Values and Identity: the United States of America as a Responsible Great Power. Why renewal of the treasured traditional American values and ideals is so important? (original) (raw)
Values and Identity: The United States of America as a Responsible Great Power. Why renewal of the treasured traditional American values and ideals is so important?
Jakub Łukasz Samoraj
THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM | SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS THESIS MAY BE REPRODUCED IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER WITHOUT AGREEMENT FROM THE AUTHOR. ALL IDEAS INCLUDED IN THIS BOOK CONSTITUTE A PRIVATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT THAT BELONGS TO MR JAKUB ŁUKASZ SAMORAJ.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM
SCHOOL OF POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Values and Identity: the United States of America as a Responsible Great Power. Why renewal of the treasured traditional American values and ideals is so important?
Being a Dissertation submitted for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Diplomacy
By Jakub Lukasz Samoraj
September 2009
I have read and understood the relevant information on plagiarism and the penalties that may be imposed where an academic offence is committed as state in the postgraduate handbook.
CONTENTS
Contents … 3
Introduction … 5
Chapter One … 10
Back to the Founding Fathers: Traditional American Ideals and Values
Chapter Two … 21
The English School and Constructivist Values
Chapter Three … 44
Antithesis of the Traditional American Ideals and Values during the
Presidency of George W. Bush
Chapter Four … 55
Recovery of the Identity of the United States of America during the
Presidency of Barack Obama
Chapter Five … 69
Conclusions
Bibliography … 77
"It is unbelievable how many systems of morals and politics have Been successively found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, to Reappear a little later, always charming and surprising the world as If they were new, and bearing witness, not to the fecundity of the
Human spirit, but to the ignorance of men."
(Alexis de Tocqueville 1852: Paris)
“One of the main purposes of university education is to escape from the Zeitgeist, from the mean, narrow, providential spirit which is constantly assuring us that we are at the peak of human achievement, that we stand on the edge of unprecedented prosperity or an unparalleled catastrophe; that the next summit conference is going to be the most fateful in history or that the leader is either the greatest, or the most disastrous, of all time. It is a liberation of the spirit to acquire perspective, to recognize that every generation is confronted by problems of the utmost subjective urgency, but that an objective grading is probably impossible; to learn that the same moral predicaments and the same ideas have been explored before. One need read very little in political theory to become aware of recurrences and repetitions…”
(Martin Wight 1991: 6)
“The function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit this process of change by imposing a legal strait jacket upon it but rather to facilitate it: to ease its transitions, to tempter the asperities to which it leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which it gives rise, and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for international life in general. But this is the task for Diplomacy, in the most old-fashioned sense of the term…” [G. F. Kennan 1951:98]
“Only those can truly promote security, well-being and justice, who do not consider the world a battlefield between good and evil, Light and darkness, but perceive is as a single whole, where evil is nothing but absence of good, and darkness - nothing but absence of light.
Those, who are ready to promote light and good in the world instead of waging war against darkness and evil.”
(Vladimir Inosemtsev 2007: November)
"Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time. We are the ones we 've been waiting for.
We are the change we seek."
(Barack Obama,
5th 5^{\text {th }} February 2008, Chicago)
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this dissertation is to identify, explore and consider parallels between the treasured traditional ideals that guided the United States of America throughout its history and the English School and constructivists values in order to demonstrate why values per se play an important role in the foreign policy making, identity formation and perception of a ‘Responsible Great Power’ such as the United States of America in International Relations. It will be argued that American values and ideals are durable and prone to a process of continuous evolution as well as perfecting, throughout history.
The end of the Cold War and concomitant collapse of the Soviet Union brought with it the unique opportunity for the United States to become a responsible global leader. In a world, freed from the constraints of power politics and superpower rivalry, the United States was committed to create the so-called ‘New World Order’. This was in order to shape the international environment in a fashion that would reflect its preference of how the world should be ordered. That is, more conducive to the American principles that have been worldwide and commonly recognized as compatible with human rights standards, liberal values and global peace.
This endeavour was about to be implemented by adopting a prudent and skilful diplomacy, which combines trust in a rational statecraft with a commitment to embrace humanitarian intervention, promote multilateralism and some fundamental liberal freedoms. However, the events preceding, and those that followed after September 11 put American diplomacy, and subsequently, its leadership role to a serious test. Sovereignty of the most powerful state in the world had been breached by an appalling
act of terror. Motivated by fear the United States has instrumentally adopted the Manichean vision of the world divided between good and evil, thereby undermining traditional American values and ideals whilst unilaterally embarking upon an interventionist project that excludes considerations of just international intercourse. The ‘New World Order’ has become a unipolar system dominated by a single global power. Thus, some authors have referred to the diplomacy introduced by President George W. Bush as a "suicidal statecraft that undermines its own imperial power: (Brzezinski, 2005: 46).
In the midst of a universal dissatisfaction with the American leadership, plus simultaneous disrespect for the system of human rights and growing irrelevance of a painstakingly constructed body of international law, calls have been raised for the reform of world institutions and creation of a new international order to replace the one that emerged from the Second World War. Most notably, during a service to mark the World Day of Peace celebrated in 2004 Pope John Paul II said:
“More than ever, we need a new international order that draws on the experience and results achieved in these years by the United Nations… it would be able to provide solutions to the problems of today… based on the dignity of human beings, an integrated development of society, solidarity between rich and poor nations, and on the sharing of resources and the extraordinary results of scientific and technological progress.”
(John Paul II, Mass at St Peter’s in Rome, January 1st 2004)
Not surprisingly, therefore, the election of Barack Obama, as President of the United States, has generated huge worldwide expectations for a change in the United States’ approach to diplomacy and foreign affairs through restoration of traditional American ideals and values. The key question remains whether America can conduct a wise, responsible, and effective foreign policy - one that avoids the pitfalls of a beleaguered
mindset but still comports with the United States of America’s historically novel status as the world’s paramount power. Consistent with the classical understanding of the term diplomacy is the management and facilitation of change in International Relations and the maintenance by continual persuasion of order in the midst of change. A more academic and instrumental understanding of the term stipulates that diplomacy “is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys” (Nicolson 1963:15). As such diplomacy can be only possible within “legitimate” international orders (Kissinger 1957:2).
This dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that focused on building sustainable relationships, supported by a restoration of the treasured, traditional American values and ideals, a persuasive negotiating process will be a crucial variable in renewing legitimate authority and buttressing the leadership role of the United States in the upcoming international order. This task may not be easy given the fact that currently, the institution of sovereignty is in a historical decline whilst globalization and revolution in communications have created new, complex challenges for modern diplomacy. It seems that the quest for a wise foreign policy must begin with the realization that ‘globalization’ is an inevitable reality which in its essence implies a global interdependence and unremitting quest for a more inclusive, just global community and ‘a more mature system of great power management’ in an increasingly interconnected, interactive and interdependent world.
The analytical framework of this dissertation will emphasize in what way cognitive and cultural factors such as cultural values can motivate and legitimate decisions that relate
to the general diplomatic process. Using the combination of historical and theoretical literature, this dissertation will discuss evidence that indicates that values, ideals and normative principles are constitutive of the American identity formation. National identity in turn remains never fixed or stable - it is rather a continuing exercise in the fabrication of illusion and the elaboration of convenient fables about who ‘we’ ‘are’ (Ignatieff 1998:18). Identity is also prone to evolution in particular historical circumstances just as during the current period of changes internally and externally to the state that have an impact and may lead to re-definitions on national identity and thereby foreign policy interests. Consequently, when the United States was willing to lead the international society by deed and example, based on invocation to traditional American values and ideals, then her leadership was more effective gaining universal recognition and respect. That is to say, when the United States was prepared to lead the international community in a spontaneous and constructive dialogue with other countries, in particular - by taking adequate measures to promote common interests to avoid crises involving the danger of war, then the United States perception as a legitimate global leader was more likely to be internationally accepted. In such cases, America was more capable to effectively perform its managerial function having been recognized worldwide as securing not only its own interests, but also working with other members to uphold the society of states as a whole, thereby generating more just international order.
Conversely, when America abandoned her value-laden heritage and neglected the means of diplomatic management as a way of solving agreements, then the country was automatically at risk of operating beyond the international community, thus generating more hierarchical systems of power. This resulted in America being more likely
subjected to accusations of imperialism or hegemony that had devastating effects on the United States standing around the world. In support of this argument, this dissertation will identify, discuss and draw parallels between traditional American values, ideals and those proffered by the English School scholars and constructivists. This will be followed by a preliminary analysis of the United States diplomacy during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
In order to set a brief historical background the next Chapter will detail the development of the cherished traditional values and ideals revealed in the democratic humanist approach to the American foreign policy making and rhetoric - values and ideals that guided the United States of America from its inception.
