime Minister. The constitutional framework does not clearly establish the prerogatives of these two figures, thus creating a deadlock. Moreover, under this kind of institutional balance, the important issue of counter-terrorism is likely to be blocked due to any institutional clashes. Thus, the political contingency influences the effectiveness of the government action. Tunisia has to face all these challenges in order to deal with a constantly changing threat, which has deep roots in the socioeconomic context of the country. The chapter first analyses the evolution of the Jihadist threat in Tunisia, retracing the three phases that characterised the origins and development of home-grown terrorism. In the second part, it aims to give some policy indications on possible measures to be taken to fight terrorism.

Introduction

In the spring of 2013 a series of attacks in the area of Jebel Chaambi began, which caused the deaths of dozens of National Guard and Security Forces members. Between April and the end of 2013, at least 20 soldiers were killed in several attacks, including eight in an ambush on 29 July 2013. 1{ }^{1} This particular episode, in which the victims were brutally assaulted by the militants, has shocked public opinion and this led the government

[1]

  1. 1 Between 2013 and 2015, even before the attacks against the Bardo Museum and the tourist resort in Sousse, almost 100 members of the Tunisian security forces were killed in attacks, especially on the border with Algeria. For more details about these attacks, see the website Jinkyfada, at https://inkyfada.com/maps/carte-du-terrorisme-en-tunisie-depuis-la-revolution/#yearBilan. ↩︎

to react to the wave of unprecedented violence in the country. These violent incidents came after two years of confrontation between the transitional authorities and a new generation of young Salafists that emerged after Ben Ali’s fall. 2{ }^{2} Faced with this escalation of violence, in August 2013 the government has reacted by banning the Salafist movement Ansar alShari’a in Tunisia (AST), classifying it as a terrorist organisation. From then on, a new phase of confrontation between the authorities and Jihadist groups started. This study will try to understand the causes of the radicalisation process in Tunisia and the context in which a Salafist movement gradually turned into a Jihadist one. The analysis goes further and is not focused just on AST, as this organisation was banned in 2013. Thus, other drivers of radicalisations will be identified. These have to do with the internal political, social and economic context, as well as with external influences that contributed to the rise of the Jihadist ideology and the first manifestations of violence within Tunisia. 3{ }^{3}

Radicalisation: A Conceptual Analysis

Before starting the discussion about radicalisation in Tunisia, it is useful to specify what is intended by “radicalisation”, as the term has been widely used in literature, but not always with the same meaning. It is important to note that radicalisation does not automatically mean “terrorism” and that not all radicalised individuals eventually turn into perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Radicalisation here is referred to as the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs, 4{ }^{4} rather than terrorism itself. This distinction is crucial because there is no evidence that all the radicalised people in Tunisia (and elsewhere in the global arena) eventually choose to become terrorists. However, on the other hand, it might be easier for a radicalised individual to become a terrorist than it is for an individual who had not undergone a process of radicalisation. In other words, radicalisation is seen as the first step towards the actual perpetration of terrorist attacks, whereas it is rare that a person will choose to become a terrorist without having undergone a process of ideological radicalisation before. As some scholars have highlighted, there is no unique definition of “radicalisation”. 5{ }^{5} The main distinction is between the ones that intend radicalisation as

[1]

