Morality and the problem of personal identity (original) (raw)
2015
The present text explores the philosophical context of the conceptual „birth“ of the concept of personality as the primary knowledgeable marker of the unique human being as existential self, different from the common concept of „individual“. We trace the main definitions of the concepts person and later the one of "personalitas", claiming that in the scholastic philosophy of 12th and 13th century one could witness a major development of the definition of "persona", which results in the construction of the perosnalitas concept, inherited later by the early modern and modern philosophical thought as the main term denoting the uniqueness of the human being. For the most part this transformation is to be found in several of the works of the 13th century doctor subtilis John Duns Scotus, whose later influence on the university scholastic and the early modern thinking is considered to be essential by the vast majority of the scholars in history of medieval philosophy. The basis of this conceptual development lies in the new perspective, in which the definition of „person“ is problematized. Scotus uses the tradition of the theological Trinitarian debate very well and introduces the persona concept into the field of anthropology, connecting it to the problem of infinite freedom of will of the finite human being and the possibility of a moral act at all. A fundamental role here plays the concept of incommunicability (incommunicabilitas), used by Scotus to define the intensity of the ontological freedom, which one finite rational being could possess, and to draw the boundaries allowing and defining the true moral action of each human being as its metaphysical power to realize its own unique existence. The conclusion we reach is that according to Scotus the personal identity is inextricably bound up with the moral action, as far as the human being is actualizing its nature as a single person by exercising its will, because its existence is a contingent and not necessary an independent one.
Parts and Wholes: Revisiting the Mystery of Identity in Early Philosophy
The nature of the human person has been a central feature of philosophic and theological discourse. Susan Grove Eastman’s Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology represents a recent foray into this trans-categorial topic. She explores Paul’s view of the human person by juxtaposing his writing with ancient and contemporary frameworks, using Epictetus, current psychology, and neuroscience as a few of her chief guides. Her research construes the human person chiefly as relational rather than as a Cartesian, self-enclosed individual. Such a construal in some ways echoes the insights of personalist philosophers (Jacque Maritain, Gabriel Marcel, W. Norris Clarke, Josef Pieper, and John Paul II). But Eastman parts ways in significant respects from their methodology and conclusions. Her work differs insofar as our relational nature is construed in almost exclusively modern sociological and psychological categories which downplay classical tensions between body and soul (as well as matter and spirit) and which also deemphasize reason, agency, and individuality. Yet perhaps the most significant shortcoming of such an approach, is in its laying aside or misconstruing historic philosophic and ecclesial contributions to the inquiry. Ancient and medieval philosophy has a long tradition of philosophic anthropology, and the Church has labored in the past to clarify the nature of personhood, particularly in light of the great Christological and Trinitarian controversies. Further, because Eastman is “not giving a comprehensive overview of either ancient or current views of the person,” the selectivity of her historic dialogue lends itself to a distortion of the options open either to Paul or to his interpreters. This is further prejudiced by Eastman’s claim that to compare historic patterns of thought is to contradict an “embodied, socially embedded understanding of persons.” A result is that Epictetus, who stands in her work as an example of the historic anthropology of the Pauline period, implicitly and precipitously limits the potential range of Paul’s thinking about personhood. To address these problems, the body of this paper offers an initial foray into the broader historic perspective of philosophic anthropology. Plato and Aristotle provide the methodological and philosophic context inherited by virtually every major thinker who follows them in the West, including the Stoics and potentially St. Paul. In so far as a person is not an utterly self-enclosed or self-sufficient being, her work promises to challenge insufficiently developed conceptions of identity, agency, and interiority, particularly those which posit too radical a demarcation between the self and the world, or which fail to grasp the intersubjective nature of our existence. Nevertheless, the notion of identity or personhood as relational requires further development in order not to fall into ambiguity or contradiction. This paper provides some of the initial philosophic context for Eastman, via Plato and Aristotle. It explores their use of mereology (the study of parts and wholes), a virtually universal mode of inquiry into the human person. A complete survey would require a thorough analysis of significant aspects of Platonism, Epicurean and Stoic Philosophy, as well as an exploration of Near Eastern and Jewish thought (chiefly in the Hebrew scriptures), the New Testament as a whole, and later developments in Christian anthropology. We would only then be prepared to engage more recent postmodern frameworks of the human person. Such an overview would nevertheless help us adjudicate personhood from a number of necessary angles. Most fundamentally, it would allow for a historical dialogue in the broadest sense: one which would give due measure not only to the whole scope of philosophy, but especially to the Christian tradition and its fundamental influences. The overarching goal is to understand the human person by seeking a coherent metaphysical and anthropological framework, one which is faithful to Paul and all of Scripture.