CHAPTER ONE
Back to the Founding Fathers: Traditional American Ideals and Values
The belief of the special character of the United States of America can be traced back to the vision of the founding fathers of the Republic. America was born out of a selfdetermination and quest for freedom sentiment. As such it was a prolonged process of upheaval towards the attainment of self-government. Historically, the country has been one of the greatest sources of progress and liberty that the world has ever known. The first phase of immigration to America consisted of Christian immigrant settlers who, whilst trying to avoid prosecutions escaped from Britain and were travelling to the new continent with great expectations. Immigrants viewed the inhibited continent as the Promised Land whilst founding the new American society. Thus, at the core of the foundation of the United States of America was a pioneering spirit of liberty.
The main aspiration that accompanied pilgrims’ escape from oppression, and later on the ‘March on the West’, was to become an independent, united nation and ultimately to form a modern, liberal Republic. From its early beginnings thus, America was associated with the fulfilment of the so-called ‘American dream’ - a promise for a better life with shared opportunity and equal treatment for all. A life offering a sense of dignity and self-worth that would enable people to have common hopes and modest dreams. Traditional values of freedom, liberty, humanity and justice, tolerance, humility and faith were promoted by the Founding Fathers of the American Republic, such as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson or Abraham Lincoln.
In 1787, representatives from the thirteen states met in Philadelphia to write a Constitution for the newborn Republic. Due to an outstanding and spontaneous effort of forty individuals, who did not always agree with each other, but who shared enormous dedication and grand vision owing to their conviction of the uniqueness of what was happening, locked themselves in a bungalow and produced an extraordinary document called ‘The Constitution of the United States of America’. Based upon this remarkable event, the Confederation of States has continually evolved until America has become a modern, liberal and democratic republic: a union of states joined together by a simple motto: “E pluribus unum” - “Out of many one.” A new chapter in the history of immigrants and unexpectedly in the history of the whole world had begun.
A new constitutional arrangement called ‘The New Deal’ was ordered by a set of novel institutions and practices out of which the most important components were: individual freedom and civil rights, popular sovereignty, limited government specified in a constitution, multiparty electoral democracy, private property and market capitalism, rule of law and independent courts, as well as liberty and separation of church and state. These institutions became codified in the founding documents of the Republic including the Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights or individual states constitutions. A federal structure of government as illustrated by Madison (1788 No. 46) required that in order to escape the extremes of tyranny and direct democracy government should be kept in check by the States and the common will of the citizens. As the author famously declared: “you must first enable the government to control the governed; in the next place oblige it to control itself” (Federalist No. 51).
The ideals inspired by and expressed in the European Enlightenment of the Eighteen Century greatly influenced the newborn Republic. But the common and long awaited ‘dream’ was to break away from the established polities of Europe, where the traditional hierarchies of the Crown and Church, held sway. As Kissinger observed:
“Americans then as now viewed their nation as motivated by principles higher than those of the Old World, which they imagined reflected the basically selfish aspirations of monarchs. By contrast, the American republic was viewed as operating according to the dictates of enlightened rationalism; it was destined to serve as a model for less fortunate peoples obliged to live under less benevolent rule.”
(Kissinger 2002:238)
What made the United States a truly exceptional Republic, was the degree of liberalism that has been enshrined in its Constitution as well as in the fabric of the American society from the early beginnings of its formation. American colonies have enjoyed a greater personal freedom and political independence than their European counterparts. However, there was something specifically unique in the American understanding of Liberty, which was not only perceived in terms of political liberty, but denoted something qualitatively additional and exceptional. As de Tocqueville observed:
“All the English colonies, therefore, at the time of their inception, shared a great kindred spirit. From the start, they all seemed destined to promote the development of liberty, not the aristocratic liberty of their mother country, but middle-class, democratic liberty, a complete example of which had still not been encountered in the history of the world.”
(de Tocqueville 2003:40)
What was most treasured and extraordinarily valued was a civil and moral liberty defined in the following words by one of the early Puritan preachers of the new born republic, John Winthrop:
“It is a liberty for that only which is just and good; for this liberty You are to stand with the hazard of your very lives.”
(de Tocqueville 2003: 55)
Moreover, what has made the United States exceptional was the degree to which antistatism has been institutionalized and made the object of sustained popular pressure. Anti-statism and the fear of despotism led the American Framers to create a state structure that was fragmented, decentralized and accountable. Separation into three modes of power (following the Montesquieu’s division) was: legislative, executive and judiciary. This allowed different branches of government to ‘check and balance’ one another. The open structure of Congress and its frequent elections provided access to individuals and groups who sought to affect foreign policy. In general, American political development has been exceptionally successful whilst at the same time profoundly different from the European system, along with many of the major features of European life: most notably the feudal stage with its ancient regime and workingclass socialist movements.
Notwithstanding the above, the most important feature of the newborn American society has been common traditional values, principles and beliefs that were embraced by most Americans from the early beginnings of the state formation and throughout the majority of America’s history. It is believed that these common values and ideals were an influential part of what made America a great, free and a united nation, what contributed to the idea of what is America. The most important being individual liberty, prayer, strong work ethics and humility, as well as desire for education and personal improvement.
These ideals and beliefs allowed for the single most distinguishing feature of the United States, namely its extraordinary success as a nation. They constituted the ethics of the American heritage that civilized and instilled in many generations, not only a sense of
patriotism, but also a mutual regard for each other. This was based on the conviction that everybody has a stake in a common project; that everybody has got equal chances and that in America there are no barriers to success if there are people willing to work for it. More importantly, these shared values have enabled Americans to have common aspirations, common hopes and one unpretentious ‘the All American Dream’. This was based on an idea that all people are equal, all are free and all deserve a chance to pursue a full measure of happiness.
Perhaps, because of the above described deep-seated characteristics, Americans are traditionally optimists regarding progress in many domains of human activity, including politics at the national or the international level, as both are desirable and possible. Americans have historically shared a conviction that man is endowed with an indefinite faculty for improvement and that human nature, at least to some extent, is capable of perfectibility. At the heart of this assumption lies the belief that with time, effort and motivation, reasonable individuals can co-operate to solve important social problems for the benefit of all constituent parties. It is a conviction that through hard work and strength of mind ‘the American Dream’ can endure and that common ideals will bring about a degree of justice, opportunity as well as universal prosperity.
Common liberal and democratic values have been incorporated into the ‘American Creed’, which can be summarised in five terms: individual liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire (Lipset 1996:19). Lipset explained these values allowed Americans to abandon feudal structures, monarchies and aristocracies that have for centuries corrupted European empires. As a newborn society, Americans were uniquely cohesive, mainly due to the fact that the whole country lacked the
emphasis on social hierarchy and status differences characteristic of postfeudal and monarchical societies. As Lipset elucidated, the emphasis in the American value system has been on the individual as opposed to the state:
“Citizens have been expected to demand and protect their rights on a personal basis. The exceptional focus on law here as compared to Europe, derived from the constitution and the Bill of Rights, has stressed rights against the state and other powers. America began and continues as the most antistatist, legalistic, and rights-oriented nation.”
(Lipset 1996: 20)
However, the most extraordinary source of uniqueness of the American society has been a desire to realize spiritual ideals without being scrutinized. Having disposed of long-established constraints and aristocratic institutions Americans have succeeded to mould together in a wondrous harmony two quite distinct elements that are perceived as difficult to compromise, namely: the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty. Widespread was a conviction that the nature of the territory which the Americans inhabited was unique. It was believed that the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans was destined to be populated and developed whilst being granted a special blessing. In reality, Americans as no other nation managed to blend democratic ideals with a geopolitical wonder. As de Tocqueville observed:
"The chief circumstance which has favoured the establishment and the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States is the nature of the territory that the Americans inhabit. Their ancestors gave them the love of equality and freedom, but God Himself gave them the means of remaining equal and free, by placing them upon a boundless continent, which is open to their exertions… In the United States not only is legislation democratic, but Nature herself favours the cause of the people. "
(de Tocqueville 2003: 290)
Various strands of Protestant Christianity have been particularly prevalent in the United States in both subtle and more direct ways. For example, the Christian theme of equality reinforced democracy whilst the Protestant theme of individualism reinforced
liberalism. Additionally, the evangelical Baptist tendencies of early American churches, such as the Puritan founders of Massachusetts Bay Colony, have also infused American life and foreign policy with a degree of messianic sense that America would inspire and help to lead mankind towards some noble and generous goals. Such optimism was based largely on the assurance that democratic America is a virtuous state willing and able to perform a paternal role whilst leading the whole international community not only with words, but also with deeds through setting an intelligent example to the world.