  1. 2 Few comprehensive studies have been conducted on Tunisian Salafism since the fall of Ben Ali. However, the issue is being more closely studied. Among the most important studies so far are: Merone, F., & Cavatorta, F. (2012). Salafist mouvance and sheikh-ism in the Tunisian democratic transition. Working Papers in International Studies. Centre for International Studies. Dublin City University; Torelli, S.M., Merone, F., & Cavatorta, F. (2012). Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and opportunities for democratization. Middle East Policy, 19(4), 140-154; International Crisis Group. (2013a). Tunisia: Violence and the Salafic challenge. Report Middle East and North Africa Report, N. 137; Gartenstein-Ross, D., Moreng, B., & Soucy, K. (2014, February). Raising the stakes: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia’s shift to Jihad. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. See also Wolf, A. (2013, January). Tunisia: Signs of domestic radicalization post-revolution. CTC Sentinel, 6(1), 1-4.
    3 For a comprehensive study on the radicalisation process in Tunisia, see also Fahmi, G., & Meddeb, H. (2015). Market for jihad. Radicalisation in Tunisia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ CMEC_55_FahmiMeddeb_Tunisia_final_oct.pdf
    4 See also Borum, R. (2001). Radicalisation into violent extremism I: A review of social science theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 7-36. Retrieved from http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss
    5 For a comprehensive discussion on radicalisation, see also Schmid, A.P. (2013, March). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counterradicalisation: A conceptual discussion and literature review. ICCT Research Paper, The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Retrieved from https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf ↩︎

the violent act itself, and those that mean the pursuit or acceptance of changes in society and state, which could undermine the democratic principles. In this sense, radicalisation is seen as a danger for democracy itself. This meaning could also be accepted in the following analysis, as what is meant here by radicalisation is an anti-systemic process aimed at destabilising the democratisation process started in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali. Therefore, in this analysis the distinction between violent radicalisation and non-violent forms of radical thinking is not important, as what is crucial is the attitude (or the behaviour) more than the violent action per se. Indeed, the presence of radicalised individuals, even if not automatically violent, represents a concern for the authorities and could undermine the process of democratisation, should these individuals choose to embrace terrorism instead of remaining quiet. For this reason, radicalisation will be seen as a change in thinking, as this is seen as the first step towards the actual perpetration of terrorist attacks. Another important distinction is between individual and collective radicalisation. In the first case, we are talking about single persons that, for different reasons (economic and social disparities, marginalisation, poverty, ideological and political reasons), undergo a process of radicalisation that brings them close to antisystemic positions. These episodes are to be debated case by case, as there is no common pattern of individual radicalisation. The definition of collective radicalisation is conferred on particular political or social organisations that radicalise as a group as a reaction to repressive or exclusive politics. As will be debated, in Tunisia we are mostly witnessing cases of individual radicalisation rather than collective. As for the reasons behind radicalisation, the literature makes a distinction between two main kinds of radicalisation processes: political radicalisation (often connected to group radicalisation) and social radicalisation (connected to individual radicalisation). 6{ }^{6} In Tunisia, both processes are present but the majority of the case studies are to be defined as cases of social and individual radicalisation, more than of political radicalisation.

The Premise: Jihadist Salafism Trying to Institutionalise?

Since its appearance in 2011, AST has been at the boundary between the so-called quietists and political Salafists on the one hand and the traditional Jihadist movements on the other hand. 7{ }^{7} Its emergence has to be directly linked to the process of political liberalisation that has begun in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s escape to Saudi Arabia. The new political landscape has allowed all political and social powers to be represented in the public space. On the other hand, the new climate of national reconciliation led to the

[1]

  1. 6 According to the radicalisation theory literature, the radicalisation arising from socioeconomic factors, differently from the type caused by political (as repression) factors, represents a dynamic that is individual, not collective. This kind of radicalisation seems to mainly involve the younger population and is caused by social and economic factors such as urbanisation, unemployment, population growth, poverty and social exclusion. See in particular Ashour, O. (2009). The de-radicalization of jihadists. Transforming armed Islamist movements. London-New York: Routledge. In general, for the discussion about the radicalisation and moderation of Islamist political movements, see also Jilian Schwedler, J. (2007). Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    7 For a classification of Salafist movements, see Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). Anatomy of the Salafi movement. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29 (3), 207-239. ↩︎

