XLIII. The Geopolitical Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Lebanon (original) (raw)
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The geopolitical impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon
Regional Science Inquiry, 2012
This paper identifies and analyses the geopolitical impact that the Syrian crisis has on Lebanon. This impact is manifested in two forms: a subsystemic one (within the Syria-Lebanon subsystem) and a systemic one (exerted from the system of the wider Middle East). The first refers to the direct repercussions that the increasing instability of the Syrian part has on the Lebanese part of the subsystem. More specifically, the impact that have some factors of the Syrian crisis-namely, increasing sectarianism and Islamic radicalism-on the internal political and religious power relations of Lebanon. The second form of impact refers to the indirect yet critical repercussions that the instability at the centre of the Middle Eastern system has on Lebanon. As a state of proxy actors through which the regional powers project power and as an integral part of the Syria-Lebanon subsystem, Lebanon is the primary point on which the systemic pressure is applied. As a result of this systemic impact, the internal politico-religious power relations of Lebanon become a micro-level representation of the regional power relations of the wider Middle Eastern system.
Lebanon: At the Edge of Another Civil War
DergiPark (Istanbul University), 2008
As the 2006 Israel attack divided Lebanese people into pro-Hezbollah and pro-Western lines, Lebanon has fallen into chaos among its sectarian groups for the first time after the 1975 Civil War. As the eruption of violence in May 2008 left at least 81 people dead and as Lebanon was politically paralysed, the opponent parties decided to withdraw from step back the Gulf Emirate of Qatar. To manage the inherent problems of a country having 17 religious minorities, a weak central state built on power-sharing and a violent history, it is essential to determine the internal and external factors influencing the country's political situation. In this context, this article argues that any agreement reached by the outer forces for Lebanon's peace and stability ignores the Lebanese reality and lacks an enduring solution to the long unresolved conflicts in the country. To understand the underlying factors causing conflicts in the country, it is crucial to note internal and external dynamics constituting modern Lebanon's politic structures' weaknesses.
The Effects of Arab Spring and Syrian Uprising on Lebanon
2013
This paper seeks to analyse the multiple dimensions of the effects of the Arab Spring and Syrian uprising on Lebanon since its inception in 2010. For obvious reasons, the main body of this work will be dedicated to the effects of the Syrian turmoil on the Lebanese scene. The main arguments hereafter will try to show two main effects on Lebanon. Firstly, I will highlight the spill over effect the Arab Spring had on certain groups of the Lebanese civil society and how these actors mobilized a population to address a claim for the abolition of the sectarian system. Secondly, I will underline the polarization effect the Syrian conflict creates in the political scene in Lebanon due mainly to Lebanese actors who use some of its main dimensions (e.g., political, sectarian) for their own purposes. In order to develop these arguments, I will divide the presentation in three sections; the first section will demonstrate the initial impacts on the Lebanese society and also delve in the first po...
The paper analyzes the transformations occurred in the two most active and relevant communities in Lebanon after the end of the civil war, namely the Sunni and the Shiites, in the light of Arab uprisings and of the changes in the regional balance of power. If the meta-narrative of the ‘sectarianization’ of the Middle East, especially after 2011, has powered the interpretation of the regional events as marked by the struggle between Sunni and Shiites, the analysis of the transformations of the above mentioned communities in Lebanon and of their impact on the internal and external level, provides one of the best examples against this simplistic representation: the sectarian contraposition is deeply rooted in Lebanon, a pars constituent of its system, but, despite the rhetoric, both communities tend to have more pragmatic and accommodating attitudes instead of exacerbating sectarian confrontation as the afore-mentioned meta-narrative tends to impose. While it is true that each community has witnessed the radicalization of certain positions and that, over the years, major changes are taking place, those have been fuelled by the meta-narrative that is emerging at the regional level and not by a desire to bring the country to the brink of the abyss
This article argues that, contrary to mainstream liberal school claim, Syria did not act as a destabilizer of the Lebanese confessional system which led to the breakdown of the system and to civil war between 1975 and 1990. Rather, the Syrian regime, driven by the interests of the Damascene bourgeois class closely associated with the transit trade between Beirut and the Gulf region via Damascus, chose to contain the crisis and rehabilitate the confessional system which is a system of hegemony that hinders class struggle to the benefit of the Lebanese mercantile bourgeoisie.