The above described ideals and common perception of the United States as a most liberal State in the world has been enshrined in the American identity, and the common identity of the American people. The United States has been popularly recognized as a beacon for other nations and peoples searching for peace, freedom and democracy. America thereby, has become a truly sovereign and democratic leader on a global scale. Such an image was cherished by consecutive administrations and presidents of the Republic including: Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman and Jimmy Carter. As a result, cognitive and cultural factors, for example: shared values and ideals have motivated and legitimated decisions that related to the general direction of past foreign policies.
It appears that traditional American ideals have become more popular than ideals promoted by any other country. These ideals have become even more influential and of more worth when they were enshrined in the network of democratic institutions. As Tocqueville observed:
"There is therefore at the bottom of democratic institutions some hidden tendency which often makes men promote the general prosperity, in spite of their vices and their mistakes, whereas in the aristocratic institutions there is sometimes a secret bias which, in spite of talents and virtues, leads men
to contribute to the afflictions of their fellows. In this way it may come about that under aristocratic governments public men do evil without intending it, and in democracies they bring about good results of which they have never thought."
(Tocqueville 2003: 255)
Democratic ideals, associated with the American political tradition, further reinforce America’s soft power and cultural impact. In the age of the most massive spread of the democratic form of government, the American political experience tends to serve as a standard for emulation. The spreading emphasis worldwide on the centrality of a written constitution and on the supremacy of law over political expediency has drawn upon the strength of the American constitutionalism. The appeal and impact of the democratic American system based on the rule of law and primacy of the constitution has also been accompanied by the growing attraction of the American entrepreneurial economic model, which promotes global free and uninhibited competition.
When is comes to the form of government that Americans have chosen in their country it seems that the idea of America has been also enshrined in the fabric of democratic institutions. Extremely valid over here seems to remain the contention made by Tocqueville nearly two centuries ago who has warned about the dangers of unrestrained powers of the state:
"A democratic state of society, [however] similar to that of the Americans, might offer singular facilities for the establishment of despotism. Ancient tyrants like Roman emperors "possessed an immense and unchecked power which they frequently used “to deprive their subjects of property or of life; their tyranny was extremely onerous to the few, but it did not reach the many; it was confined to some few main objects and neglected the rest; it was violent, but its range was limited.”
(Part 2: Book 2, Chapter 5)
As for the international arena and much more decisively, the above described ideals and beliefs have been more effective and pertinent when the United States was ready to refine and cherish them at home, without contaminating them by extensive political interactions or abusing them through coercive interventions on the rest of the world. Indeed, it was one of the founding fathers of the newborn Republic: George Washington in his Farewell Union Address, advising against America’s involvement in entangling alliances:
“It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion, it is unnecessary, and would be unwise to extend them.”
(Gilbert 1961: 145)
In other words, Washington was aware of the fact that committing oneself to total isolation is not the best choice for the Republic. On the other hand, excessive interventionism would be a total antithesis of the foundations on which the United States had been established. The role for the United States therefore, was to acknowledge that the world is to a great degree socially interdependent and that America must be a constructive part of this world thereby becoming part of the solution to global problems and not the maker of them.
The rational option to lead the world was to choose to do so through dialogue and consent and not by coercion. This could not be accomplished by a recourse to jingoism or by panic mongering but it rather requires the synthesis of traditional American idealism with a degree of sober pragmatism regarding the realities of foreign policy. That is to say, to be ready to fight to remedy wrong but not to punish sin and to be
aware of the contention that the world will not be made righteous by exploitation by the strong on the weak. This reveals a creative role of Christianity in mundane history, which has been so evidently explicit in the United States identity that has been influenced to a large extent by cherished traditional American ideals. Such an approach necessitates that the United States neither retreats from the world nor tries to bully it into submission, but leads by deed and example even beyond her own borders. This point is extremely important as it is analogous to another vital prescription that Washington laid down for the United States in his Farewell Address:
“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign relations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.”
(Cobden 1886: 3).
This was a maxim for the United States of America as at that time the country was in a position of actual physical isolation from other powers that might threaten her. Later on this contention has been transformed by another author into a general prescription for all states requiring a limited interventionism:
“As little intercourse as possible betwixt the government, as much connection as possible between the nations of the world.”
(Cobden 1886: 116).
Thomas Jefferson - the greatest democrat to emerge from American democracy - when President of the United States, provided an equally famous conclusion in his First Inaugural Address. That is: if only Americans could maintain freedom of action America could develop and expand bringing prosperity at home and peace and democracy beyond her borders:
“It is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication will expand itself beyond present limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws.”
(Jefferson 1903: x.296)
In summary, American Framers praised the virtues of self-government and will of the people whilst realizing the need for a constitutional arrangement with some central institutions to constrain the unmediated power of the state managed to create a system of democratic government that has been proclaimed by most of experts in the field as a brilliant success. A close to a perfect model that parliamentary democracies all over the world would do well to copy. The landmarks of this model have been above all written constitution, federal form of government, separation of powers and judicial review system. Through construction of this type of government America has demonstrated to the world that “with wisdom and knowledge men may govern themselves.” Because of the above American model has been extremely influential and beneficial outside of the American continent. With the important stress in the American model being placed on the role of common ideals, culture and education in fostering fundaments of the society that is composed of free individuals and institutions.
Consequently, having briefly outlined the historical establishing of traditional American ideals and values: their formation and development throughout history, the next Chapter will demonstrate that following one particular line of interpretation these ideals are parallel to the English School and Constructivists logic of thinking in International Relations Theory.
CHAPTER TWO
The English School and Constructivist Values
The English School Theory of international society alongside constructivism is a via media - the middle way between realist accounts of systemic logics and revolutionist accounts which were devastating to states systems throughout the history of humankind. The English School contends that cooperation between states and individuals is possible even within anarchical orders. The international society supporters claim that the condition of anarchy does not preclude the transformation of systems into international societies of states, which are not alien to morality or a sense of common interest (Dunne: 1998:11). Indeed, for the English School scholars ethics and values are central to the understanding of world politics. The exceptional worth of the English School stems from the fact that it has some connection with the realist tradition in International Relations Theory, along with some significant departures.
Realist accounts of International Relations tend to perceive the total of relations between states from the systemic, positivist perspective whereby states are compared to the colliding billiard balls. Consistent with this approach, relations between states form a system in which states are preoccupied mainly with survival, the accumulation of power at the expense of the less powerful states and interstate security.
In contrast, the English School approach offers a synthesis of a wide variety of theories and concepts whilst moving beyond the rigid realist - idealist divide. The English School scholars claim that the existence of a society presupposes the existence of a system. It is problematic whether the school should be treated as a national branch of the English thinking on international relations particularly given the fact that it
embraces cosmopolitan ideas and appeals to the theoretical framework of various other cultures. This approach in vast part relies on an analytical eclecticism - borrowing from various other theories whilst combining explanation of key concepts such as agency and structure, theory and history as well as morality and power.
The English School scholars claim that states to some extent form a society of states as opposed to the international system. A society of states is understood as a group of states or independent political communities which not merely form an artificial arrangement, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize common interest in upholding these rules (Bull 1977:13). International society shares wider and deeper interests beyond the survival of states. Through their membership of the ‘anarchical society’ states share a common commitment to spoken and unspoken rules, international institutions, limited forms of co-operation, all of which help to maintain a degree of order in international politics (Bull, 1977). Key to this claim is that states have reached a minimum level of agreement on limitations of the use of violence, respect for property rights as well as diplomatic conduct.
According to realists an international society did exist in the past and supported moral obligations of a supranational character. However, it was rooted in an aristocratic culture of diplomacy that operated in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. These aristocratic units were believed to be members of a cosmopolitan community of humankind, and when their diplomatic culture collapsed, so did the possibility of international ethics or traditional values.
The English School challenges the realist contention that international society does not exist and that moral ideals and principles do not matter in contemporary world politics. Simultaneously, the English School does not understand International Society to be composed of aristocratic units, but independent states. States are capable and do hold a sense of obligation not only to their own citizens but also to the whole community that is dependant not on a shared cosmopolitan culture, but on mutual respect, concord as well as common interests and values. Such values over time can initiate sufficient contact and cooperation so that to generate a degree of cultural harmony, common social consciousness and consensus among likeminded states. In this sense, the conditions of anarchy and security dilemma do not prevent peaceful or even harmonious relations among states that share certain common values and have agreed upon a framework of normative principles.
