Motivational Internalism: a Somewhat Less Idealized Acount (original) (raw)

A paper arguing against a strong form of motivational internalism (draft of 4/16/23)

Some writers in metaethics have maintained that moral motivation is intrinsic to the semantic content of an apparently propositional reasons statement. This paper unpacks and responds to this claim by showing that all mainstream metaethical views are committed to the non-identity of the properties that underlie actual motivation with the properties of the semantic contents of moral judgments. First, the paper reconstructs accounts on which the semantic contents of moral judgments are supposed to be intrinsically motivating. Then, it objects to such accounts by showing that the semantic contents of reasons statements, according to any metaethical view of what these consist in, are not of the right kind to belong to the proper objects of motivational states. An important implication of this argument is the falsity of a strong version of the motivational internalism thesis, according to which there is a necessary connection between agents’ recognition of reasons statements and their possession of corresponding motivation because motivational state contents are intrinsic to the semantic contents of reasons statements.

VIIIAn Argument Against Motivational Internalism

Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 2008

I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify the notion of practical irrationality it does not support motivational internalism. Weakest internalism only claims that agents are irrational if they entirely lack motivation to do what they judge they ought to. I do not argue against weakest internalism, but I argue that it is not an important view.

Defusing counterexamples against motivational internalism

Externalists argue that motivation is external to moral judgments on the grounds that people can be unmoved by their moral judgments. I reply that people sometimes act indifferently to their moral considerations not because their moral judgments lack motivation but because their moral judgments are obstructed by rival desires. It appears that the moral motivation wanes while the moral judgments linger. In reality, however, the moral motivation is only made inconspicuous by the motivation of the opposing desires. A moral judgment is subject to obstruction just like an emotive judgment and a gustatory judgment.

"Internal Reasons and the Motivating Intuition"

Internalist theses, as they are usually stated, describe a necessary relation between an agent’s having a reason and some other, usually motivational, fact about the agent. So, for example, internalists might claim that an agent can have a reason to perform some act only if he has a relevant desire, or only if he would be motivated to perform it in suitably idealized circumstances. Why should we accept internalism about reasons? I begin by exploring the thought, appealed to by Bernard Williams and often cited in support of internalism, that reasons must be capable of explaining action: it must be possible for a fact that is a reason for an agent to act to be the reason he acts – the reason that motivates him. I call this the Motivating Intuition. As I argue (in section 1), it represents a key step in Williams’ argument for internalism. And (as I try to show in section 2), the Motivating Intuition has much to be said for it. The problem is that versions of internalism that reflect the Motivating Intuition are vulnerable to numerous counterexamples, and that attempts to revise the internalist thesis to avoid these counterexamples introduce a divide between normative reasons and possible explanations of action. The result is that workable versions of internalist theses lose the support of the Motivating Intuition, and so begin to appear unmotivated. But the same counterexamples that forced the modification of internalist theses, and others, should also lead us to reconsider the Motivating Intuition itself. Indeed, I argue (in sections 3 and 4) that we should reject the Motivating Intuition, and that examples of reasons we have to act which cannot, or should not, be the reasons why we act are in fact quite common. Where does this leave internalism? If the Motivating Intuition is misguided, should we reject the internalist thesis? Are there any other grounds for thinking there is a necessary connection between facts about our reasons and facts about our current motivational profile? I close (in section 5) by suggesting that there are.

Moral Reasons: A Defence of Internalism

In this paper, I argue that moral agents do not necessarily have good reason to behave morally. This, because having good reasons is contingent upon persons themselves. I do so by defending internalism about reasons and show that it leads to the untenability of moral rationalism. That is, moral truths or principles are not intrinsically reason-giving. However, they can be reason-giving when linked to someone’s subjective motivational set. I conclude that, under normal circumstances, people do have reason to behave morally, but not necessarily so.

Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism

Philosophical Studies, 2010

Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus. But succumbing to the first temptation places one under a burden to justify what is motivationally exceptional about moral beliefs and succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practicality intuition that cognitivist motivational internalism is suppose to capture. In this paper, I offer a way of defending cognitivist motivational internalism, which does not require accepting that there is anything motivationally unusual about moral beliefs. I argue that no belief satisfies the Humean constraint: all beliefs are capable of motivating without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire.