Reconciling the Past and the Present: Evaluating the Dayton Peace Agreement 1995 (original) (raw)
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Is Dayton Failing: Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement
In anticipation of the fourth anniversary on 21 November 1999 of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, this report presents a detailed analysis of the agreement and the future of the Bosnian peace process. The report assesses efforts to implement the agreement annex by annex, identifying obstacles to continued progress and setting out key choices facing international policymakers. A traditional peace treaty consists of a cease-fire and arms reduction and boundary demarcation agreements. Dayton went far beyond these goals to create a new state, comprised of two multi-ethnic entities. Dayton's aim was to not only stop the fighting, but to reverse ethnic cleansing and provide a blueprint for a unified country. Today Bosnia and Herzegovina has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper and operates at the mercy of the entities. Indicted war criminals remain at large and political power is concentrated largely in the hands of hard line nationalists determined to obstruct international efforts to advance the peace process. In many areas, local political leaders have joined forces with police and local extremists to prevent refugees from returning to their pre-war homes. The effect has been to cement wartime ethnic cleansing and maintain ethnic cleansers in power within mono-ethnic political frameworks. The few successes of Dayton – the Central Bank, a common currency, common license plates, state symbols and customs reforms – are superficial and were imposed by the international community. Indeed, the only unqualified success has been the four-year absence of armed conflict. A thorough examination of the Dayton Peace Accords, annex by annex, indicates that the ethnic cleansers are winning the battle to shape post-war Bosnia. All in all, significant portions of Dayton remain unimplemented. In spite of the High Representative's recent energetic and long-awaited actions on refugee returns, it is too early to state whether or not they will translate into actual implementation. Local authorities continue to demand donor aid in return for partial co-operation. Dayton’s fragile and limited achievements to date could now be threatened as donor aid starts to fall. The inability of donors to hold out the promise of aid could cause local leaders to be even more non-compliant than now. The severe economic downturn and negative GDP growth that a reduction in aid will cause can only aggravate social unrest. Pensions are in arrears, and estimates of unemployment range from 39 percent in the Federation to 50 percent in Republika Srpska. Social discontent has already burst into the open, with demonstrators regularly blocking highways and buildings. Ominously, in the past, many local politicians have channelled this unrest into nationalism. The current policies for implementing Dayton are flawed, due to the refusal of the NATO-led international force (SFOR) to fulfil its mandate and act as an implementing agent, despite clear authorisation to do so under the terms of the agreement. In addition, two out of the three ethnic groups actively oppose Dayton, and are prepared to wait until such a time as the international community withdraws and the agreement can be laid to rest. Unless a way can be found to break the current deadlock, the agreement’s only major success – peace – will be increasingly at risk. While peace was a worthy and admirable goal, it was the promise of implementation of certain key principles and the creation of a unified state that persuaded the Bosniaks in particular to sign the agreement in 1995. Unlike the Serbs and Croats, they demand a higher level of implementation of all the Dayton annexes throughout all three ethnic areas. The failure of current policies to ensure complete implementation could yet trigger renewed fighting, particularly as the international community starts to withdraw. As the 1998 Madrid Implementation Council noted, “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s structure remains fragile. Without the scaffolding of international support, it would collapse”. The international community must now examine seriously its options for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future. These policy options include: 1. Pulling out immediately; 2. Maintaining the present approach; 3. Rewriting the Dayton Peace Accords; 4. Enforcing Dayton more robustly; 5. Creating an international protectorate for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community must decide if Dayton is worth salvaging, or whether a complete pullout is warranted, as isolationist forces in some countries urge. If the international community decides to pull out, it must be prepared for the very real possibility that the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks will attempt to achieve their unrealised war aims through violence. All the hard-won progress of the last four years will be lost. If the international community chooses this option, it must decide if it is willing to pay the social, political, economic, and human costs associated with a renewed war in the Balkans, as well as the implications for broader pan-Balkan and European stability. If, on the other hand, the international community wishes to remain engaged in Bosnia, it must choose one of the remaining options, realising that some could also lead to renewed fighting. The International Crisis Group does not believe that Option Two – maintaining the present approach – provides a viable basis for long-term peace in Bosnia. Option Three, while risking renewed fighting, could also lead to a positive reinterpretation of the political realities in place and lead to a lasting peace. Options Four and Five, while requiring a more focused long-term international presence, would lock in the gains made to date and create an environment conducive to the development of an international exit strategy, and the emergence of Bosnia as a self-sustaining economic and political unit. Option Four would require a more robust approach within the Dayton framework, both by SFOR and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), as well as more targeted approaches to aid. Option Five, while unpopular abroad, is very popular in Bosnia, and would enable the international community to correct some of Dayton's mistakes. Sarajevo, 28 October, 1999
The Bosnian Peace Process: The Power-Sharing Approach Revisited
2007
This article argues that the post-Dayton political organisation of Bosnia represents an exemplary illustration of the difficulties associated with the empirical application of the pluralist model of “consociational democracy”. The country’s political system has been predicated on the existence of consensus and the spirit of cooperation among the three ethnic groups without, however, offering any electoral or political incentives to their leaderships to cooperate. Also, the inclusion of several elements to the Dayton accords of a partition approach to conflict resolution has even encouraged the ethnic leaderships to maintain their nationalistic programs and their endeavours to exploit the aforementioned power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, the structural deficiencies of the Dayton agreement have permitted nationalists to continue implementing their ethnic agendas and have accounted for the slow progress towards the implementation of the Bosnian peace process. Therefore, this article elaborates on the international policies in Bosnia, aimed at transforming the country into a viable multiethnic state, and highlights the significance of motivations for implementing the peace process.
