Does Charles Taylor Have a Nietzsche Problem? (Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 2017 24:3, 372-386) (original) (raw)
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In this paper, I argue that a close examination of Charles Taylor's central concept of "strong evaluation" brings out more clearly the continuing tensions in his writings as a whole. I trace back the origin of strong evaluation in Taylor’s earliest writings and continue by laying out the different philosophical themes that revolve around it. Next, the focus is on the separate arguments in which strong evaluation is central, uncovering certain methodological conflicts in Taylor’s strategies. Arguing against most of his commentators, I suggest that a distinction should be drawn between the philosophical-anthropological, ethical, and ontological implications of strong evaluation. As a result, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it clarifies the issue of strong evaluation by distinguishing the different arguments in which Taylor employs the concept. Second, it makes the case for multiple tensions within Taylor’s methods. Third, as a consequence, this analysis opens up the question of the metaphysical status of his ontological view.
In this paper, I critically discuss Charles Taylor’s employment of the concept of ontology by shining a spotlight on a shift in emphasis from an anthropocentric to a non-anthropocentric viewpoint in his more recent writings on ontology. I also argue that Stephen White’s characterization of Taylor’s “weak” ontology, while revealing, only partly explains Taylor’s position, as White’s interpretation leaves no room for the metaphysical thrust in Taylor’s thought. Drawing attention to a Taylor left out of White’s Taylor, I ultimately seek to show why Taylor’s distinctive mode of argumentation is not consonant with White’s weak-ontological approach.
This conference centers on Charles Taylor’s paper “Ethics and Ontology” (2003) and its central theme of the relationship between ethical beliefs and ontological views. Taylor’s moral phenomenology defends commonsense moral reactions against reductionist views that attempt to dismiss these reactions altogether as mere projection on a neutral physical world. His criticism is that this naturalist ontology annihilates our very sense of morality, that is, the sense that moral values are in some way different from, higher than, or incommensurable with natural desires. Against this background, the central question of the conference is: What do our ethical views commit us to ontologically? In this way, this conference aims to discuss Taylor’s moral phenomenology in order to open up the question of the implicit ontological commitments behind our ethical beliefs. Keynotes: Ruth Abbey (University of Notre Dame) Nicholas Smith (Macquarie University) Arto Laitinen (University of Tampere)
This paper argues that Clark's and Dudrick's study of Beyond Good and Evil, despite numerous qualities and the correct conclusion that Nietzsche pursued a normative project, remains dissatisfying for two main reasons: 1) The methodological distinction between esoteric and exoteric doctrines, problematic as it is from the outset, would require a detailed genetic reconstruction of Nietzsche's ways of obscuring his 'real views' and of translating them into a new language. Clark and Dudrick, however, seem to use that distinction mainly to accommodate Nietzsche to their understanding of philosophy. 2) Their reconstruction of empiricist and idealistic epistemologies, given in terms of exclusive opposites, fails to appreciate how Nietzsche tries to replace such false contradictions with gradational differences and how he dialectically distributes approval and criticism to both explicitly and through the composition of his aphorisms.
This essay pursues the development of Charles Taylor’s concept of “strong evaluation” from his first publications on this topic until his most recent uses of the concept. Because Taylor employs strong evaluation in discussions of philosophical anthropology, ethics, phenomenology, and ontology all in one, it has been (mis)understood in a variety of ways. To clarify his strategy, the analysis gradually progresses beyond strong evaluation to the more fundamental question of the relation between philosophical anthropology, ethics, phenomenology, and ontology in Taylor’s writings. It concludes that Taylor’s reasoning especially deserves further investigation with regard to the ontological implications of strong evaluation. Keywords: Charles Taylor, strong evaluation, ethics, philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, ontology
Review of Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil
Journal of Nietzsche Studies
This is a contribution to a symposium on Clark and Dudrick’s The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. I focus on three aspects of their book. First, I critique Clark and Dudrick’s claim that Nietzsche recognizes a discrete “will to value.” Second, I argue that Clark and Dudrick’s reading of Nietzschean drives (Triebe) as homunculi is indefensible. Third, I raise questions about their claim that Nietzsche understands the self as a “normative ordering” of drives, which they distinguish from a “causal ordering”; I suggest that Nietzsche would reject this causal/normative distinction.
Taylor and the hermeneutic tradition
Charles Taylor, 2004
The chapter shows how the theme of meaning-constitution in relation to human subjectivity runs like a red thread through Taylor’s work on epistemology, philosophy of language and ethics. It draws attention to issues that are commonly regarded as weak points for the hermeneutic tradition Taylor identifies with and it considers whether Taylor is any more successful when dealing with these issues himself.