amnesty granted to many political prisoners by the first transitional government, including Islamist militants arrested in previous years. In this context, the radical manifestations of Islamism also emerged, among them AST. Although this movement has been classified as a terrorist organisation by both the Tunisian government (August 2013) and the US Department of State (January 2014), it was initially a Salafist movement devoted mainly to activities of da’wa and social interest. In this context, its main activities in Tunisia focused especially on two directions: preaching and proselytism (activities related to tarbiyya, or “education”) and all the activities that can be traced to what has been called “Islamic welfare”, such as support for needy families, the organisation of convoys carrying food and medicines and relief for people affected by natural disasters. However, to make it a movement sui generis if compared to traditional Salafist group classifications, there were at least two factors. On the one hand, the nature of its leadership: indeed, the founder and leader Abu 'Ayyadh (whose real name is Sayf Allah Ben Hassine), who reportedly died in a drone attack in Libya in 2016, was a former Jihadist who fought in Afghanistan after the US intervention in 2001. He was among the founders of the al-Qa’ida-inspired movement Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) and he was finally arrested in Turkey and deported to Tunisia on charges of terrorism (Torelli, 2013a). On the other hand, AST has always maintained a double strategy and, to some extent, a dual nature: while in Tunisia it dedicated itself to social activities and da’wa, at the same time it endorsed the global Jihad and it felt fully within the global Jihadist ideology. This was evident from AST’s symbolism and ideology of reference, as well as from the frequent references to Jihad in Iraq, Syria and even Myanmar. While, at first, the Ennahda-led government tried to include AST within the legal political framework and AST itself evaluated the possibility of institutionalising, it eventually took another path.

AST’s positions vis-a-vis the Tunisian government have gradually radicalised in part as a consequence of Ennahda’s democratic stance within the framework of the Tunisian political transition, and in part as a direct result of the institutions’ attitude against it. AST was the protagonist of the incidents in September 2012, when a group of Salafists attacked the US embassy in Tunis and four militants were killed in the subsequent clashes. The event marked a change in tactics for the movement, because for the first time AST had targeted a Western symbol and clashed directly against the Tunisian security forces (International Crisis Group, 2013a). Since the beginning of 2013, Ennahda changed its attitude towards the Salafists and opened a new phase of confrontation. Political opportunism has in part contributed to forge Ennahda’s strategy. The Islamic party seems to have realised that winning the trust of the citizens who do not naturally belong to its electoral basin could be even more important than the consensus’ consolidation among Islamic conservatives. The Egyptian example was a warning: sharpening the confrontation/clash with secularists could lead to loss of credibility

and, consequently, of power (Marks, 2015). In May 2013, the then-Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh passed to the phase of confrontation with AST, by banning its annual meeting, which was held in Kairouan. Whether or not its intentions were genuine, the Islamic party seemed to have realised that such a hard confrontation between itself and the secular opposition could not only block the institutional transition, but also be detrimental to its political purposes. It is worth mentioning that in 2013 two opposition leaders, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, were killed. These acts of political violence deeply shocked Tunisians, while the opposition called for the dismissal of the Ennahda-led government. Therefore, for Ennahda to publicly condemn AST would be a tactical move aimed at recovering trust among citizens. On the other hand, this has led to an open confrontation with the Salafists, who have gradually lost all confidence in Ennahda and in Tunisian institutions, feeling persecuted and marginalised.

From its point of view, Ennahda was facing a dual challenge. First, it had to convince the Tunisians that it was not involved in any act of violence that the country has been witnessing. Second, as a government party, it had to ensure citizens about the territory’s protection and the security within their boundaries. Detecting and combating the alleged terrorists should have been the first step in this direction. In this context, the accusations of AST being behind major acts of violence in the country found a place. By officially designating AST as a terrorist movement, Ennahda’s leaders wanted to distance themselves from Salafism and to reassure citizens about having identified the enemy to fight (Marks, 2014). In this context, AST members had three different options: to accept the new situation and abandon politics; to “emigrate” to countries where they could still fight for the ideological utopia of a new “Islamic order”; to stay in Tunisia and promote violent Jihadism. The Jihadist vanguards active in the area of Jebel Chaambi and coming from Algeria served as a catalyst for those who decided to revolt against the Tunisian authorities. At a later date, the global rise of the so-called Islamic State would have to attract more young Tunisians, thanks to their presence in and influence on Libya too, just at the border with Tunisia. Meanwhile, a process of radicalisation was beginning to involve hundreds of individuals as a reaction to the social, political, economic and cultural marginalisation that has excluded part of society from the transitional process (Merone, 2016).