The Metaphysics of Personal Identity
2016
One of the most debated topics in medieval philosophy was the metaphysics of identity—that is, what accounts for the distinctness (non-identity) of different individuals of the same, specific kind and the persistence (self-identity) of the same individuals over time and in different possible situations, especially with regard to individuals of our specific kind, namely, human persons. The first three papers of this volume investigate the comparative development of positions. One problem, considered by William of Auvergne and Albert the Great, deals with Aristotle’s doctrine of the active intellect and its relation to Christian philosophical conceptions of personhood. A larger set of issues on the nature and post-mortem fate of human beings is highlighted as common inquiry among Muslim philosophers and Thomas Aquinas, as well as Aquinas and the modern thinker John Locke. Finally, the last two papers offer a debate over Aquinas’s exact views regarding whether substances persist identically across metaphysical “gaps” (periods of non-existence), either by nature or divine power.
Aristotle's concept of individuality: A Hartmanian interpretation
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1980
chief good seems a platitude, and a clear account of what it is is still desired."5 In order to advance his discussion, Aristotle delineates three predominant lifestyles which are enigmatic of man's attempt to achieve eudaimonia. There are, first of all, those who see happiness in terms of pleasure. These are people
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica, 2019
Any discussion on a person's right to identity ought to start with a study of the content of a person's identity. While ascertaining the essence of a person's identity, the author was inclined to think that the development of a personal identity as a permanent concept was promoted by the genesis of the human dignity, individuality, autonomy and personality of a person. It is human dignity, the manifestation of which, inter alia, is to be found in the person's identity, which forms the basis of its legal protection, transforming the identity of a person into legal value and, accordingly, creating the right of a person to identity. Thus the article provides a legally philosophical insight into the historical circumstances in which the concept of personal identity arose, and that are essential for a comprehensive modern understanding of the concept.
A Synergetic Concept of Autonomy and Personhood: Perspectives in Early Christian Thought.
Identity and Self-Respect, ed. by István Bujalos--Anna Kata Váró (Debrecen University Press), 2015
Perspectives in early Christian thought Around 400 we witness the emergence of concurrent anthropological models in several dimensions. First, Augustine luridly opposes Pelagius' concept of absolute human autonomy and self-constitution and develops a vision of humans completely devoid of any valuable initiative-a model so vividly criticized under the guise of Protestantism by Erich Fromm. None of these extreme positions take into account the traditional model developed by early Christian thinkers, i.e. the synergetic pattern, which excludes either complete selfdetermination or absolute dependence on the Other. Second, in striking contrast to this, in the very same period Augustine appropriates a deeply Plotinian notion of the self, where self-knowledge, self-consciousness and self-love are the highest expressions of the divine element in humans, the reflection of the divine Trinity in a single self. Greek authors of the previous period, however, envisage a Divine Trinity, which can be modelled on the human level exclusively through different interpersonal relations from family through Church community to the entire human society. In my paper I explore the Augustinian option, which was more influential in modern European thought-either positively or negatively-and the Greek alternative that appears to be more promising for a less individualistic anthropology. Why should one respect oneself? A plausible answer since Kant-and in a way since Pico della Mirandola's De hominis dignitate − refers to the fact that she or he is an autonomous agent. Another grounds-or possibly another way of expressing the same grounds − can be that she or he is a person. In the following, I shall examine the intrinsic tension within these two concepts as they appear in Late Antiquity.