2000 From Conflict to reconciliation PP.pdf
Intractable intergroup conflicts require the formation of a conflictive ethos that enables a society to adapt to the conflict situation, survive the stressful period, and struggle successfully with the adversary. The formal termination of such a conflict begins with the elimination of the perceived incompatibility between the opposing parties through negotiation by their representatives-that is, a conflict resolution process. But this is only part of the long-term reconciliation process, which requires the formation of peaceful relations based on mutual trust and acceptance, cooperation, and consideration of mutual needs. The psychological aspect of reconciliation requires a change in the conflictive ethos, especially with respect to societal beliefs about group goals, about the adversary group, about the ingroup, about intergroup relations, and about the nature of peace. In essence, psychological reconciliation requires the formation of an ethos of peace, but this is extremely difficult in cases of intractable conflict. Political psychologists can and should work to improve the state of knowledge about reconciliation, which until now has received much less attention than conflict resolution.
This study analyzes four mediation initiatives in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to understand the differences between mediators' capabilities and their effect on the negotiating flexibility of the disputing parties. It is claimed that regardless of the outcomes of the negotiations, in all mediation cases, parties adopted flexible negotiating behavior in the form of making or offering concessions, agreements on rules and procedures, agreements on mutual solutions, and introducing new peace proposals. In all instances, the mediators played both the facilitator and manipulator roles. The difference between a mediation process leading to an agreement and one ending with a stalemate is found in the way and extent to which a mediator uses his or her leverage in playing the role of a manipulator.
Journal of Human Rights, 2017
This article uses the northwestern Bosnian village of Prijedor as a case study to empirically engage with theoretical debates about how to understand and research reconciliation and its causes in postconflict societies. It starts with a review of almost 60 different academic definitions of reconciliation with a goal to map out a comprehensive overview of various types and levels of the phenomenon. It then tests the theoretical analytical 18-box matrix devised with data gathered in Prijedor (BiH) during two consecutive periods of fieldwork in order to further improve it and to introduce a temporal dimension into the research of reconciliation.
2011
This thesis aims to design an analytical framework to develop analysis on reconciliation processes within post-violent contexts. The text exposes two specific analytical methodologies: the quantitative and the qualitative one. The qualitative methodology is chosen to analyze two initiatives carried out in the frame of post-war Bosnia, to explore how these practices have been implemented and whether they had a really impact on the process of reconciliation. Through the exposition of an analytical approach and its specific methodologies, the text opens future analytical research on the path of reconciliation processes.
The Third Pillar: The Role of Reconciliation in Supporting Peace Agreements
2017
Social-psychological research suggests that parties in conflict develop a conflict identity which becomes independent of the conflict itself contributing to the breakdown of agreements and the continuation of the conflict. This identity, formed of collective memories, negative stereotypes, existential fears and strong emotions, requires more than a passing nod to reconciliation in a peace settlement. Yet neither policy-makers nor political science research have paid much attention to these dynamics. Traditionally considered as a complement or final stage of the conflict resolution process, reconciliation activities have not been viewed as integral to increasing the durability of peace settlements. However, if the “mind and heart” remain armed, the hand will always find a weapon, even after the most rigorous post-conflict peace-building programmes. The central argument of the thesis is that institutionalising and implementing reconciliation measures are fundamental to increasing the ...