Explaining Russia’s Increasingly Aggressive Responses to Popular Revolutions: From the Coloured Revolutions to the Crises in Ukraine and Syria: An Instrumental Constructivist Approach (original) (raw)
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2008
where he is an associate professor specializing in Russian politics. Zellen: Some observers were surprised by Russia's military response to Georgia's effort to reclaim the breakaway region of South Ossetia-especially by its swiftness, its tactical success, and its overwhelming application of force (some say a 10:1 superiority over Georgian forces.) Were you surprised by Moscow's response? Ostrow: I, in fact, expected some sort of "action" by Russia somewhere before the election. My co-authors were less inclined to think so and proved right. What surprised me most in this whole process was the relative obscurity of Medvedev. I thought perhaps it would be used to bolster him. In fact, it ended up cementing the reality of Putin as still in power, just from a slightly different "seat." There can be little doubt that he retains a solid hold over the military and decisions related to its use. As far as Russia's ability to overwhelm the Georgian forces, Russia showed in the second invasion of Chechnya that it retains this capacity to overwhelm. Zellen: Do these recent events in Georgia indicate a return to a more aggressive Russia-and do they reflect an abandonment of its rapprochement with the democratic West? Ostrow: Abandonment may be too strong a word. I think Russia would rather the West accept it and continue to deal with it as before, meaning, it would prefer the West welcome with open arms a more assertive and aggressive Russia. But if it has to choose, the current regime leans to the assertive/aggressive. This is by no means the first salvo. Russia has been increasingly independent in its foreign policy since Putin's rise.
After the demise of the Soviet Union and the Communist-dominated regimes of central and eastern Europe, democratic polities were created and consolidated in a number of post-Communist countries. But in others -most notably, the non-Baltic post-Soviet states -the process of democratization never started or, if it did, stalled at some point and the countries evolved into hybrid regimes that combined, in varying mixes, elements of democratic and authoritarian politics. Building on Levitsky and Way (2010a), this article considers the extent to which and means by which Russia, by far the largest and most powerful of the post-Soviet states, influenced the consolidation of authoritarian politics and erosion of democratic politics in the other non-Baltic post-Soviet states. After noting the substantial erosion in rights, liberties and democratic politics that has occurred in Russia over the past two decades, the article suggests the asymmetries in size and power that favor Russia, coupled with its extensive cultural, economic, and security linkages with the other states, not only provide it with leverage vis-à-vis those states in the pursuit of its interests but also legitimize and reinforce the authoritarian elements in their polities, reduce the incentives for their leaders to strengthen the democratic elements, and in some instances have contributed to rollbacks of rights, liberties and democratic politics.
Putin had a more modest foreign policy rhetoric and seemed to be far more pragmatic than Primakov during his first term of presidency. However, such conditions did not last long and Russian government chose a more assertive stance once political stability was ensured and economic growth showed signs of improvement. In the following article we have assumed that similar patterns of thinking and acting which have not been necessarily subject to considerable changes as a result of vibrant conditions can be found in Russian foreign policy. It seems as if guiding principles of foreign policy are deeply embedded in political culture of the country. Despite some tactical changes to compensate for country"s backwardness and economic difficulties as a historical tradition, Russians have never retreated from claiming the status of a globally recognized great power and international rule maker. In this article using descriptive-analytical method we have examined the following: "Despite domestic and international ups and downs, how can continuity in the rhetoric and action of Russian foreign policy since 2004 be explained?" Our hypothetical answer to this question is that: "Russian foreign policy has very deep ideational roots influencing the nature and identity of the state, which have been shaped through centuries by natural-geographical characteristics of the land, and historical and intellectual developments."
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs and Tomasz Stępniewski, 2023
This paper delves into the nuanced motivations underpinning Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, centered on preserving stability for Putin's regime. Examining the intricate interplay between domestic and foreign concerns, the invasion emerged as a pivotal strategy to bolster domestic support and reinforce Russian leadership. Post-2012, Putin, in consolidating power through internal policies and external assertiveness, responded to catalysts-opposition protests in 2012 and Ukraine's "Revolution of Dignity" in 2014. State-controlled media played a crucial role in shaping narratives, framing the invasion as a defense against alleged Western "imperialist" threats. The paper scrutinises Putin's strategic evolution, highlighting the convergence of historical events, opposition dynamics, and media narratives in shaping the rationale behind Russia's impactful incursion into Ukraine.
The Evolution of the Russian Elites' Perceptions of National Interests, 2012-2016
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017
Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, Russian-Western relations have experienced rapid decline, with piling ideological resentments, new Cold War rhetoric streaming from both sides, increasing geopolitical confrontation, and greater potential risks associated with future military escalation. The West's growing anxiety over Russia's revised geopolitical ambitions to redraw spheres of influence, on the one hand, and Russia's retaliatory policies, on the other, exacerbate the importance of the study of factors affecting the perception of national interests by Russian elites. This paper offers a conceptual model which links the effects of national identity on the perception of the scope of national interests. The concept of national identity here is composed of such factors as "Patriotism," "Nationalism," "External" and "Internal Other," and the Soviet past. The conceptual model is tested using the Bayesian Structural Equation Model by drawing the data from the Russian Foreign Policy
External forces and Russian foreign policy: Simulation of identity narratives inside Putin’s regime
International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 2019
This article analyzes the impact of external factors on Russia’s foreign policy. Specifically, it identifies patterns in Russia’s foreign policy reactions to two kinds of developments: changes in US foreign policy, and fluctuating global oil prices affecting Russia’s economy. Our hypothesis is that US foreign policy, as it is perceived by Putin’s regime, is the key determinant of the Kremlin’s reactions, while the changes in economic trends, affected by oil price, influence the regime’s preference to choose more confrontational or more defensive ways of action. As the analysis shows, different versions of national identity narratives can be constructed within Putin’s regime: it acts as a closed political system that can produce different foreign policy reactions and even ideological narratives without major changes in the governing elite.
Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in its "Near Abroad"
How, to what extent, and why have the forms of political authority in the non-Baltic post-Soviet states changed since 1991? What impact has Russia had on such changes? Drawing on Freedom House and Polity IV data, this article considers the extent and direction of changes in the democratic and authoritarian elements of the Russian and other post-Soviet polities in recent years, some of the linkages through which Russia may exercise leverage vis-à-vis the other post-Soviet states, and the extent to which exercising that leverage may have influenced the forms ofpolitical authority—specifically, the extent of democratization—in the other non-Baltic, post-Soviet states.