The First Stage: The “Algerian Connection” and the Internal Drivers for Radicalisation

Since the spring of 2013, Tunisia has been affected by a series of attacks against security forces and the National Guard, especially in the area of Jebel Chaambi, on the border

with Algeria. Although the Tunisian government has singled out AST as responsible for the repeated attacks, it has not provided clear evidence of the direct involvement of the Salafist movement in the terrorist activities in Tunisia (Torelli, 2013c). In addition, the features of some attacks give the impression that other Jihadist groups are operating in the country. What was the origin of these groups? The assumptions, in this case, appear to be substantially two. On the one hand, there is evidence of infiltration of Algerian Jihadist elements in Tunisia: this would be confirmed by the arrest of some Algerian nationals at the border with Tunisia, but also by the kind of operation conducted, which resembles those of the Algerian Jihadists during the 1990s civil war. It is worth noting, in this regard, that in June 2014 for the first time al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for an attack conducted against the house of the Interior Minister Lotfi ben Jeddou in the city of Kasserine (Tajine, 2014). The Tunisian government has deployed an increasing number of forces in order to fight Jihadism, but attacks have continued since then, reflecting these groups’ elusiveness. Between 2012 and 2013, the authorities declared they had identified a new Jihadist cell called Uqba ibn Nafáa, but in the following months the group was no longer mentioned, nor has any attack been ever claimed by this alleged Tunisian Jihadist movement, although some sources have accused this elusive group of being responsible for the 17 July terrorist attack on the Jebel Chaambi in which 15 Tunisian soldiers were killed. The second hypothesis - which does not exclude the first one - is that there would be individual Tunisians that have gradually radicalised, becoming part of the local Jihadist networks. In this case, it is possible we are facing forms of so-called personal Jihad.

In fact, despite claims by the Tunisian government, initially the direct relationship between AST as a movement and Jihadist cells operating on the Jebel Chaambi has not been proven. On the contrary, what seemed to emerge was rather the creation of a network of contacts with Jihadist groups already operating in Algeria, with particular reference to AQIM. There are several elements in support of this argument. Firstly, the geographical proximity between Algeria and the limited area in which the attacks have occurred; secondly, the tactics used by Jihadist cells recalled those used by Algerian fighters during the Algerian civil war; finally, many combatants on Jebel Chaambi were Algerian, as confirmed by the Algerian intelligence, who warned the Tunisian authorities about the border infiltration attempts. Therefore, it is legitimate to imagine that, at this stage, the appearance of Jihadism in Tunisia was actually due to external infiltration attempts, rather than to internal causes and AST did not play a primary role.

However, the evolution of the Jihadist threat has followed a path directly influenced by domestic factors too, which contributed to the radicalisation of hundreds of young