Persons : their identity and individuation
1998
This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? In chapters 2-3,1 discuss matters related to the first question. In chapter 2,1 discuss 'identity' and 'criterion of identity'. I argue that we ought to understand 'identity' as numerical identity. A 'criterion of identity', I argue, should be understood as a specification of the essential conditions for being an object of some sort S. In chapter 3,1 distinguish between two different accounts of how persons persist; the endurance view (persons persist three-dimensionally through time), and the perdurance view (persons persist four-dimensionally in virtue of having numerically distinct temporal parts). I argue that the endurance view of persons is ontologically prior to the perdurance view; on the ground that objects must always be individuated under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. In chapter 4-8, I discuss the second problem. I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. In chapter 5-7,1 consider in turn Psychological Criterianism, Physical Criterianism and Animalism. I argue that none of these accounts is adequate on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity, or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. In chapter 8, I discuss Non-Criterianism. I consider in turn Cartesianism, The Subjective view and Psychological Substantialism. Against these accounts I argue that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. In chapter 9,1 formulate a biological Non-Criterianistic approach to personal identity; the Revised Animal Attribute View. Person is a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring persons. A person, then, is an animal whose identity as person is primitive in relation to his identity as an animal. I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons.
Last Possible Abstraction: The Persona Concept According to Richard of St. Victor
Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur, 2018
The paper makes a short overview of the first usages of the persona concept in the Western philosophical tradition, starting with Tertullian, the Cappadocian Fathers and Augustine. It is demonstrated that all of these initial usages are lacking the status of clearly defined philosophical concepts. The en is presented the first definition of persona in the Latin thought, which is formulated by Boethius in his famous Treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. The focus of the text falls on the critique of Boethian definition by Richard of St. Victor in his treatise De Trinitate, and on his own definition, given at the same place, which promotes the incommunicability as the essential property of the person. We are especially emphasizing the major importance of the conceptual separation that Richard does between persona and substantia. The latter has a great impact on the development of the personality concept, which is later adopted and unfolded by a number of Western philosophers, including Peter John Olivi, John Duns Scotus and Immanuel Kant. Keywords: person; personality; identity; Self; Boethius; Cappadocian Fathers; Augustine; Duns Scotus; Trinity; Trinitarian debate; substance; incommunicability.
The human person as imago dei: christian and jewish perspectives
2014
This thesis explores the evolution of the biblical concept of imago Dei. Written from the perspective of Christian theology, the thesis engages select Jewish and Christian voices in analysis of the shared theological premise that the human person is created in the image of God The discussion will begin with the scriptural origins of the concept, drawing upon exegetical interpretations as well as the early perspectives of the Rabbinic and Patristic period. It will then offer a comparative account of the contributions of Maimonides and Aquinas, in their intellectualist conceptions of human distinctiveness. From there, the discussion will turn to the Christological appropriation of the concept in work of Karl Barth and then to the covenantal, dialogical interpretation of David Novak. In both of these thinkers, we will observe a rejection of the intellectualism of Aquinas and Maimonides in favour of relational interpretations which are, in their integrative understanding of the person a...
Bioethics and the identity of the human person
Revista Romana De Bioetica, 2013
, what is a person?, then we should start out from the experience we have about ourselves, the experiences of our body, from the continuity in which the experience of knowledge and thinking is the experience of our entire person and not of a part (I'm the one thinking, not my brain thinking about me). On the other hand there are sufficient biological, anthropological and ontological arguments, which show that the concept of human being and the one of person may be used as synonymous terms, since they indicate the same reality. The question is why we still prefer to use the concept of person and not the one of human being. The answer seems as simple as possible. Although we essentially express the same reality, yet the concept of person attributed to man serves to express uniqueness, for the way a person is different from any other beings. Christian faith is presented as a place to be welded "the claim of dignity and human life socialization". Human ego finds actually in God not only his Creator, but also his absolute interlocutor, not just a master of life, but a Father of life, a Brother in human history, allowing us to understand the deep meaning of being created after the image and likeness of God. In this article we want to offer our reflections a scientific but also religious nature, regarding the secrecy and the permanent miracle of the human person's life.
The Question of Identity in Man the Philosopher and its functionality in our Seminary Formation.
ABSTRACT This paper is an urgent reaction to the misconception of the relevance of philosophy in our contemporary world. This work centers on the idea of giving a definite stand for identifying who bears the burden of answering a philosopher and the responsibility attached. It is also a reaction on the present situation whereby all have lost hope of transcending the level of what they believe and the viewing of nature as a stagnant phenomenon instead of realizing its dynamic nature. It helps to suggest an answer to what could heal these wounds and ensure harmony. That was why the discourse started with an introduction that reinstates the position of man as a knowing being. And it continued by tracing the conceptual meaning of identity which is the key operative word in this work. It went further to delve into the functionality of identity in man giving it a base on sameness which evokes comparison. The work took another length to consider the Igbo identity of 'mmadu' (human being) by giving analysis of man and his important cosmic position with regard to ensuring a beauty-filled life. It garnered strength by tracing the philosophical quest from the outset and locating its crux in man with Socratic insight. The work considered in an elaborate manner the character required of a philosopher and then planted its seed in our seminary formation. It developed a suggestive conclusion to digest the topic and for a fruitful consideration of philosophy.