The English School scholars draw a lot from the constructivist approach emphasising the social construction of world politics and of what states are and in what way they pursue their intended interests. In contrast to pure rationalist and non-progressivist approaches constructivists treat the identities, meanings and interests of actors as being endogenous to process of iteration and are socially constructed. In other words, constructivists offer a worldview that “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler 1997:322). Thus, a fundamental principle o constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.
As such, constructivists approach has clear parallels with supporters of the cultural approach in international relations theory who maintain that it is possible illuminate important features of international politics that were previously enigmatic and that have crucial practical implications for international theory and empirical research. The parallel between the English School scholars and constructivists has been most vividly portrayed by Dunne - when he observed:
“The English School has always stood four-square in the constructivist camp… For the English School, the society of states is not a given. It has been constructed by states but it is not reducible to them. As a structure, it contains the behaviour of states through institutions (or practices) which embody highly developed forms of intersubjective identity that rationalism cannot comprehend”
(Robersome 2002: 95).
Despite being to a degree similar to rational choice theories constructivism is a specific kind of social theory advocating analytical eclecticism whilst seizing the middle ground between rationalism and interpretive approaches and building a bridge between various other theories. Above all, whilst rationalist approach assigns a limited causal role to ideational factors constructivists approach seeks to go beyond the narrow analytical framework of the rationalist approach by broadening the array of ideational factors that can affect the outcome (Ruggie 1998). Ideas and ideals are of such importance for social constructivists that they are responsible for constructing preferences and interests - that is the material world is what the ideal world makes of it, or as Wendt (1998:3) declared: “anarchy is what states make of it”. This does not automatically entail that constructivists advocate replacement of ‘brute materialism’ with ‘brute idealism’ - the camp seems to suggest that material forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life.
Thus, being placed in the family of cultural approaches constructivism clearly demonstrates that human most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived as ex nihilo by human consciousness; and that these understanding were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted. Consequently, it may argued that constructivists believe that since the human capacity for learning has its greatest impact on the manner in which the individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world whilst cognitively framing the world they experience and construct such human capacity provides us with indications as to how human beings could avoid total crises and manage differences peacefully in a constructive manner (Adler 1997: 322).
The constructivist approach maintains that international politics are socially constructed by complex cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world (Adler 1997: 1). In other words, it constitutes an area in which the identities of actors are intersubjective and therefore to a large extent malleable to social interaction. As such, it remains a complex theoretical concept that is still in huge extent unexplored as there is no unequivocal consensus on its intrinsic nature and substance as well as its potential to be examined together with its numerous symbioses - in particular - these with the politics of psychology developed in modern American political science.
Constructivists are mainly preoccupied with the relationship between agents and structures. The main insight behind constructivism is that meanings and the world that sovereign states occupy on the international arena are “socially constructed”. This implies that states are not purely depending on their own power potential and material
capabilities but the existence of patterns and interstate relationships depends by and large on webs of interstate relations and practices between states. As Ruggie (1998: 856) claims “constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life”. Constructivists tend to stress the role of soft power, legitimacy and ideals - instead of hard power and power politics calculations. For constructivists’ ideas, meanings and relationships vary over time as they are never fixed or stable.
According to constructivists sovereignty is a social institution in a sense that sovereign states are those who are perceived by other states as community actors sharing common rights and duties towards its own citizens. This understanding stipulates that sovereignty constitutes an important organizing force in International Relations that rests on the shared ideas of people and the practices people engage in. However, sovereignty is neither fixed in its meaning nor is it permanent feature of political life and knowledge as the absolutist interpretations of sovereignty would claim. In fact, sovereignty to a degree must be shared with other states and not perceived as an unconstrained absolute. For that reason, constructivists are to a degree in accord with postmodern deconstructivists whilst claiming that social and political reality is made, and more importantly in the process of constantly being remade and redefined. At this stage, constructivism offers the opposite approach to materialist and positivist approaches such as neoliberalism and neorealism which seek to explain international patterns as a result of purely material forces.
For the same reason, constructivists seem to be in agreement with the globalist perspective - which is generally understood as the acceptance of the view usually labelled as ‘globalization’ and is definitely identified with the antithesis of realism’s
and neorealism’s statist, power-political and state-centric understanding of international system structure. In this sense, constructivists tend to challenge John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism (1995: 91) consistent with which “the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics.” The camp seems to be more aligned with cultural, transnational and international political economy approaches where globalization has its origins and which clearest guiding theme is the deterritorialisation of world politics taking the state and the sate system, off the centre stage of world politics (Held 1999: 5).
Consistent with the constructivist approach, the ideas that give shape to international politics are more than just the beliefs of particular individuals. Ideas are primarily intersubjective which means that they are shared between people and states and institutionalized: expressed in collective practices and identities. They are embedded not only in human minds but also in collective memories and the rhetoric of statecraft. That is why, constructivist approach is more complicated than the simple divide between stringent idealism and pure realism as it stipulates that material reality must be understood through social concepts that define the true meaning for life, thereby forming socially constructed interests and identities.
For constructivists, beliefs, expectations and interpretations are inescapable when thinking about international affairs, and their importance demonstrates that the materialist position is untenable. Whilst the shift from a materialist to a socially constructed view of International Relations was controversial in the 1990s, it has been broadly accepted in modern history. Materialist theories of International Relations generally emphasize the importance of ‘non-material factors’ such as strategy or
intelligence over the nonmaterial factors, namely: socially constructed interests, ideas, values and normative principles reflected in collective identities.
Most constructivists agree on the fundamental existence of a formal condition of anarchy among states and perceive it as a crucial element of the international structure. On the other hand, hierarchy is perceived as an alternative to anarchy and constructivists often agree with neorealists that anarchy is the fundamental, organizing principle of the international system.
However, constructivists also accept the possibility that changes in the social relations among states could transform the anarchical system into something that is not anarchic but neither is it hierarchic. The key concept here is international legitimacy which refers to relations of legitimated power based on common ideals and shared normative principles that eventually can generate common interests and identity. The emphasis on questions of legitimacy in international relations is growing as the belief in the inevitability of a state-cantered balance of power seems to be in decline.
Whilst some constructivists have remained within the anarchy problematic, others have found empirical evidence of the existence of institutions of legitimated power. International legitimacy can be found in international organizations or in practices and institutions of the international society such as international law or Great Powers. The conventional view stipulates that the content of anarchy might change due to common practices, shared ideals and institutions. The so-called post-anarchy view forms a fundamental challenge to the shared premise that anarchy is the continuing basis for international politics and this approach has affinity with the English School approach,
which has always perceived International Relations to form an “International Society” rather than an international anarchy or international hierarchy.
Constructivists maintain that how people and states think and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves, about others plus shared understandings and practices in which they participate. Constructivism argues that objective reality is composed from social processes and interactions between states and human beings and their relevance for international life is a function of the social construction of meanings. On this point, constructivists generally agree with the English School scholars confirming that states perceive some needs and interests but they also act according to certain moral principles and established routines.
Middle ground ethics, or in other words “political morality” was placed by Wight at the centre of Western Values in International Relations. Political morality rests on the notion that “duties are owed not only by each government to its subjects, but by one government to another, and by one people to another” (Wight 1966: 128). Moreover, according to constructivists and the English School scholars international ethics is not build upon an idea of right or wrong founded on universal moral principle as the pure cosmopolitanism suggests. Instead, the concept of international ethics rests on ideas of right and wrong found within a practice of states. It arises from the situatedness of states in a wider community of states. Within such a community, obligations follow from a shared interest in maintaining the world of heterogeneous, sovereign states that coexist on a basis of toleration and reciprocity to a large extent in a societal context of shared cultural values - if possible buttressed by common, supranational institutions.
Solidarist camp within the English School argues that obligations of an ethical kind do obtain, a code of practice represented in an ethics of coexistence whilst from a minimal level of moral community more robust ethical concerns can be developed within the international society. For instance, the formation of security mechanisms or shared identity. These are possible to establish since the ties that bind individuals to the great society of humankind are deeper than the pluralist rules and institutions that separate them. In other words, as Bull (1977: 22) advocated: “the ultimate units of the great society of mankind are not states but individual human beings.”
Solidarist camp within the English School, believe in a collective enforcement of international rules and the guardianship of human rights. In fact, in a solidarist model the most powerful state - hegemony - is represented as a leader of the so called coalition of like minded states - partners, not of international society in a broad sense, although the coalition may seek to widen and capture as many members as possible. There is likely to be a denser sharing of values in this case and this, along with an existence of an external threat to the coalition, promotes shared interests and in the final effect common identity.
