Veganism and 'The Analytic Question' (original) (raw)
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Veganism, Normative Change and Second Nature
Environmental Philosophy
This paper draws on the account of second nature in Aristotle, Dewey and Hegel to examine the way in which norms become embodied. It discusses the implications of this for both the authority of norms and how they can be changed. Using the example of veganism it argues that changing norms requires more than just good reasons. The appreciation of the role of second nature in culture allows us to: firstly, better conceive the difficulty and resistance of individuals to changing norms because of the material resilience of norms, habits and customs in a culture. Secondly, it argues that the effective adoption of a new norm such as veganism or the behavioral change necessary to respond to climate change, requires not just more good reasons but the creation of material pathways in the culture in which those revised norms can be inhabited. In the context of global warming, ecological crisis, a rapidly increasing population and rising concern with the harm caused to animals by factory farming we probably do not need more good arguments for those living in the industrialized world, and increasingly in the developing world, for shifting the Western diet away from animal forms of protein and dairy to far higher levels of dependency upon plants for nutrition. The most principled way to respond to these concerns is veganism. 2 If we assume that the principles that should guide one's action occur within a rational sphere, and if one's concern was to minimize harm to animal life, the earth's ecology and climate then veganism would appear to be an eminently justifiable aspiration. 3 Even if this is a contestable claim, the problem at issue here is complementary to these moral considerations: the difficulty of moral philosophy and good reasons alone to initiate and consolidate normative change in both an individual and a culture. While I use the example of veganism throughout the paper, this is indicative of a broader set of problems that could have been illustrated with the difficulty of changing any 2 I am not concerned in this paper to defend the moral superiority of veganism or to claim the immorality or otherwise of consuming animals or their products. All these are morally contestable ideas and their status in modern culture is unresolved. For detailed defences of veganism see the excellent work by Gary Francione 2008 and Gary Steiner 2008. 3 For a subtle and comprehensive overview of veganism and its limits as a way to minimize harm to animal life see Gruen and Jones 2016.
Vegetarianism and Veganism: Conflicts in Everyday Life
2020
In everyday situations, the experience of being a vegetarian or a vegan occurs within a process of conflict and practices of negotiation involving decisions, refusals, consumption acts, and proximity and distance between people in their relationships, mainly including the family. Many dilemmas result from the inconsistency between theory and difficult practices to be obeyed. To understand how this phenomenon, the chapter uses the interviews with vegetarians considering different alimentary restrictions and data obtained from observation in virtual groups of vegan activists. We have conducted the research between 2015 and 2017 as part of a larger project entitled: The Social Place of Animals in Contemporaneity.
Communicating Veganism: Evolving Theoretical Challenges to Mainstreaming Ideas.
Studies in Media and Communication, 2019
Veganism, as both a philosophy and social movement, faces numerous challenges to the communication of its ideas across society. As a unique modern counterculture, it stands in contravention of prevailing anthropological discourses that dominate conceptual frameworks. This has led to difficulty in constructing updated virtue epistemologies that result in veganism as a logical moral conclusion. It is clear that new social discourses need developing, and that this is a primary concern for affirming moral agency. To explain this and identify key issues and features, vegan communications are evaluated herein from a philosophical, psychological, and informational perspective, with a view of both historical and modern social contexts. In doing so, a number of novel theoretical reflections are offered. This is done through a discussion separated into four sections dealing first with a view of veganism in evolution, secondly with the social complexity of media trends and social positioning, thirdly with achieving constructive dialogue given present-day challenges, and finally with a discussion of modern information systems. Overall, this broad systems view of veganism in society leads to the conclusion that an up-to-date vegan communication theory must necessarily incorporate such diversity considerations, and must also generate a new discourse that is in line with the complex nature of social dynamics and individual development. Done prudently, this could propel vegan ideas further into the mainstream of conversation and consciousness, fostering a new paradigm for consumption.
If Veganism is not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
Animals, 2020
In their daily practices, many ethical vegans choose what to eat, wear, and buy among a range of options that is limited to the exclusion of animal products: the idea of using such products is not ordinarily rejected, but does not occur as a possibility at all. In other cases, when confronted with the possibility of consuming animal products, vegans have claimed to reject it by saying that it would be impossible for them to do so. I refer to this overlooked phenomenon as 'moral impossibility'. An analysis of moral impossibility in animal ethics shows that it arises when one's very conception of 'what animals are' shifts: through encounter with other animals (physical presence) or when individuals learn in an engaged way about animals and what happens to them in production facilities (imaginative presence). This establishes a link between increased knowledge, understanding, and imaginative exploration on the one hand, and the exclusion, not of the choice, but of the very possibility of using animals as resources on the other. Taking seriously moral impossibility in veganism has two important consequences: one is that the debate around veganism needs to shift from choice and decision, toward an analysis of concepts and moral framing; the other is that moral psychology is no longer to be understood as empirical psychology plus ethical analysis, but the contents of psychological findings are themselves influenced and framed by moral reflection.
Veganism as political solidarity: Beyond ‘ethical veganism’
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2022
Veganism is commonly described as the attempt to avoid, as far as possible, the exploitation and consumption of animals and animal products. While some people choose the plant-based diet associated with veganism for health or other self-interested reasons, the majority of philosophical work on the topic has been devoted to discussion of the ethical justification of veganism (i.e., to 'ethical veganism'). Some argue that it is a moral imperative if we take the rights or interests of animals seriously (e.g., Francione & Charlton, 2013; Mason & Singer, 1980). Others regard it as a necessity if we are to live up to our duties to live as sustainably as possible (Fox, 2000), or to minimize public health risks (Melina et al., 2016; Vyas, 2019; Walker et al., 2005). Still others hold that it is supported by religious and spiritual reasons (Kemmerer, 2012). These justifications are, of course, not mutually exclusive. And yet, others have questioned whether moral concern for animals really does entail a vegan diet (Davis, 2003 (on field deaths), but cf.
The Routledge Handbook of Vegan Studies, 2021
Philosophical consideration of animals constitutes an important building block of vegan studies, with the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan forming a part of the “prehistory” of vegan studies. However, contemporary work in “animal ethics” remains of value to vegan studies scholars, who frequently address questions with a philosophical character. This chapter serves as an introduction to animal ethics for the vegan studies scholars. While it begins with Singer and Regan, it does not end with them, and instead introduces readers to a range of questions in the ethics of veganism and contemporary animal rights theory. In these debates, scholars of vegan studies will, if they scratch the surface, find a great deal of value for their own work. It is the contention of this chapter that analytic philosophy and animal ethics should be more than a stopping-off point on the way to vegan studies. Indeed, animal ethics may be able to provide the kind of vegan theory that vegan studies scholars seek—or, at least, the normative dimension of such a theory. Thus, though vegan studies and animal ethics are different disciplines, they can be closely allied.
The Discursive Construction of Vegetarianism
Vegetarianism is becoming increasingly common in the Western world, yet little has been written on how the practice is discursively constructed. This represents a gap in the systematic understanding of the motivations, ideas and issues of the vegetarian community, especially because vegetarian discourse both seeks to explain the deviant practice to meat-eaters and simultaneously rationalize the practice to vegetarians. By focusing on how the three main motivations behind vegetarianism - animal welfare, health and the environment - are presented, this essay explores the discursive construction of vegetarianism from a social problems perspective. It reveals that although vegetarians have succeeded in making meat eating a social problem, the majority of the vegetarian arguments do not in fact support or necessitate an all-out ban on animal products. Instead, they provide a useful explanation for the now growing flexitarian movement, and the rise in ethical, health-oriented and ecologically conscious consumers.