The Inclusiveness Condition in Survive-minimalism (original) (raw)
Related papers
In this paper, I argue that both parametric variation and the alleged differences between languages in terms of their internal complexity straightforwardly follow from the Strongest Minimalist Thesis that takes the Faculty of Language to be an optimal solution to conditions that neighboring mental modules impose on it. Hard conditions like legibility at the linguistic interfaces invoke simplicity metrics that, given that they stem from different mental modules, are not harmonious. Widely attested expression strategies, such as agreement or movement, are a direct result of conflicting simplicity metrics, so that UG, perceived as a toolbox that shapes natural language, can be taken to consist of a limited number of marking strategies, all resulting from conflicting simplicity metrics. As such, the contents of UG follow from simplicity requirements, and therefore no longer necessitate linguistic principles, valued or unvalued, to be innately present. Finally, I show that the Strongest Minimalist Thesis does not require that languages themselves have to be optimal in connecting sound to meaning.
On Aspects of the Theory of Syntax
Inference: International Review of Science
In the first essay for a new series on landmark texts, Anna Maria Di Sciullo revisits Noam Chomsky’s classic Aspects on the Theory of Syntax. Published in 1965, Aspects was a revelation, presenting linguists with what, at once, became the Standard Theory. It promoted linguistics into a science, one that accepted the methods and the standards of the hard sciences themselves.
"One of the most fundamental goals in linguistic theory is to understand the nature of linguistic knowledge, that is, the representations and mechanisms that figure in a cognitively plausible model of human language-processing. The past 50 years have witnessed the development and refinement of various theories about what kind of ‘stuff’ human knowledge of language consists of, and tech- nological advances now permit the development of increasingly sophisticated computational mod- els implementing key assumptions of different theories from both rationalist and empiricist perspectives. The present special issue does not aim to present or discuss the arguments for and against the two epistemological stances or discuss evidence that supports either of them (cf. Bod, Hay, & Jannedy, 2003; Christiansen & Chater, 2008; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; O’Donnell, Hauser, & Fitch, 2005). Rather, the research presented in this issue, which we label usage-based here, conceives of linguistic knowledge as being induced from experience.
On the form-function dichotomy in linguistic theory
Studia Linguistica Universitatis Iagellonicae Cracoviensis 127, 2010
This paper focuses on an important divide in theoretical linguistics between two broad perspectives on the structural properties of human languages, generative and functionalist. In the former, linguistic structure is explained in terms of discrete categories and highly abstract principles, which may be language-independent or language-specific and purely formal or functional in nature. In the latter, explanation for why languages have the structure that they do is found ‘outside’ language, in the general principles of human cognition and the communicative functions of language. The aim of this paper is to highlight the need for abstractness, explicitness, simplicity and theoretical economy in linguistic description and explanation. The question is not whether principles of grammar are formal or functional. The question is whether the principles that are postulated to explain linguistic structure express true generalizations.