A Formal Anarchy - Toward an Artaudian Philosphy (Presented at Deleuze Studies, Rome) (original) (raw)
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2022
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The paper aims to explain the interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas as advanced by Leo Strauss in one of his first works dealing with Hobbes (The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis, 1935). According to this interpretation, the theory of the separate existence of ideas is specifically justified by Plato’s awareness that ordinary language is the only gateway to the ultimate causes of things. This interpretation is based, among others, on two passages in the Platonic dialogues, Phaedo 99 c-e and Republic 472 c-e. In the former Socrates speaks of the need to “take refuge in the logoi” in order to avoid being blinded by the sight of sensible things. In the latter, Socrates claims that the purpose of the inquiry into the nature of ideal republic is “not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of this ideal". The paper shows that Leo Strauss’s hermeneutics of Plato was influenced by the teaching of Husserl and Heidegger, particularly by the need for a critique of the modern way of conceiving the relationship between theory and practice. The excursus on Plato in the book about Hobbes shows in an exemplary way the 'phenomenological function' that Strauss assigns to the hermeneutics of the ancient classics. According to Strauss, the Platonic dialogues and in particular the figure of Socrates shows that philosophy, understood as the pursuit of truth, can never neutralize the conflict with the doxa, understood as the order established by authority. Hence, Platonic dialogues have an intrinsically ‘political’ nature, which requires the reader to perform the difficult task of reactivating the process of liberation from captivity in the world of doxa.
Change and Contrariety: Problems Plato Set for Aristotle
1994
¡le^v v Contrariety and Change: Problems Plato Set for Aristotle James B ogen (P itzer C ollege) C harles M. Y ou n g (C larem ont G raduate S ch o o l) I P la to and A risto tle each b eliev e that contrariety is fundam ental to th e a n a ly sis o f ch an ge. A t Phaedo 7 0 e 4-7 1 a l0 , for exam ple, S ocrates sa y s that a ll th in gs th at h ave an origin (ε χ ε ι γ ε ν έ σ ι ν) and th at h ave contraries (ε ν α ν τ ία 1) com e to b e (γ ίγ ν ε τ α ι) ou t o f (έ κ) con traries. T hus i f som e th in g com es to b e greater, it m ust p reviou sly have been sm aller, and v ic e versa. O ther illu stratio n s in clu d e com in g to be w eaker, faster, better, and m ore ju st from th e contrary con d ition s. "E very th in g ," S ocrates sa y s, "com es to be in th is way: contrary th ings from con traries" (Phaedo 7 1 a 9-10). A risto tle ex p resses a rem arkably sim ilar view at
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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2018
In this paper I argue that in several passages Plato sympathizes with the following view: sensible particulars undergo continuous, pervasive physical change; as a consequence, where there seems to be one and the same object which is identical through time, there is in fact a succession of impermanent objects numerically distinct from each other but similar to each other. I illustrate the difference between this view—which invites interesting comparisons with modern and contemporary theories—and other, superficially similar views which Plato criticizes. I also suggest that this view might contribute to explaining Plato’s contention that sensible particulars lack being and are confined to coming to be. Finally, I show that my interpretation was well attested in antiquity; and I put forward the hypothesis that part of the aim of certain Aristotelian claims about substance might be to correct Plato in this respect.
Criticising Change, from Theognis to Plato
Lexis, 2022
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