Therefore, great importance and emphasis at this stage is placed on the leader’s perceived legitimacy within the coalition itself. Legitimacy is a social phenomenon - in essence - it is something which has to be socially bestowed rather than something that actors can claim for themselves. Indeed, no action can be described as legitimate if it is not socially recognized accepted and recognized as rightful.
In this regard, solidarism differs from pure cosmopolitanism in that the latter approach is agnostic as to the institutional arrangement for delivering some universal values. On the contrary, solidarists abandon claims to establish formal political hierarchies as they advocate an extension of an international society through a progressive, continued evolution and not its transformation by an unexpected revolution. Solidarism is defined by shared ideals and institutions and it is held together by binding moral principles and conventions. In terms of values, in a solidarist international society individuals are entitled to basic human rights and human dignity whilst states have certain obligations towards their own citizens.
Solidarists also believe that ultimately an international system will evolve into some kind of a truly cooperative global community which refers to the shared interests and values “linking all parts of the human community” (Bull 1977:279). The process itself, however, constitutes an extension of the international society and not its transformation. ‘Community’ over here is an extremely misleading and complex concept to apply. Having noted its reference to common interests and common identity as well as classical contrast with the term ‘society’ it may be used with the adjective ‘global’ or ‘worldwide’.
Community in this context implies that ideals are necessarily particularistic; it would seem to follow that with only an apparent paradox that it would not be possible to mount a ‘communitarian’ defence of the idea of world community - or that on communitarian lines a world community could not exist at all. The existence of such a community would be signalled by the development not just of global common interests and ethical system, but also of a wide-reaching consciousness of common identity that
characterizes larger community called ‘humanity’ with its intrinsic nature. The key term at this point then is global civil community, or global civil society.
A number of countervailing forces in the modern world in the realms of ideas, or of technology broadly defined, or of social and political action - appear to act either to promote or to hinder this development of a global community, but crucially behind the struggle between these forces is the fact that it is generally assumed that there is an underlying trend guaranteeing or at least making it very likely that promoters of the community will succeed. The assumption that some kind of a shared normative arrangement and common global identity will triumph over those based on particular local contexts is a characteristic feature of the contemporary modern liberalism in almost all its forms.
The premise underlying that assumption is that the world is moving into the direction of an ethical, global community, albeit with a faltering step because of the contest between the forces representing common interests and common identity and those representing the old, particularistic order. In other words, there is a high probability that the trend would continue so that the sequence ‘kin, tribe, city, state’ would, eventually be completed by ‘world’. If true, then this would be possible to happen conceivably through a gradual and controlled process of devolution of power that could lead to an increasingly formalised community of shared interest, in the best possible scenario with supranational arrangements that could progressively assume some sort of the special security roles of traditional nation-states. In such a community power would have to become exceptionally balanced whilst being simultaneously constrained.
The term global community was first introduced by the English School writers. The key implication of Bull’s analysis of the world community is that if we are true to the idea of a community of states - where the majority of the members are non-Western — we must to some extent listen and accommodate their demands. Although Bull never had the chance to offer his commentary on the emergent responsibility to protect norm, it is nonetheless consistent with the call for the expansion of international society. He argued that the expansion of international society, as a result of decolonization and the dispersion of global human rights and justice substantiates the claim that a solidarist international community is not only plausible, but increasingly necessary in order to maintain a degree of international order in the international society (Bull, 1984).
The definition of the world society includes a broader understanding of the moral concerns such as: the claim of individuals to human rights and dignity, the claim of indigenous peoples to autonomy or the need of transnational corporations to penetrate the hard shell of sovereign states. Consistent with this understanding human rights are at the centre of the classical English School’s conception of a world society. Nevertheless, an account of the development of human rights would need to show that the cosmopolitan culture of late modernity is to some extent shaping a new institutional arrangement in a present multicultural world. Therefore, an unconditional rejection of cosmopolitanism including its various interpretations may not always be precise and convincing.
Understood in this context, cosmopolitanism dismisses ethical and moral relativism, and equally it rejects the idea of the need to preserve some kind of an absolute political control. Indeed, in the modern age what seems apparent is that our moral problem is
not relativism as such but increasingly pluralism - the enduring conflict between competing and sometimes incompatible definitions of ‘the good life’. Thus, above described approach is set against an apparent refusal to judge and condemn in circumstances where judgement and condemnation seem mandatory. In the multicultural world that exists during revolutionary times the constructive logic of thinking and acting advocates rejection of any type of universalism or exceptionalism, acceptance of the multiethnic, cultural diversity and search for qualities that are shared and common to the all of humanity.
Portrayed in this way - cosmopolitanism refers rather to the notion of a multicultural diversity, tolerance for the other as well as tolerance and harmony of various religions derived more explicitly from the American state of Pennsylvania. Thus, cosmopolitanism is not concerned with replacing, but with supplementing more fixed human identities. It has got its roots in the policies of ancient Greece where stoics as opposed to Cynics did not with to replace particular identities with a universal one, but rather construct a cosmopolitanism which develops from the grassroots level. Above all, it aims to complement and build on multiple identities, rather than destroy human diversity and various enriching particularities that it holds to be vital in order to sustain a global community of shared interest.
Understood in his way, cosmopolitanism builds on the basic principles of equal dignity, respect and the priority of vital need in its preoccupation with what is required for the autonomy and development of all human beings (Held 2001: 86). The development of this kind of ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ depends above all on the:
“Recognition by growing numbers of peoples of the increasing interconnectedness of political communities in diverse domains including the economic, cultural and environmental; and the development of an understanding of overlapping ‘collective fortunes’ which require collective solutions - locally, nationally, regionally and globally.”
(Held 2002: 39)
Cosmopolitanism from this theoretical perspective points primarily to the idea of a sociability and solidarity of states. The fact - that states have common interests and agree upon some kind of shared normative arrangements that can generate shared identity but does not expand into Kantian universalism. As Dunne (2003: 305) observed:
“But there is [must be] more to the idea of International Society. In addition to the fact of interdependence which generates common interests, states also have a capacity for sociality, manifested in the diffusion of shared values and in their general fidelity to the rules. This does not mean that states will always act in accordance with agreed rules and conventions, only that this is the regular pattern and not the exception.”
Consistent with this approach apart from having agreed upon common interests, institutions and shared values, states can also work together so that to generate a ‘common social consciousness’ based on ever-wider common interests, common bond of human dignity and a deepening sense of shared identity. Such a normative system buttressed by basic claims of individuals to human rights could be truly protected only by a legitimate global leadership. As Dunne (2003: 306) advocated:
"International Society exists to protect diverse political communities from being overrun by more powerful neighbours. It is, in this sense, a great leveller. To invoke a helpful - if fictitious - metaphor deployed by Vattel, 'a dwarf is as much a man as a giant is: a small republic is no less a state than the most powerful kingdom. This is why non-intervention is the constitutive norm of international society: to recognize another community’s right to independence is at the same time a commitment not to interfere in its domestic jurisdiction. As far as the moral purpose of international society is concerned, it is worth underlining the fact that, from its inception, it was 'not just a society of
sovereign states but a society for sovereign states.
At this point, there is a parallel between the English School values and the traditional American ideals what will be discussed below. From a theoretical standpoint, the via media of the English School expresses itself in the fact that it is not reducible either to myopic realism or to unbending idealism despite the fact that it simultaneously draws to some extent from both schools. More specifically, the focus on systemic forces draws insights from realism whilst the processes in world society - such as widening of moral responsibility - is parallel to cosmopolitan, idealist strands. Realism is dismissed for not taking duties to noncitizens seriously, whilst stringent revolutionism is rejected because, in the minds of domestic publics citizens matter more than just strangers.
Consequently, there is a clear parallel with what all great figures in the English School: Butterfield, Wight, Bull and Watson suggested that the future of the international society is likely to be determined by the preservation and extension of some kind of a common socio-political cultural framework. In this sense, shared culture would constitute a prerequisite for an authentic international society. As Wight (1977: 33) put it: “We must assume that a states-system [that is an international society] will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.”
Correspondingly, all great historians within the School have strongly emphasised that international societies have always grown up within the context of shared cultures. Herbert Butterfield (1965) has even made the following observation:
“Granted that a states system is already in existence, it may not be difficult to add to it new units which were once outside it - even units that are of a quite alien culture … It looks as though (in the conditions of the past at least) a states system can only be achieved in a tremendous conscious effort of reassembly after the political hegemony has broken down.”