Tunisians. This has changed the landscape of the Jihadist movements operating in the country. The final effects of this process emerged with the two attacks in March and July 2015 on the Bardo Museum in Tunis and against tourists at Sousse, but this has come through a long process. This process was triggered by two different factors, the first specifically political and the other socioeconomic. On the one hand, the continuous actions of repression - often preventive and indiscriminate - against Salafist members has inevitably led to an increased polarisation, helping to radicalise even further individuals who were not directly linked to Jihadist networks (International Crisis Group, 2016). On the other hand, the government’s ineffectiveness in addressing and resolving the serious socioeconomic disparities again caused the discontent of a generation that, after having personally contributed to Ben Ali’s fall, found itself marginalised again. 8{ }^{8} The process of exclusion of AST leaders - who have moved into neighbouring Libya, where in the meantime several Jihadist groups began to operate - has also led to less control on the basis of the movement, whose members have dispersed and have made different choices. Among them, some allegedly continued to profess the Salafist ideology while not resorting to violent methods, others have abandoned activism and, finally, some have embraced the Jihadist ideology, radicalised and joined the active Jihadist cells in Tunisia. In this case, what occurred was the so-called process of “radicalisation through exclusion”, which involves the radicalisation of individuals as a reaction to their exclusion from the political and social arena. 9{ }^{9} In this way, the government’s policies could also have contributed to escalating the tensions. Many young people have approached the most violent groups in response to a political and institutional system that has rejected them. Different, but with similar results, is the process that has caused the radicalisation of hundreds of young Tunisians as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the government regarding the conditions of backwardness in part of the country. In this regard, it is no coincidence that some areas of Tunisia (with particular reference to central and western regions, such as Kasserine, the area of Ben Guerdane and some peripheral areas of Tunis) are the most affected by the phenomenon of radicalisation (The Soufan Group, 2015).

The process of radicalisation in Tunisia has become increasingly alarming to the point that Jihadism has become a domestic phenomenon and began to affect not only the outermost areas but also urban centres. After AST was dissolved and was declared a terrorist organisation, other movements have emerged. Initially, the major and apparently the more organised was the Brigade Uqba ibn Nafi. According to some sources, this is a sort of “branch” of AQIM in Tunisia and according to local intelligence sources it has been driven directly by an Algerian militant, Abu Sakhr Lokman. With time, Uqba ibn Nafi has been able to take advantage of the discontent of the youngest and most marginalised

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  1. 8 See, for example, World Bank. (2014). The unfinished revolution: Bringing opportunity, good jobs and greater wealth to all Tunisians. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/658461468312323813/The-unfinished-revolution-bringing-opportunity-good-jobs-and-greater-wealth-to-all-Tunisians
    9 See in particular Ashour, O. (2009). The De-radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming armed Islamist movements, Routledge: London-New York. In general, for the discussion around the radicalisation and moderation of Islamist political movements, see also Schwedler, J. (2007). Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ↩︎

groups, becoming increasingly characterised as actually “Tunisian”. However, compared to other organised groups in other countries such as Egypt or Libya, the kind of Jihadism that appeared in Tunisia seems to be the more “individual”. In fact, individuals or small cells seemingly disconnected with each other perpetrated several violent incidents connected to radical Islamism. In other cases, both in Tunis and in other parts of the country, the security forces have carried out arrests and raids against suspected terrorists, confiscating weapons and ammunition, but it was difficult to draw a common thread that, beyond the ideological aspect, would combine these individual cases together. Therefore, we can say that the kind of Jihadism who was born in Tunisia is different from the one that emerged in other post-Arab Spring contexts, because it is a phenomenon that affects the individual aspect, rather than the collective sphere of a single organisation. One example in this regard is that against a very large number of people who, once radicalised, have gone to fight to Syria, Iraq and Libya, the most active Jihadist group in Tunisia, Uqba ibn Nafi, is probably composed by only a few hundred, if not dozens, of people.

The emergence of this kind of Jihadism poses relevant safety issues for the Tunisian authorities, since it is more difficult to face and prevent terrorist actions organised by individuals or small isolated cells. An interesting dynamic to be studied in order to understand the phenomenon of radicalisation of individuals who turn to Salafist Jihadists concerns the simultaneous dismantling of AST’s structure in Tunisia. In fact, the on-going attacks against security forces on the border with Algeria and Libya have been occurring even after AST’s designation as a terrorist organisation and the campaign of repression against Salafists by the government. AST’s lack of legitimacy and its subsequent disappearance from the public space led the leadership to have less control over their members, some of whom have gradually turned into Jihadists. In this case, the actual element of novelty and transformation if compared to the first months of AST’s activity is the fact that some Salafists have experienced Jihadist practice (while AST was Jihadist in its background ideology and symbolism, but not in concrete actions). Moreover, they turned from supporting Jihad just outside Tunisia to bringing it within Tunisian territory, even if this process cannot be attributed to AST as a movement but rather to out-ofcontrol individuals. This sort of “individual radicalisation” is often the result of disillusionment caused among certain sections of the younger population, who feel marginalised from the transition, despite having contributed to the previous regime’s fall.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the existing connections - this trend has already been observed in the Sahel region by AQIM and other Islamist groups present in Mali such as MUJAO Ansar al-Din - between local crime dedicated to the illegal drugs,

