Blacklists and Bureaucrats, Resistance and The Rabbinate (original) (raw)
Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads
Introduction Raphael Cohen-Almagor General The Crisis of Governance: Government Instability and the Civil Service David Nachmias and Ori Arbel-Ganz Citizenship Education in Israel – A Jewish-Democratic State Orit Ichilov, Gavriel Salomon and Dan Inbar The Military-Political Complex: The IDF’s Influence over Policy towards the Palestinians Since 1987 Yoram Peri On the Need for A Constitution Meir Shamgar Institutions Presidency in Israel: Formal Authority and Personal Experience Yitzhak Navon The Government Gad Yaacobi The Knesset Naomi Chazan The Attorney General in Israel – A Delicate Balance of Powers and Responsibilities in a Jewish and Democratic State Elyakim Rubinstein Particularistic Considerations and the Absence of Strategic Assessment in the Israeli Public Administration: The Role of the State Comptroller Eliezer Goldberg The Press Council Raphael Cohen-Almagor Final Word Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads Raphael Cohen-Almagor Notes on Contributors Index
Disqualification of lists in Israel (1948?1984): Retrospect and appraisal
Law and Philosophy, 1994
The aim is to review the decisions of the Central Elections Committee and of the Supreme Court regarding disqualification of lists in Israel. Two major questions are addressed: When should tolerance have its limits?; and, What constraints on liberty should be introduced in order to safeguard democracy? The judicial analysis focuses attention on the issue of whether the justices acted in accordance with the law. Consideration is given to the written law and to existing normative considerations which allow justices an exegetic latitude. It is argued that the Neiman decision of 1984 was flawed, that the Court was erroneous in ignoring the licensing effect of its decision, and that democracy does not have to allow a violent list propounding the destruction of democracy to act in order to fulfil its aim. It is neither morally obligatory, nor morally coherent, to expect democracy to place the means for its own destruction in the hands of those who either wish to bring about the physical annihilation of the state, or to undermine democracy. These two cases are the only cases in which democracy has to introduce self-defensive measures and to deny representation in parliament to violent lists that convey such ideas, and that act to realize them. I. INTRODUCTION In 1981 some members of the Central Elections Committee (henceforth GEe) 2 including its Chairman Moshe Etzioni J., wanted to
public admisnitration reviewPublic Administration Review , Sep. - Oct., 2001, Vol. 61, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2001), pp. 569-584, 2001
This article explores the process of appointing government ministers and senior executive offi- cials in Israel. It provides several case studies of the appointment process in the 1 990s, a period of hyperfragmentation in the Israeli parliament. These studies reveal evidence of gross irrespon- sibility in the appointment process, as well as a lack of a meaningful oversight and checks in the process. One consequence is that the Israeli High Court was asked to intervene and review and reject a number of these appointments. The article argues that although well meaning, this intervention represents a dangerous new trend; this new role for the Courts is both inappropri- ate and counterproductive. It is inappropriate because judicial intervention imposes a legal solution when a political solution is called for, and it is counterproductive because frequent judicial intervention weakens both the judiciary and the political process. The article concludes with a proposal for an alternative approach to cope with the lack of meaningful oversight in the political-appointment process.
Public Administration Review - PUBLIC ADMIN REV, 2001
This article explores the process of appointing government ministers and senior executive officials in Israel. It provides several case studies of the appointment process in the 1990s, a period of hyperfragmentation in the Israeli parliament. These studies reveal evidence of gross irresponsibility in the appointment process, as well as a lack of a meaningful oversight and checks in the process. One consequence is that the Israeli High Court was asked to intervene and review and reject a number of these appointments. The article argues that although well meaning, this intervention represents a dangerous new trend; this new role for the Courts is both inappropriate and counterproductive. It is inappropriate because judicial intervention imposes a legal solution when a political solution is called for, and it is counterproductive because frequent judicial intervention weakens both the judiciary and the political process. The article concludes with a proposal for an alternative approach to cope with the lack of meaningful oversight in the political-appointment process.
Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts, 2007
comparative analysis. Within the limited scope of this paper I cannot delve into this interesting debate and will limit myself with identifying two major groups of definitions of judicial activism, attempting to describe the Israeli judiciary as activist according to both grand approaches. One group of definitions can be viewed as emerging from a jurisprudential vantage point, the other from a political science or theory of the state viewpoint. The jurisprudential gateway offers a non-relational definition of judicial activism-examining to which extent courts allow themselves leeway, freedom and discretion in interpreting existing norms (constitutional and legislative and indeed common law ones) and to what degree the courts allow themselves departures from previous rulings-the degree of changes in the law the source of which are the courts. The main framework of analysis here is a theory of the law, theory of judicial discretion and interpretation. The political science gateway adopts a relational definition to judicial activism, focusing on the role of courts in shaping collective decisionmaking in society relative to the role of the other branches of governmentthe legislature and the executive, and in relation to the public opinion. In this category emphasis is given to the area of public law and to the degree in which courts scrutinize and review decisions of the other branches of government. The main framework for this kind of analysis is the theory of the state, in general, and the doctrine of separation of powers, in particular. The courts in Israel can be regarded as activist according to both grand definitions. They have become one of the country's most significant law-Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=957849 makers, as well as political establishments. Above all, the Supreme Court of Israel emerged as a dominant branch of government. It moved center-stage in the collective decision-making process in Israel, affording an unprecedented degree of intervention in the conduct of the other branches of government, and, thus, attracting ever-greater attention, but also growing criticism, from the Israeli media and public. 3 It is not surprising, therefore, that judicial activism is on the scholarly agenda in Israel for the last 35 years and on the public agenda for the last 20 years. One of the leading law journals in Israel had dedicated a whole volume to judicial activism in Israel already in 1992. 4 In recent years, the public debate around the issue was very much instigated by the rhetoric and reasoning that characterizes the Supreme Court in the era of Justice Barak (who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1979 and retired as its President on 2006) and especially following his academic publications beginning with the book on judicial discretion, published in 1987, 5 However, I will try to show in this chapter that judicial activism can characterize the Israeli Supreme Court from the very beginning of its operation in 1949. This chapter will elaborate on judicial activism of the Israeli judiciary, and especially its Supreme Court according to both definitional approaches. Section 3 will focus on public law and mainly on the political science definition of judicial activism, while Section 4 will focus on private law vis