The above mentioned process would lead to a creation of some kind of a shared sociopolitical context that could embrace both common ideas and values that are rooted in societies in general as well as in their elites and which can provide the world global society of today with the kind of underpinning enjoyed by the geographically smaller and culturally more homogenous international societies of the past (Bull 1977: 305). Common culture over here refers not simply to a strict socio-political construct but to common ideas, ideals, values and traditions that are transmitted through one generation to the next through mechanisms of socialization. Such culture can be buttressed by the system of empirical beliefs, archetypes, myths, expressive symbols, perceptions and values which define our reality. While the culture is influenced by the forces and events external to the culture itself, it profoundly influences how such forces are perceived and shapes a way in which a given society responds to them. In this sense, cultures enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and are not merely subjective reflections of concrete objective reality.
Moreover, as Bull stated the agreement upon the existence of a common culture is not to imply that any cosmopolitan culture is likely to become dominant throughout the world, engulfing cultural particularisms, or that it is desirable that such a development should take place. Above all the author has stressed that:
“Like the world international society, the cosmopolitan culture on which it depends may need to absorb in the future non-Western elements to a much greater degree if it is to be genuinely universal worldwide accepted and provide a foundation for a universal International Society.” (Bull 1977: 305)
It may be added that such a society in order to be fully recognized would have to arise at least to some extent as the consequence of a social consensus among sovereign, likeminded states and not as a result of a coercive process or imposition on the weaker members of the international society. Thereby, being constructed in the midst of an evolutionary process of consensual change it would have to become an imagined ‘cosmopolitan community of humankind’ founded upon some sort of indispensable constitutional agreement, in the best possible scenario - buttressed by common, supranational institutions.
At this point, it may be worth noting a contention from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean made by Senator Fulbright, who observed that it would be altogether unrealistic, dangerous and probably undesirable as well to aspire toward a single, absolute universal community of humankind with common values and common institutions. Indeed, as the author observed: “the rapprochement of people is only possible when differences of culture and outlook are respected and appreciated rather than feared or condemned, when the common bond of human dignity is recognized as the essential bond for a peaceful world” (Senator Fulbright, From remarks upon receiving the Athinai International Prize awarded by the Alexander S. Onassis Foundation, Athens, 1989).
At this point, it must be reminded that a universal global society still remains an utopia, and one that may be receding from view rather than becoming closer. In an increasingly globalized world society has indeed been developing, but it still exists within a
violence-prone system, both international and transnational. (Keohane 2002: 6-7).
Therefore, it may be stressed that a belief that a world community is emerging need entail neither adherence to a facile progressivism of a supernatural getting in the spirit of things and transforming the whole universe, nor a belief that a saintly, self-scarifying altruism is, or should be rife among the peoples of the world. The sense of common identity that is required for the world community to operate is more down to earth and rather practical, closer to the idea that peoples should not be indifferent to the suffering of others than to the ideas that we give the interests of others equal weigh with our own. It is also plausible to suggest that many of the positive features that a putative international community might provide could be found within the scope of an association of communities founded by and large on the rule of law and fidelity to the internationally accepted legalistic regimes and not united in any worldwide project.
Consequently, cosmopolitanism - understood in this fundamentally liberal context equals rather to ‘cosmopolis’ whilst extending beyond pluralism with its minimal core of standard of coexistence upon which states agree in order to limit negative effects of anarchy. Taken from such a theoretical perspective, the argument for the existence of ‘cosmopolis’ is without doubt less informed by utopian visions or by universalist ethics. That is because in its essence it does not necessarily denote absolute political control and preservation of the superior culture.
So, cosmopolitanism is not interested in a single conception of top-down authority, it is rather concerned with the renaissance of legitimate power at multiple levels. The approach points rather to the intensification of certain cultural and organizational
features of world society thereby claiming that states have certain interests and values in common and that there are cosmopolitan standards of treatment that all peoples are entailed to claim which are recommendable for all states to accept. In other words, states in their dealings with one another are not free of moral or legal restraints: they are bound by the rules of the international society they compose and in whose preservation they have a stake.
At the same time, this approach does offer something qualitatively additional. Namely, it refers to ideas pertaining to the concept of ‘world justice’ as an extension of both basic individual human rights as well as states justice. According to Bull (1977) these are ideas which seek to spell out what is right or good for an ‘imagined civitas maxima’ or a cosmopolitan society to which all individuals belong to. As the author observed:
“This notion of justice as the promotion of the world common good is different from that of the assertion of the rights and duties of individual human beings all over the globe for it posits the idea that these individuals form or should form a society or community whose common interests or common good must qualify or even determine what their individual rights and duties are, just as the rights and duties of individuals within the state have in the past been qualified or determined by notions such as the good of the state, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of its citizens, or the general will. It implies a conception of justice that is ‘proportionate’ as well as ‘arithmetical’, ‘distributive’ as well as 'communitive.”
(Bull 2002: 81)
Consequently, as Bull explained, the notion of the ‘world common good’ pertains not only to common ends or values of the society of states, but rather to common ends and values of some kind of ‘an imagined community of mankind’. Constituent members of this society are first of all individual human beings or nations and not states (Bull 1977: 810).
A considerable emphasis over here is being placed on the potential of humankind to identify morally with each other on the basis of shared normative prescriptions and experiences. More importantly though hereby adopted more cautious position is that the sort of global civil society thereby composed looks less like conventional strains of normative cosmopolitanism, and more like a form of transnational network society (Axford, Huggins 2001: 1) From such theoretical assumption, global civil society does not inevitably require a hierarchical system of power. Quite the opposite - despite the division of humanity into separate, independent states, it is possible to identify with some kind of a shared socio-political, intercultural compromise as well as establish a moral concern for humanity as a whole existing beyond national borders. Thus, ‘cosmopolis’ may possibly refer to the idea that humanity is to be treated as a single, solidarist community that possesses moral priority and shares common values, if possible buttressed by common institutional and constitutional arrangements in the transnational, globalized world.
At this stage, there is a clear equivalent between the English School values and traditional, cherished American ideals. Within contemporary American political culture there is a growing consciousness of the interdependence of the emerging global international society which can comprise some kind of an ideational basis of a radically different American foreign policy in the future.
In this sense, there is a clear contrast between the ambitions of the so called ‘imperial overstretch’ that characterized former presidency of G. W. Bush and values and ideals promoted by President Obama which are quintessentially traditional American values emphasising moral awareness, human dignity, tolerance and our common humanity.
Such values advocate unity among all peoples around the world, above all: unity among: Christian, Muslims, and Judaists as well as aimed at endorsement of a ‘common social consciousnesses’ among all peace loving nations. It may be added that this trend in politics reflects also a spirit in which Senator Fulbright has once stated:
“What I do question is the ability of the United States or any other Western nation to go into a small, alien, undeveloped Asian nation and create stability where there is chaos, the will to fight where there is defeatism, democracy where there is no tradition of it, and honest government where corruption is almost a way of life.”
President Obama pledges to defend those who are oppressed under authoritarian regimes as he supports a universal endorsement of human dignity and renewal of the system of human rights worldwide starting from change within the United States. In the words of the current President the mission for the United States in the next several decades will be to: “provide global leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a common humanity” (Obama 2007: 1).
Based on the above discussion, the next chapter will identify and discuss the assumption that during the Presidency of G. W. Bush the cherished traditional American ideals were profoundly undermined, resulting in a crisis of legitimacy and credibility of the United States as a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in International Relations.
The new constructivists approach in this context seems to be more convincing and up-to-date. By assuming that states are rational but existing to a degree in a socially constructed environment, the approach overturns a false dichotomy that separates some versions of rational choice and constructivism. By studying both the material and social
content of the international environment it links the materialist emphasis of realism with the ideational concerns of cosmopolitanism, simultaneously moving beyond both approaches - thereby forming a distinguishing and unique quality of a via media.
CHAPTER THREE
Antithesis of the Traditional American Values and Ideals during the Presidency of George W. Bush
The art of identification of the most effective means to the ends of foreign policy based on the values that inspire choices about goals has always constituted a considerable challenge for foreign policy making process. Undoubtedly, a substantial disagreement exists about the best way to characterize some universal goals, values and instruments of American foreign policy making process. It may be also observed that it is unlikely that any consensus will crystallize in the very near future, because the subject is complex and amenable to differing but equally plausible interpretations. The term ‘foreign policy’ in itself is extremely elastic and complex. Goals, values, ideals and instruments that serve them have habitually taken new directions as global circumstances: political, economic, geographical and geopolitical changed and American leaders sought to cope with them throughout the course of history.
The challenge whilst discussing these goals is even more difficult as clearly there can be observed fluctuations and altering cycles in defining U.S. goals and postures as there are two main world views - idealism and realism - both of which at various times have dominated the thinking of U.S. leaders and shaped their foreign policies. The two value systems stem from very divergent beliefs about the ways to best reconcile the tension between ideals and interests, between principles and power and between moral purpose and military primacy. As the topic is extremely complex controversies about American foreign policy goals, values and instruments and their impact upon diplomatic process abound.
Consequently, the following chapter will explore and further develop the idea that during the Presidency of Gorge W. Bush traditional American values and ideals have been profoundly undermined and diluted. From the theoretical perspective, it may be argued that this was due to Bush and his staff strong inclination towards a second image approach in International Relations which stipulates that a specific domestic system may lead to a better international arrangement. That is why, concentration was on the nature of others’ regimes whether they are democracies or tyrannies which they think explains their behaviour and therefore strong influences how the United States should behave towards them (Jervis 2008: 2).
During this presidency America pursued a path that has left it less admired by its traditional allies, less feared by its enemies and less capable of convincing the rest of the world that American economic and political model is worthy of emulation. What resulted was a global crisis of legitimacy and credibility of the United States of America as a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in International Politics. Under Presidency of George W. Bush American people have been motivated largely by fear due to a national trauma caused by tragic events from 11 September. In reality, the most powerful country in the world was shaken into a sudden awareness of its unexpected vulnerability. This triggered huge consequences on the formation of the American identity as a nation, foreign policy formulation as well as the United States position on the international chessboard. As Dunne (2003:315) observed in the course of the ‘war on terror’ the United States of America has stood to a great degree against international society as understood by classical English School scholars.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the world seemed to be going in America’s direction. America’s vision of International Relations and the world’s aspirations were
remarkably congruent. It was a vision symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the triumph of the ideals traditionally championed by the United States - liberal democracy; free global markets, individual justice and human equality as well as multilateral governance. Yet America’s authority measured in term of credibility, respect and cooperation of governments around the world has declined sharply after the tragic events. In large extent, the United States presented itself to the world as a country that seeks to unpredictably reshape and transform the world order - and it does so for reasons that are tied directly to its security. America thus, could not be safe until threatening despotic states join the democratic world. This logic has been captured by Robert Jervis in the following words:
“As long as many countries are undemocratic, democracies elsewhere, including the United States, cannot be secure. President Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world safe for democracy. Bush extends and reverses this, arguing that only in a world of democracies can the United States be safe.”
(Jervis 2006: 13).
September 11th was a defining moment for the United States which herald shifts in the American behaviour allowing the neoconservative camp to set out a new vision for American foreign policy - a vision based on unilateral power and military prowess. (Kennedy-Pipe, 2008: 418). Simultaneously, it unfettered a degree of arrogance about international law, human rights, and civilian casualty rates (Ibid). The importance of law in any society has been summarised by Senator Fulbright in the following words:
"Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. As a conservative power, the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behaviour of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we violate the law ourselves, whatever shortterm advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate
the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long-term interests."
(Lobe 2002: 3)
More importantly, September 11 gave those who wished to see global politics as divided by religion the chance to wage war on other cultures and civilizations (Kennedy-Pipe 2008: 418). Terrorist attacks have engendered among the American people a culture of fear that had devastating effects on the United States image around the world as a ‘Responsible Great Power.’ They have led to isolation of America in the world, subsequently evoking a number of offensive policy formulations about the entitlement of the United States to resort to pre-emption in order to prevent future attacks. These became known as the Bush Doctrine which led to a prolonged War in Iraq in 2003, plus widespread images from the Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, undermined American reputation prompting many people around the world to abandon a long-established confidence and trust in the United States as a ‘Responsible Great Power’.
It may be argued that what has been lost was a global role of America as a ‘compassionate leader’, plus a conviction that the country can handle its enormous power wisely. That is, by combining the politics of liberal interventionism whilst exercising moral restraint and providing a constructive leadership by remaining true to its fundamental ethical standards and traditional values. On this point it is important to note that there are two types of moralism which can describe American foreign policy. As Senator Fulbright observed:
"The inconstancy of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one is the morality of decent instincts
tempered by the knowledge of human imperfection, and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the crusading spirit…"
(Lobe 2002:4).
The Bush Doctrine with its underlying premises, namely: material self-confidence and preponderance, universalising self-interest, and unreflective faith in America’s transformative capacity - one that overstates the salience of material resources, ignores the social bases of power and legitimacy and underestimates the complexities of the global great power management (Reus-Smit 2005: 5).
The doctrine has naively assumed that power resources and political influence exist in a relationship of simple causality, with material preponderance naturally spawning political leverage and ability to get expected outcomes. In reality, the opposite seems to be true. As some scholars observe there is an attenuated relationship between material endowments and the ability to exert international impact (Reus-Smit 2005: 8). The doctrine has also wrongly considered legitimacy perceived principally through a neoconservative prism. This rested largely on idealistic foundations, namely - the claim for the centrality of a purported universal cause represented by America, the expected power of positive example, the belief in the possibility of progress. As some prominent scholars observe all these credentials are correct though they gain effectiveness mainly through their acceptance by others, not through their imposition by military might (Jervis 2005: 254). Above all:
“They require that others change not only their behavior but their outlook, if not their values, as well. For this to happen, the United States has to be seen as well-motivated and exemplifying shared ideals.”
(Jervis 2005:254).
In fact, legitimacy is a social phenomenon - an actor or action is not legitimate unless other members of the international society deem it be so, whereas neoconservative perception of legitimacy assumes that legitimacy of the United States and its foreign policy depends on nothing more than the universality of its national interests (ReusSmit 2005:5). In actual fact, it fails to understand that one can assert ones legitimacy as loudly as one likes though it is meaningless if others are not eager to follow the leader. The doctrine veils military interventions in a humanitarian language whilst giving approval to coercion, bribery, inconsistency, selectivity and self-interest that all do little to discourage the politics of cynicism. In truth, viewing politics as a possessive, primarily material, non-social and derived from any moral principles activity leaves foreign policy with an impoverished repertoire of diplomatic means of solving conflicts, or as some claim ‘anti-diplomatic techniques or tricks’ (Reus-Smit 2005: 8).
Therefore, it may be claimed that the doctrine has led to a global crisis of America’s international prestige and degradation of the United States role as a Great Power in International Relations that has triggered widespread notions that the country has become a hegemon or an empire in a unipolar world. The rise of American unipolar power and the erosion of the norms of state sovereignty seemed to have worked against the traditional Westphalian order, altered the logic of order and rule, and made American power more controversial and contested in the eyes of other members of the international community. By pursuing a more imperial foreign policy, the United States put itself in danger of undermining its own cultural power as well as destroying the very rule-based order that it was instrumental in creating in the post-war period (Buzan 2007: 2).
Indeed, when the most powerful state is no longer subject to rules or international regimes, other states become scared and seek to counter its power. Moreover, in bypassing multilateral forms of governance, the United States has increasingly sought to rely on its overwhelming military superiority and a more coercive variant of power. The unchecked power for the presidency of George W. Bush meant that the United States had a freedom to act alone in whatever coalitions it sees fit. In reality, it was quite the opposite - unfettered power created resentment and opposition that has made it more difficult for the United States to act gaining international acceptance. What has subsequently occurred was that the ‘soft power’ and symbolic importance of the United States of America as a global protector of freedom and democracy has been eroded. The arrogance of power derived from the fact that America can redefine the existing rules guiding the whole international system in an omnipotent, egoistic manner, what is worse with a blinding self-confidence about the virtue of its cause and far-reaching, universal goals. In other words, that it can act unilaterally when deciding upon starting wars, preventing them or pre-empting thereby deciding without any prior consultation with the rest of international community about the sovereignty of others.
The English School scholars have long held that the Great Powers enjoy certain special rights and responsibilities within the international society. It follows, therefore that there are certain rights and responsibilities attached to the most powerful state within the international community. However, the actions that the United States has embarked upon in response to September 11 triggered the common perception that America has generated hierarchical systems of power which undermine traditional notions of international society (Dunne 2003: 305). In the course of the “war on terror” and numerous others unilateral acts America has put itself to a great extent in opposition to
the international society based on common interests and shared values as understood by classical English School scholars. Consequently, by rejecting the cherished, historical American founding ideals and values the United States has largely undermined a long-established image as a ‘Responsible Great Power’.