weapons and goods trafficking, and Jihadist cells. This occurs both at the border with Algeria and with Libya. The networks built around the relationship between smuggling and guerrilla Jihadists provide a means to obtain financing and, at the same time, grouped to exercise a form of control over a given territory (International Crisis Group, 2013b; International Crisis Group, 2014). This aspect seems to be correlated to two factors: the on-going economic crisis, as new illegal business is taking root, and the regional security crisis. Therefore, Libya is becoming a new safe haven for regional Jihadist groups, even from Tunisia itself (Torelli, 2014a).

The Influence of Libya and IS: The Transition to the Strategy of Terror

From 2014 onwards, another factor has contributed in a fundamental way to the development of new networks of Jihadism in Tunisia and, consequently, to the adoption of new strategies and tactics of action by radical Islamist groups: the deterioration of the situation in neighbouring Libya (Varvelli, 2015). After the ban against AST, some sources reported that its leadership settled in Libya, where other Salafist-Jihadist organisations already operated. In particular, the AST leader Abu 'Ayyadh seemed to have found refuge in Libya. From there, he would have tried to reorganise the movement in order to resume operations more effectively in Tunisia. At the same time, Tunisia has always had structural problems related to existing connections between groups dedicated to organised crime and other illegal activities related to the informal economy, both to its western borders with Algeria and to the eastern borders with Libya, particularly in the area of Ben Guerdane. On the other hand, several sources have reported the possibility that local criminal networks could exploit the Tunisian porous borders. In this context, they had the opportunity of creating direct links with Islamist organisations, finding an activity of common interest in arms trafficking. Throughout 2014 and 2015, a substantial number of Tunisians who until then decided to go as foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria have shifted their destination to the nearby Libya. At the same time, Libya was witnessing an unprecedented expansion of local Jihadist groups and, above all, of movements related directly to Islamic State (IS), which in 2014 began to establish its own cells on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The so-called “Libyan connection” was definitely the external factor that has influenced more than others the creation of the substrate required for the further radicalisation of individuals that have just been radicalising in Tunisia between 2013 and early 2015. The on-going relationship between Tunisian and Libyan Jihadist networks, along with the penetration of IS ideology in Tunisia, led to the attacks in Tunis and in Sousse. The latter marked the shift to the tactic of indiscriminate attacks against civilians (for the most Western citizens) in urban

areas and aimed at hitting the heart of the Tunisian economic system by identifying the tourism sector as its favourite target.

At this point, the issue of the internal competition within the Jihadist field itself between al-Qa’ida and IS also arises. While the episodes of Jihadism that occurred up to 2015, even in their extreme violence, had chosen to only hit targets linked to the political and institutional landscape, the attacks of 2015 differ in goals (Western tourists and civilians indiscriminately) and in where they occurred (urban centres and coastal areas). At first glance, at least two elements could substantiate that IS is influencing the Tunisian Jihadist scene more than al-Qa’ida does. First, the fact that for the first time by the end of 2014 IS claimed responsibility for the murders of the two political opponents Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi (killed in 2013) through a Tunisian militant currently in Iraq. Second, the fact that for the first time IS later claimed another suicide attack on a bus carrying security forces that occurred in November 2015 in downtown Tunis, which killed 12 policemen. The evolution of the situation in Libya has contributed to accelerating this process. The partial dismantling of Tunisian cells linked to IS in Sabratha, 100 kilometres from the border with Tunisia, has raised concerns that IS-linked Tunisian fighters could soon return to Tunisia. The Tunisian town of Ben Guerdane, close to the border with Libya, has become the focus of several attacks by Libyan-trained Tunisian militants. In March 2016, a group of at least 60 Jihadists attacked the town, targeting an army barracks and the homes of military officers. Thirty-six militants were killed in the battle that followed, along with seven civilians and 12 members of the security forces (Torelli, 2016). Just days before the attack a captured militant, Mohamed Ben Mohsen Ben Mohamed al-Gharbi, revealed Tunisian Jihadists were developing a plan to use about 200 fighters in conjunction with car bombs to capture Ben Guerdane and proclaim a new Islamic State province in Tunisia. This is an important change in Jihadist strategy in Libya and shows the direct involvement of IS-linked cells in Tunisia, which had until now only seen infiltration from al-Qa’ida-linked groups.