THE THEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF HUMAN IDENTITY
European Journal of Science and Theology, 2021
Given to himself as a gift and imposed upon himself as a task, man faces the challenge of a specific kind of self-creation: being someone in an ontic sense and becoming someone in an ethical sense. Thus, having been endowed with the primordial unity and dynamics, the natural skills, the ability to use reason and, from a theological perspective, also the grace and gifts of the Holy Spirit, man is given the task of further integrating himself. In the act of bringing him into existence, God invites man to join Him in the creation of a complete form of mature subjectivity. As the foundation of human beingness, God remains hidden in the gift of grace, a gift that does not diminish the autonomy or restrict the freedom of created beings as they aspire to the fullness of perfection. In the dialogical relationship between man's self-creation and God's act of creation with His constant companionship to man, the latter can cognise ever more fully the many opportunities to attain the perfection that God has foreseen and respond to those opportunities in the freedom bestowed upon himself.
The Person: Readings in Human Nature - Preface with overview
The Person: Readings in Human Nature, 2006
What is a person? The history of this concept (πρόσωπον = prosōpon in Greek, persona in Latin, Person in German, personne in French) is intertwined with the histories of such concepts as human being, individual, soul, subject, self, ego, and mind. But while these comprise a constellation of interconnected and sometimes overlapping ideas, each has its own conceptual history, its own distinct evolution. Consequently, person does not admit of a clumsy, ham-handed semantic reduction to more basic concepts. This selection of readings is an attempt to trace in outline one trajectory in the philosophical history of the idea of the person. It is of course not intended even to approach a comprehensive study. While not disguising preferences, I tried to avoid indulging in idiosyncrasy. My goal is to offer a group of stimulating readings that revolve around a single rich, widely debated, and seemingly indefeasible concept. My hope is that this book will prove useful to students and teachers of philosophy in a variety of courses in which the concept of the person figures, including courses on the Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Anthropology, and Personal Identity. The reader will judge the extent to which I have succeeded in weaving together these diverse selections with continuous thematic threads. If the net result is closer to a coherent whole than a hodgepodge, I will be satisfied. To allow flexibility in course design, two tables of contents are provided-one chronological, one topical. Topics are grouped under seven headings: A) conceptual history, B) personology (account of the person), C) identity of persons, D) divine persons in the Christian tradition, E) nonhuman persons and human non-persons, and F) persons viewed from outside Christian, Euro-American culture. Some readings appear under more than one heading. Instructors are encouraged to experiment with grouping the readings to serve their particular needs. For ease of reference, the readings are arranged chronologically. They begin with the prehistory of the concept in Plato and Aristotle. The inception of the concept in ancient Stoicism (Cicero and Epictetus) is followed by the development of the concept through medieval discussions of the divine persons of the Trinity. Key texts on the concept in the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and 19 th century European philosophy show an increasing emphasis on theories of personal identity. Selections from 20 th century Anglo-American males are balanced with contributions by women philosophers (Weil, Warren, Rorty, Midgley). Some religious pluralism is gained with the perspectives of Taoism (Smullyan), Buddhism (R. Taylor, Parfit), and Islam (Legenhausen) alongside the texts in Christian theology.
Center for Human Rights Studies, 2010
The contributions of Greek philosophy to human understanding are broadly known and deeply appreciated. Perhaps less appreciated are its contribution to the religious understanding of Christianity and Islam. These need to be known and celebrated. At the same time, however, it is important to be aware of the limitations of the ancient Greek mind in order to shed light on the later contributions of the great monotheistic religions to the appreciation of the dignity of all human beings as persons in the image of God. This, in turn, provides the realist metaphysical foundation for the rights of persons and peoples. That is Part I of this study. Part II will examine, in contrast, the secularizing character of the modern humanistic and rationalistic paradigm. This results in the paradox that the very dynamism whereby human rights are strongly affirmed eats away at their foundations. Part III will then search for ways of restoring the religious foundations of human rights for our global age. Upon reflection it becomes apparent that the human mind has always been theistic. In the earliest prehistoric times this had the form of totemism in which all was understood in terms of the one totally unique totem. In time this was succeeded by a mythic stage, i.e., by thinking imaginatively in terms of families of gods. Hierarchically related, these expressed a foundational unity. It was natural then that with the initiation of philosophical reflection Parmenides' first conclusion was that being was one, infinite and unchanging. What was most clear and most necessary was the One; its recognition came first; what was problematic was not the one God, but the multiplicity of persons and thing.
