In Defense of the Knowledge Argument (original) (raw)

The Knowledge Argument Against Materialism and the Strategy of Phenomenal Concepts

Filosofska Dumka, 2023

Materialism/physicalism that generally dominates in the contemporary analytic philosophy is challenged by fairly powerful anti-materialist arguments, notably the zombie argument (most influentially defended by David Chalmers) and the knowledge argument (the most widely discussed version of which was advanced and defended by Frank Jackson). These arguments highlight the explanatory gap from the physical (which, if materialism is true, should constitute everything that exists, including consciousness) to phenomenal mental states, the principal impossibility to explain the latter by the former, and from this conclude that phenomenal consciousness is not physical, and so materialism is false. Materialist philosophers attempt to neutralize these arguments in several ways, the most influential of which is the strategy of phenomenal concepts. This article analyzes the main points of this debate with a focus on the knowledge argument, examines and responds to the main objections to the knowledge argument-that it should be mistaken because the alternative is epiphenomenalism, which is unacceptable; that no new knowledge but only new capacities and/or acquaintance are involved; that the knowledge is the same but in different forms; that the knowledge argument affects only type physicalism but not token physicalism. The case is made that psychophysical identities assumed by a posteriori physicalism are unexplainable in principle, and the postulation of brute unexplainable psychophysical identities glossed over by the strategy of phenomenal concepts amounts to dogmatic commitment (motivated by scientism) to a view despite its apparent falsity and its unintelligibility (the impossibility to explain how it can be true), made less unpalatable by offering an ad hoc theory about the mindbrain arrangement that makes us unable to see how the view can be true. As opposed to this, the position of the supporters of the knowledge argument and the zombie argument can be seen as guided by the principle of rational trust in obviousness and our capacities of judgement.

Introduction to The Knowledge Argument (ed. Sam Coleman)

The Knowledge Argument, Classic Philosophical Arguments Series (Cambridge University Press), 2019

Draft introduction to a forthcoming collection of essays on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, featuring: Tim Crane, David Rosenthal, Brie Gertler, David Pitt, Frank Jackson, Galen Strawson, Torin Alter, Amy Kind, Tom McClelland, Philip Goff, Hedda Hassel March, Robert Howell, and Michael Tye. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/knowledge-argument/4E82722A55EA31B9B623EEAB3B13767D#fndtn-information

A Sadrian Interpretation of Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument

Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Shi‘i Studies, 2022

Frank Jackson's 'Knowledge Argument' has generated extensive debate and discussion in western philosophy of mind since its publication in 1982. The main thrust of the argument rests on the claim that the knowledge we acquire from phenomenal experiences appears to have a peculiar nature, one that is difficult to account for in a purely physical ontological world view. The conclusion of the argument is that the mind (or the mental) is ontologically distinct from the physical (i.e. the brain), a position known as 'Dualism' in western philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Many find the argument convincing. Interestingly, even those who don't ultimately agree with its Dualist conclusion have conceded that the properties of phenomenal experiences do appear to be unusual in character. However, discussions surrounding the non-materiality of the mental and the peculiar nature of knowledge that accompanies phenomenal experiences can also be found in other philosophical traditions. In particular they feature heavily in the works of Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, otherwise known as Mullā Ṣadrā, a prominent Shi'a philosopher from the Safavid era. Moreover, his distinct metaphysics and epistemology present, in my view, an interesting and alternative interpretation of the 'Knowledge Argument'. This paper seeks to provide a Sadrian analysis of Jackson's argument focussing on both the conclusion and the main thrust of the argument.

Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism: Putting a new spin on the knowledge argument

Philosophical studies, 2006

Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately ''secondary quality eliminativism''-the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this new argument provides a perspective to better see that certain popular would-be refutations of the knowledge argument do not work (against either version). But it also introduces some complications that will force us to take an unexpected detour through the pros and cons of naturalizing intentionality before (tentatively) embracing Jackson's dualist conclusion.

On the Rehabilitation of the Knowledge Argument

In the last decade, some viable materialist accounts of how to overcome Frank Jackson's powerful Knowledge Argument has been elaborated into such an extent that even Jackson himself has changed sides and joined its critics. In order to rehabilitate its force and importance, George Graham and Terence Horgan have redefined the original argument and exploited it against theories that reply to Knowledge Argument with a mode of presentation replies (using Michael Tye's representational theory of mind as an example). The message of this paper is that Graham and Horgan do not succeed in their task, since their view of Tye's theory is inadequate and because the intuitive thrust of their argument is derived from Joseph Levine's explanatory gap-argument that Tye has already successfully met.

THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND HIGHER-ORDER PROPERTIES

Ratio, 2005

The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective.

The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument

I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more than her acquisition of these abilities. The physicalist can admit this, since it does not commit one to the view that there are any facts of which Mary was ignorant (in spite of her exhaustive knowledge of truths about the physical world). I argue against this view, on the grounds that the knowledge of what an experience is like cannot be equated with the possession of any set of abilities.