Conclusion: A Jihadist Threat Influenced by Wrong Policies?

These considerations lead us once again to analyse the root causes that have pushed thousands of young Tunisians to embrace the ideology and practice of Jihad. At the basis of this process of radicalisation there are structural reasons that concern the strong disparity between the urban areas and the peripheral ones, along with the age-old scourge of a labour market unable to satisfy the demand of the young generations. The frustration and the despair that led thousands of Tunisians to endorse the Jihadist

ideology and to reject the institutional system to the point of turning against it by resorting to terrorist attacks have worsened over the last few years. Paradoxically, the misplaced hopes for change have exacerbated the internal conflict, helping create more discontent.

The transition from 2011 onwards has certainly had the merit of giving a new political and institutional structure to the country through the adoption of a new Constitution, the holding of democratic elections, the inclusion of most of the political parties, the direct participation of civil society and the dialogue between the various stakeholders. However, at the same time, this stage seems to have entirely missed the real socioeconomic issues that were at the very foundation of the riots that caused the fall of the previous regime.

Against this background, what contributed to further raise the level of conflict has been the response of the Tunisian authorities to the terrorist threat. In this case, too, the Tunisian government showed a relative myopia in providing exclusively short-term and security-driven responses, without addressing the socioeconomic long-term causes of radicalisation. The summary arrests, the abuses in prison, the proclamation of the state of emergency and the entire structure of the new counter-terrorism law, are all examples of a strategy that has not been able to combine the need to give an immediate response to the terrorist threat and to take action at a structural level in order to remove the root causes of radicalisation.

Recommendations

Against this background, some recommendations are given to Tunisian social and political actors and authorities, as well as to the foreign partners, such as the European Union.

dialogue with the radical (when not overtly violent) elements is necessary in order to recompose the cleavages and to avoid new waves of radicalisation. Generally speaking, there are a series of stakeholders that should take part in the definition of the national counter-terrorist strategy. These are representatives of civil society, youth associations, unions and the Ministries of Finance, Economy, Youth and Sports, Religious Affairs, Women and Family, Education, Employment and Cultural Affairs. A more coordinated action between these stakeholders will be the most effective way towards the implementation of a multidimensional counter-terrorism strategy.

in Libya, there is a growing concern that Tunisia could be negatively affected by the Libyan crisis. The attempt to take over the city of Ben Guerdane by a group of dozens of Tunisian militants from Libyan territory has been a clear example of the level of threat existing in that area. Also in this case, the military response should be accompanied by a more structural development plan. Local grievances are directed against the institutions, incapable of improving living conditions in the peripheral regions. This has to do with the root causes of radicalisation: if local communities perceive they are abandoned by the institutions and all they witness is the military presence, then the anti-government sentiment could grow and this could lead to more radicalisation.

objective. An important role has to be played by the Islamic party Ennahda. Once entangled in social and religious activism too, in its 10th Congress (May 2016) Ennahda announced that it would abandon the religious discourse in order to fully commit to political activity. While this move could be a good one in terms of institutionalisation of the party, the risk is that a social vacuum could be created, which the extremist and radical elements could exploit to recruit new followers.

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