Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making (original) (raw)
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The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitu¬tional suggestion, bringing a severe penalty if found guilty. We know of 35 such cases between 403 and 322. During the fourth century the notion of illegality was extended to a mere question of undesirability. Henceforth any decision by the Assembly could be overturned by the courts, but if the accuser failed to get at least 20% of the jury votes, he was punished instead. While these rules can be seen as a safeguard against bad decisions, they also provided the Athenian politicians with important information about the relative strength of their political support. This effect has...
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In the present essay we examine decision-making and choice under direct democracy procedures, focusing on two famous examples: Themistocles’ Naval Law of 483/2 BCE and modern Greece’s referendum of June 2015. They concerned, in a broad sense, the choice between the finance of public good(s) versus the increase in available personal income. We analyse the similarities and differences in the institutional setting, the means available for discussion and consensus building and the actual outcomes, which were different: in ancient Athens the outcome was in favour of the “public good” defense and in modern Greece, it was of no consequence since the final actual outcome was contrary to the referendum. Lastly, we offer some thoughts regarding the different outcomes, which were dependent on the specific perceptions of each issue, the possibility of disaggregation of choice elements, the time horizon and historic context and the perception of citizens-voters, as to the “quality” of their gove...
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The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitutional suggestion, bringing a potentially severe penalty if found guilty. We know of 35 such cases between 403 and 322. During the fourth century the notion of illegality was extended to a mere question of political undesirability. Henceforth any decision by the Assembly could be overturned by the courts, but if the accuser failed to get at least 20% of the jury votes, he was punished instead. While these rules can be seen as a safeguard against bad decisions, they also provided the Athenian politicians with important information about the relative strength of their political support. This effect has not been analysed before, and it may help explain the relative stability of political life in classical Athens. Furthermore this analysis also contributes to our understanding of a curious but often overlooked fact, namely that the decrees of the Athenian Assembly to a great extent concerned honorary rewards, and the use of the graphe paranomon in turn was largely focussed on the honorary decrees.
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions*
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004
Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We define an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business. for helpful conversations and comments, and Takehiko Yamato for detailed comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. We are also grateful for suggestions by Alberto Alesina and two anonymous referees that have improved the paper. Financial support under NSF grant SES-9986190 and under DCGYT Direcció General de Recerca projects PD-98-0870 and SGR-980062 is gratefully acknowledged. This project was initiated during a visit of Barbera to Caltech.