Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem (original) (raw)

Hylomorphism Extended: Dynamical Forms and Minds

Philosophies

Physical objects are compounds of matter and form, as stated by Aristotle in his hylomorphism theory. The concept of “form” in this theory refers to physical structures or organizational structures. However, mental processes are not of this kind, they do not change physical arrangement of neurons, but change their states. To cover all natural processes hylomorphism should acknowledge differences between three kinds of forms: Form as physical structure, form as function resulting from organization and interactions between constituent parts, and dynamical form as state transitions that change functions of structures without changing their physical organization. Dynamical forms, patterns of energy activation that change the flow of information without changing the structure of matter, are the key to understand minds of rational animals.

6. Mere Hylomorphism and Neuroscience

Minding the Brain: Models of the Mind, Information, and Empirical Science, 2023

The ancient doctrine of hylomorphism has made something of a comeback in recent years among both philosophers working in the metaphysics of material composition and philosophers of mind. It is attractive to the latter, because hylomorphism promises to split the difference between materialism and more robust forms of dualism in intuitively satisfying ways. Nevertheless, hylomorphism as it has been applied to the mind-body problem is not without its critics. On the one hand, many worry that hylomorphism is really just an obfuscating version of substance dualism conveniently trading between incompatible accounts of the soul either as some sort of non-substantial, abstract entity or an individual substance-like entity. On the other hand, some worry that hylomorphism is really just a “polite form of materialism” that offers nothing more intuitively satisfying than standard forms of non-reductive physicalism, except for the fact that its talk of “souls” is attractive to those concerned with squaring materialist approaches to mind and orthodox religious views. My hunch is that these criticisms are less due to a failure to understand hylomorphism on the part of its critics, and more so as a result of the way in which hylomorphism is presented by its proponents. Aristotle’s original proposal for a distinction between matter and form was not intended as a doctrine narrowly construed for the philosophy of mind, and even less so to solve anything akin the modern mind-body problem that has vexed us these last few centuries. Rather Aristotle’s hylomorphism is a holistic doctrine that can only be understood as it incorporates and synthesizes elements from his philosophy of nature, metaphysics, teleological ethics, and philosophy of “mind.” In what follows, I will present Aristotle’s hylomorphism as it can be extracted from some of the more salient moments in his Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and De Anima. I call the position I will construct “Mere Hylomorphism,” because I take it as the minimal doctrine one must accept to be a hylomorphist in continuity with Aristotle, though I am aware that other versions worthy of consideration are on offer. Moreover, I do not propose Mere Hylomorphism as a definitive interpretation of Aristotle, but simply as a plausible position that can be constructed from some of his most central texts. I will recommend Mere Hylomorphism on the grounds that it reveals hylomorphism as having intuitive appeal while clearly being neither a sly dualism, nor a polite materialism. We will also see that Mere Hylomorphism is recommended by the fact that it underwrites an integration between philosophy of mind and neuroscience.

