Political Dynasties in a Democracy: Why Political Families Exist and Persist in the United States of America (original) (raw)

Political Dynasties

2007

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.

Democratic Dynasties: Explaining Their Prevalence in Modern Democracies

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Though no systematic cross-national data exist political dynasties seem common in some countries yet almost completely absent in others. Dynasties might be important because if dynastic politics is common it may prevent meritocratic access to position of political power, thus denying the political system talent. But what explains the existence and variation in the extent of political dynasties? The popular literature seems to point to culture, but we develop a theory based on the electoral system and party organisation. In short we expect dynasties to be more common where the electoral system is candidate based and where party organisations are personalised rather than institutionalised. Using a number of cases, Argentina, the US, the UK, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands and Israel we find support for our hypothesis.

Political Dynasties issues are useful for a remarkable family

In structure affluence in the advantage of their picked positions, political Dynasty can use sway, join money related resources and use their political contraption to abuse business openings. Political Dynasty will undoubtedly utilize their budgetary cutoff points sharing awards, dedication administrations, and court ball instead of placing assets into social progression programs, fiscal exercises, and establishment. Under tight restrictions and Equality Most made countries. Political customs convey the capacity to deplete the endowments of those specialists. Closeness The capacities, characteristics, and ethics of the work only from time to time improve from forever, especially to mind-boggling families who value the comfort and position of the effect. Intrinsic Aftereffects OF Political Line exactly when people from a comparative family include various circumstances inside a city or Town, most will likely merge the power in a truly monarchial way. New considerations have been backed off by the coordination of the board capacities as negative personal conduct standards are intensified. The administration progresses control by removing others from a just opportunity to serve. Thus, it decreases the element of political participation among people.

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES POLITICAL DYNASTIES

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.

White House Inheritors and Climbers: Presidential Kin, Class, and Performance, 1789–2002

New England Journal of Public Policy, 2003

To attain the highest rungs along the public ladder in a democratic society requires a fortuitous combination of talent, intelligence, and luck. Many seek those highest rungs; few attain them. Because democracy pays homage, often cynically, to the White House Inheritors and Climbers Presidential Kin, Class, and Performance, 1789-2002 Garrison Nelson The 2000 presidential election that pitted Republican Texas Governor George W. Bush, the son of a former president against Democratic Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., the son of a former U.S. senator was a dramatic reminder that presidential politics in the United States is not an equal opportunity employer. In this article retrospective assessments of presidential performance are related to social class and kinship connections for the forty-two presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush. Three separate evaluations of presidential performance were used: the 1989 Murray-Blessing Survey; the widely cited 1996 New York Times poll prepared by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; and the 200 Federalist Society one prepared by conservative scholars for the Wall Street Journal. The public's assessment was based on polling data from various national polling firms, such as the Gallup, Harris, and Zogby organizations. The performance data was related to presidential kinship data from the New England Historic Genealogical Society in 1989 and 1996 and research on the social class origins of presidents prepared by Professor Edward Pessen. The findings indicate that presidents of upper social class origins scored consistently higher on the performance measures than did presidents of lesser origins. However, the number of presidential kinship connections appears to be unrelated to social class and to presidential performance. For both the historians and the American public, class trumps kin in assessing the quality of presidential performance.

Regulating political dynasties toward a more inclusive society

2015

PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking. The authors are, respectively, senior research fellow at PIDS, executive director of the Asian Institute of Management Rizalino S. Navarro Policy Center for Competitiveness (AIM-RSN-PCC), economist at the AIM-RSN-PCC, and research associate at the AIM-RSN-PCC. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the study’s sponsors. Policy Notes