Knowledge and Reality - Personal identity as a constitution out of soul and body
I will argue in this paper that our personal identity is neither soul nor body, nor is it a composite of the two but it is a constitution out of the soul and the body. This constitutive view is one that subsumes and harmonizes the views of personal identity such as animalism, the brain view, the psychological continuity view, and soul view. The harmonizing is done by categorizing the psychological continuity view under the soul view, and brain view and animalism view under the body. First, I will define the terms soul, body and the constitution out of the two. Next, I will show how harmonizing overcomes the problems of the individual views of personal identity. Following that, I will raise an objection against my claim by stating that the act of the non-physical soul only being able to manifest itself physically makes it a physical substance. I will then refute that objection by stating that the essence of the soul and mental thoughts is its non-physicality and our instinctive views the physical and mental substances. The conclusion will summarise the points and reiterate that our personal identity is a constitution out of the soul and body
Soul as the Sole Determinant of Human Personality in Plato and Yoruba Traditional Thought
Cross-cultural Communication, 2014
The soul, as a concept, has been a subject of philosophical inquiry in ancient, medieval and modern history of ideas. There is no universal agreement on the nature or purpose of the soul. Thus, the term "soul" has been given various definitions according to the philosophical theories and cultural perspectives in which it is defined. Soul, according to many religious and philosophical traditions, is the "self-aware essence" unique to a particular living being. In these traditions, the soul is believed to incorporate the inner essence of each living being. Both Plato and the Yoruba consider the soul as the immaterial element that, together with the material body, constitutes the human individual. Plato in The Republic presents a tripartite soul which harmonious interaction produces an esteemed human personality. This Plato's idea mirrors the notion of the Yoruba that a man's soul is the reflection of his personality. The word 'soul' has been investigated from divergent thematic perspectives ─ invisibility, intangibility, immortality and reincarnation ─ but this paper sets as its task to examine the Platonic and Yoruba presentations of the soul as the sole determinant of human personality.
Personal and spiritual identity
1980
Not all concepts are learned in the same manner, nor by their acquisition are we equipped with the same sorts of instrumentalities. Take the concept of a unicorn: A fairly detailed description of one would be sufficient for you to learn this idea. Your knowledge would then allow me to expect several things of you: That you could then teach someone else this concept in the same way, i.e. by description; that you could pick out a unicorn from pictures of unicorns and other animals; that if asked, you could proceed to check whether there were any such things in existence; that, after discovering there were none, you would remain undaunted about the meaning of the concept and be the wiser as to its proper context of use, e.g. literature, mythology, and occasionally, philosophy. Here then is the sort of concept we can add to our lives or quite easily get along without. Not so with every concept. Some are indispensable. About one of these concepts St. Augustine said: "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know."1 Another such concept is that of person. Learning these concepts connects us to so many varied arenas of life, yet, unlike the situation with "unicorn", we seem unable to adequately render their meaning. But these grand concepts are distinguished in another way: they relate us in a different way altogether to the question of existence. Recognizing the identity of a thing presupposes our knowledge of the kind of thing it is. But differences in the sort of concept involved play a significant role at this point. We can note and pick out the same unicorn before and after the existence question has been answered. Pictures, paintings and storybook descriptions make this possible. The situation changes with the concept of person. Here, the question of existence is taken care of differently and the character of judgements of identity reflect this special aspect of the matter. In his recent book, The Coherence of Theism. 2 Professor R.G. Swinburne treates the issue of personal identity in a way which largely ignores these features peculiar to concepts like that of person. His work
Person: Substance and Relation
This paper analyzes the emergence of the concept of "person" in early Christian trinitarian theology and christology. In spite of the substantialist turn of some medieval thought, the paper highlights resources in modern thought to help understand the human person in more relational terms.