ENCOUNTERING MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A JOURNEY THROUGH ST. THOMAS’ MODIFIED HYLOMORPHISM

Synopsis “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit raises to the contemplating of truth: and God has place in the human heart a desire to know the truth - in a word, to know himself - so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves.” These are the beginning words of John Paul II’s 13th Encyclical ‘Fides et Ratio’. Here Pope highlights the idea that each human being has a desire to know himself. This same conception can be traced back from Socrates’ words ‘Know thyself’. This is the main search or main theme in almost all Indian Philosophical schools. This self-knowledge is well-known in the realistic sense also because this will help one to lead a meaningful life. When we ask the question ‘who are we?’ two words may come to our mind i.e., mind and body. Body as the physical part of us doesn’t have anything to do with our curiosity, because it physically perceivable. The word ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ always fascinates our thoughts, because this word itself has some mysterious content where we could not reach with our external eyes. This scientific paper on ‘Encounter Mind-body Problem: A Journey through St. Thomas Aquinas’ Modified Hylomorphism’, is a research through the philosophy of mind with an aim to find an amiable answer to the question of mind-body problem. St. Thomas Aquinas was an Italian friar of the thirteenth century and he is known as Catholic Theologian more than as a medieval philosopher. So the title of the scientific paper may lead to the question ‘why should anyone wish to study the philosophy or psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas to solve a purely philosophical problem. This question can be answered by the terms that is used in the title itself i.e., ‘Modified Hylomorphism.’ The term hylomorphism is traced back to Aristotle’s doctrine of Hylomorphism i.e., reality is constituted by form and matter. In the deeper sense it means that human beings are composed of soul as form and body as matter. In his psychology Aquinas takes doctrine of Hylomorphism and gives it a Christian colouring and makes it acceptable to Christian dogmas. So Aquinas’ modified hylomorphism could be best possible theory which could answer this philosophical issue. In first section of this research paper I have made a historical analysis on mind-body problem. First of all let us make clarity to the term ‘mind.’ In philosophy, religion, psychology, and cognitive sciences the term ‘mind’ has a number of usages. We glance over at least four of them which carry the four senses of the ‘mind-body problem. Firstly, we may use the term ‘mind’ as Descartes had used the term ‘mens’, to refer mental properties such as thought, sense, belief, desire etc. Secondly, we may employ the term ‘mind’ to refer to a person’s intellectual capacities and capabilities. Thirdly, we may speak of a person’s mind as being by means of which he thinks. Fourthly, the term ‘mind’ may used to designate or denote a spiritual substance and individual thing of an immaterial nature. In this philosophical enquiry I would like to take the term ‘mind’ as that consist of both the first and last usages together. For him human being is not composed of two substances such as body and soul, but they together constitute a substance i.e., human being. For example, in the case of understanding something, neither the soul alone nor body alone understands, but it is the whole human being who understands. So he calls them ‘incomplete substances.’ He says in his commentary on St. Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians’ (15:17-19): “My soul is not me (anima mea non est ego).” Here he denies Plato’s notion of human being as soul. According to Aquinas “what I am, what you are, what everyone else is, is nothing less than a human being. And he refuses to identify the individual with the individual’s soul, as Descartes’ was to do.” Aquinas considers human soul as the principle of one’s intellectual activity and it is incorporeal and subsisting substatial form which can either exist in union with or independent of matter. It here we can find the reall distiction between human soul and animal soul, because animal soul is non-subsisting substantial form in Aquinas’s own words i.e., it can exist only in union with matter. Human being’s soul is not in the body as a hand in the glove or it is not united to body as an organist is united with the musical instrument. The examples mentioned above are instances of accidental union. It is not applicable in the case of soul and body. Rather human soul is joined with its body in substantial union. In his master piece Aquinas gives answer to the question where the mind is located? Here he says that the power of soul can be exercised in all parts of body; in respect to sight it is in the eye, in respect to hearing it is in the ear and so on. The comparison between Aquinas’ modified hylomorphism with the dualistic and monistic philosophies of mind held that Aquinas’ conception of mind is in the middle position between monism and dualism. So his theory is free from the major demerits of both theories and the typical mind-body problem is inapplicable here. Because there is no interaction between the mind and body. When we speak of interaction let us make clear that there are mainly two reasons to hold that in Aquinas conception of mind there is no interaction between mind and body. Firstly, in this conception soul does not drive the body; instead, the soul structures the body that determines the organization of the body and its action or behavior. Secondly, in this conception, soul and body are unified by their interaction in a human being. So the mind-body problem ‘how immaterial, non-physical and non-spatial mind interact with spatial, physical and material body?’ cannot be attributed to Aquinas philosophy of mind. A human being for Aquinas is a complex of prime matter and substantial form. So there is no problem of dual properties, because human being is seen here as compound being. Even though his theory had more clarity, he failed to answer the questions of separateness, individuation and continuation of the soul after death, etc. Though these questions are relevant; Aquinas contributions to the philosophy of mind are worthy of philosophical investigation. Aquinas’ errors in the separateness, continuation and individuation of the soul after death could be answered by the Peter Inwagen by proposing a ‘naked kernel’ model of survival of the person. He states that at the time of disintegration of human body ‘naked kernel’ remains for the minimal material continuity of the person. Peter Inwagen takes the term ‘naked kernel’ from St. Paul’s First Letter to Corinthians chapter 15, versus 37 which state that “as for what you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare seed, perhaps of wheat or some other grain.” Peter Inwagen interprets these words to give a best possible answer to the question of continuity of the soul after death. He states that as in the case of wheat which is sown will be transformed into new crop, and yet this is continuation at the resurrection and the corrupted body will transform into uncorrupted heavenly body. This model of survival of the person solves Aquinas’ errors. The insight that I have received from this research paper is that the veil that covers the concept of mind is never removed. The term ‘Mind’ still remains mysterious. This reality does not discourage us; rather it shows us that there is something more to find out. So let us sharpen our thoughts and reason, and begin our intellectual research on ‘Mind.’ As Blessed John Paul II instructed, let us use our faculties of faith and reason in this journey to find out our own human nature, which is our basic thirst. `

1 Platonic model of mind as an approximation to neurodynamics

Citeseer

One of the biggest challenges of science today is to outline connections between the subjective world of human experience, as studied by psychology, and the objective world of measurable brain events, as studied by neuroscience. In this paper a series of approximations to neural dynamics is outlined, leading to a phenomenological theory of mind based on concepts directly related to human cognition. Behaviorism is based on an engineering approach, treating the mind as a control system for the organism. This corresponds to an approximation of the recurrent neural dynamics (brain states) by finite state automata (behavioral states). Another approximations to neural dynamics is described, leading to a Platonic-like model of mind based on psychological spaces. Objects and events in these spaces correspond to quasi-stable states of brain dynamics and may be interpreted from psychological point of view. Platonic model bridges the gap between the neurophysiological brain events and higher cognitive functions realized by the mind. Categorization experiments with human subjects are presented as a challenge for mind-brain theories. Wider implications of this model as a basis for cognitive science are discussed and possible extensions outlined. 1

The Entanglement Problem for Psychological Hylomorphism

Res Philosophica, 2025

The theory of psychological hylomorphism has recently been advanced by David Charles as a viable alternative to physicalist and dualist theories of the mind. According to Charles, a human or animal is a psycho-physical whole whose mental and physical properties are defined with reference to the whole. This is because it is a hylomorphic composite of matter and form, where the form contains the material principles of the composite in its definition. In this essay, we raise a difficulty concerning the individuation of forms in the light of the quantum theory of matter, asking whether the phenomenon of quantum entanglement gives us reason to doubt that the micro-physical properties of a human or animal derive (solely) from the psycho-physical properties of a middle-sized whole. We suggest several ways of amending the theory of psychological hylomorphism to accommodate entanglement, including a proposal by Simpson in which the cosmos counts as a psycho-physical whole.

A dialogue concerning the mind-body problem

2019

Three monist views on the mind-body problem are presented. Triple-aspect monism considers that there are three main phases of actualization of the potentialities in Nature: the physical, the informational, and the conscious. The double-face view assumes that conscious mind and brain are irreducible to each other, stressing not only that the conscious mind is dependent on the brain, but that changes in the brain are also dependent on the conscious mind. Qualitative physicalism adopts the mindbrain identity thesis, and defends the view that subjective qualia are actual physical attributes of some region of the brain.

Hylomorphism and the New Mechanist Philosophy in Biology, Neuroscience, and Psychology

Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science, ed. William Simpson, Robert Koons & Nicholas Teh, 2017

In this essay I argue that contemporary versions of Aristotelian hylomorphism and the “new mechanist philosophy” in biology, neuroscience, and psychology share significant commitments about the reality of the organized causal components of mechanisms. My aim is to challenge the well-known narrative that hylomorphic and mechanistic ontologies are fundamentally incompatible by establishing that the new mechanist philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism are not only complementary, but are defending many of the same ontological claims. I begin with a brief sketch of the fundamental claims of hylomorphism (§I). I then situate the new mechanist philosophy (NMP) within recent developments in philosophy of science, before introducing the basic framework of NMP. In the last two sections of the paper I argue for the compatibility of hylomorphism and NMP. I start with the major points of agreement between hylomorphism and NMP (§III). Significantly, I establish that NMP is committed to organization or structure realism (a touchstone of hylomorphism), and neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is committed to the reality of mechanisms or causal powers that produce, underlie, or maintain the behavior or capacity of (i) phenomena that are constituted through the (ii) spatial, temporal, and active organization of their (iii) component entities and (iv) component activities (the four hallmarks of NMP). In the last section (§IV) I introduce some possible points of disagreement between these two positions pertaining to hylomorphism’s substance–attribute ontology, emergence, downward causation, and teleology. I show that the disagreements about these topics do not distinguish hylomorphists from new mechanists, but represent disagreements among hylomorphists and among new mechanists. I conclude that Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism should not been seen as fundamentally opposed to mechanisms, but that it can and should embrace the many complementary features of the new mechanist philosophy in biology, neuroscience and psychology.