Whilst further developing a concept of a ‘Responsible Great Power’ as elucidated by the English School scholars it must be stressed that Great Powers should be considered not simply in terms of the degree to which they can impose order on weaker members by crude coercion, but rather in terms of the extent to which their role and their managerial functions are perceived as legitimate by other members of the international society (Bull 1977: IX). In this sense, it may be argued that the United States has projected to the rest of the world an antithesis of its own values and ideals that America has been historically a defender of and a social pioneer on a global scale. It may be argued, also that a subsequent relativisation of the traditional American values and ideals that historically have constituted a basis of the American identity was to a great extent prompted by the revolutionary approach to diplomacy and foreign affairs that America has adopted in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. As Dunne (2003: 309) claims:
“September 112001 gave the George W. Bush presidency a mission. Terrorism became the enemy, as did those states that harbour them. The war on terror became the ideology. To combat terrorism, Bush urged the American people and their allies to accept the need to fight on all fronts and to tolerate exceptional measures, including control over immigration and restricting civil liberties. In this war on terror, there can be no neutral ground: all states must choose whether to be on the side of the US or on the side of terrorists. Such a policy of coercive homogeneity runs counter to the ethos of the sovereignty norms that are embodied in the UN Charter and that are so deeply embedded in the mindset of post-colonial state leaders.”
(Dunne 2003: 309).
It was an approach to foreign policy based on the self-righteousness approach assuming that democracy is a universal remedy to global problems. This has encouraged American statesman to embark on a course of actions that have been profoundly selfdefeating, and in many respects demoralizing and eroding of American values and normative principles. Thus, it may be argued that these actions were undertaken abruptly, without sufficient consideration as well as an adequate political analysis of the global political and geopolitical situation.
Throughout this period the United States statesman used to define world affairs in Manichaean, hedonistic terms. That is of a world divided between good and evil, the saved and the damned, the oppressed and the oppressors. Consistent with this view, the United States was the epitome of right and those states that were not in coalition with America were against her. Consequently, propaganda and subversion were preferable to negotiation and leadership through consent and dialogue with the rest of the international community. Consistent with the Manichean worldview: “The only just war was holy war, leading to total victory. The right of the ‘other’ was to assimilate or risk extermination. In short, might makes right” (Der Derian 2003: 75).
This posture of overconfidence triggered America becoming increasingly isolated in the world and therefore as a consequence has made her more vulnerable to nontraditional security threats including terrorists and paramilitary groups. This led to a conviction that America has the right to define the rules of the game in the whole international society so that she could decide when to start wars or how to pre-empt or prevent them. In other words, it was the period when America has chosen to adopt a more unconstructive constituent of her Great Power identity whilst subsequently being
overconfident in the use of its power. As Fulbright (1970: 15) stated:
“There are Americas. One is the America of Lincoln and Adlai Stevenson; the other is the America of Teddy Roosevelt and the modern superpatriots. One is generous and humane, the other narrowly egoistical; one is selfcritical, the other self-righteous; one is sensible, the other romantic; one is inquiring, the other pontificating; one is moderate, the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious and the other arrogant in the use of great power.”
Such a posture of lack of restraint which encouraged rejection of the traditional cherished American values and ideals led to an excessive militarism, preoccupation with hard power over soft power that resulted in numerous military campaigns that America has embarked upon bringing about overdraft spending and economic deficit.
Furthermore, the negative posture did have an impact on the United States negotiating style. It may be worth noting that under the conditions of hierarchical systems of power or ‘hegemony’ as some scholars have referred to the United States in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, American negotiating style has become more urgent and legalistic. Such style has in reality become an antithesis of the true spirit of negotiations, leaving no room for compromise, reciprocity and exchange of concessions. According to experts from the United States Institute of Peace under conditions of global hegemony:
“US negotiators… were less concerned to negotiate, in the sense of exchanging views and trading concessions, than to dictate terms or to persuade their counterparts of the rightness or potency of the American position… this hegemonic status has aggravated a long standing U.S. trait: namely, the inclination to moralize, to treat negotiation as an opportunity to reveal unimpeachable truth rather than to understand and respect the other side’s worldview.”
(USIP 2002:3).
Consequently, having established that during Presidency of George W. Bush traditional American values and ideals have been severely eroded resulting in a widespread relativisation and demoralization of the cherished, historical American ideals and erosion of her image around the world. The following chapter will demonstrate that the election of Barack Obama as a new President of the United States has endowed America with an extraordinary although long awaited opportunity of restitution whilst moving the foreign policy process in a completely new direction. Most crucially, this revival includes recovery of the identity of American society - American people and the country’s traditional role as a symbol of progress, a beacon of hope and as a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in International Politics. As Fulbright observed:
“If we accept this leadership, we will have contributed to the world “an idea mankind can hold to.” Perhaps that idea can be defined as the proposition that the nation performs its essential function not in its capacity as a power, but in its capacity as a society, or, to put it simply, that the primary business of the nation is not itself but its people.”
It may be also added that the election has improved America’s moral standing and reputation around the world by returning to and revival of the cherished, traditional American values and beliefs going back to the Founding Fathers of the Republic. It has also considerably improved America’s soft power - the power of cultural values, beliefs and ideas in International Politics.
CHAPTER FOUR
Recovery of the Identity of the United States of America during the Presidency of Barack Obama
Abstract
“…The leadership of the President, of any President, is not enough in the democratic, pluralistic society which we have created on this continent. His leadership can be effective only if he is able to bring about, with the help of all of us, a consensus among our people. Since we are not an authoritarian society, this can be accomplished only by an unparalleled effort on the part of everyone, to understand and to work as never before, for the restoration of an appreciation of quality, of beauty, of intelligence and integrity in our national sense of values.”
[Senator Fulbright from the Penrose Lecture, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, April 20, 1961]
The underlying premise of this chapter is the contention that state sovereignty should be understood as responsibility and not a right. This presupposes that various conceptions of sovereignty, and in turn the role of international institutions, should change before humanity can effectively resolve the world’s increasingly global challenges, from international terrorism and the proliferations of nuclear weapons to climate change and poverty. Consequently, this chapter will explore and further develop the idea that values to a large extent constitute the driving force in determining the policies that the United States pursues as well as form a basis of the American domestic system and wider identity formation. Thus, during Barack Obama’s presidency American identity both as a nation and as a ‘Responsible Great Power’ has been bestowed with a unique opportunity of revival through rebirth of American society, restoration of America’s international standing and reconstruction of American diplomacy whilst undergoing an evolutionary process of change.
At this stage, the most important is recovery of the American societal identity by putting emphasis on the restitution of the cherished, traditional American ideals so that to once again respect the Constitution of the United States of America. This will be possible since traditional American ideals are in great extent everlasting and resilient. More importantly, they are prone to renewal after the periods of crises and are subject to a process of a continued perfection throughout history. Such a reunion is crucial for the United States to regain legitimacy and perform the role of a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in international politics whilst moving the whole international community into a new, unknown direction. Hence, it will be examined in what way founding ideals and values are constitutive of the American identity formation.
Traditional American ideals and values have been historically a major driving force in the United States politics, policy, identity and culture. American model seems to be exceptional in a sense that foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government; consequently, what matters is state power, not national power. From its early beginnings American governmental model has been subject to ceaseless debates. During the most heated constitutional debates critics have been arguing both for a more powerful central government and a more powerful president. In the opinion of Alexander Hamilton - one of the most prominent framers, if America were to achieve the economic prosperity of Europe, then greater responsibility and power would have to be placed in the hands of the national government, and in particular, the presidency.
Traditional American ideals have shaped the nation’s character, helped to draw attention to common history and helped form Americans’ ideas about the world and influence the way Americans respond to events beyond their borders. Traditional
American ideals comprise the principles of justice and equality; cross-cultural tolerance and above all universal dignity of all human beings. Indeed, a yearning for human dignity seems to be the most evident occurrence of the present era: “… people want dignity in their existence, dignity in their ability to give a meaningful opportunity for their children, dignity in the respect that others give them, including their cultures and their religions” (Brzezinski & Scowcroft 2008: 250).
This approach implies that the condition of anarchy and the security dilemma do not prevent peaceful and even harmonious relations among states that share a degree of certain common cultural values and beliefs. Such values together with a spirit of tolerance help to explain both Americans’ sense of themselves as a chosen people as well as their uniqueness as a nation. From this perspective, American foreign policy making ought to be based on a sincere commitment to cultural values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law as well as economic opportunity and progress. The rationale for this is that diplomacy can facilitate cooperation, contribute towards mutual understanding and possibly resolve disputes if it is skillful, and the legitimate interests of the parties in dispute are taken into account.
The underpinning basis of this approach is that ideals proffered by America are attractive to the rest of the world and policies based on these ideals enhance America’s standing and legitimacy around the world. Legitimacy in this context requires that the leading power is not simply material or coercive, but it is ‘also the product of legitimacy, of the perception on the part of other social actors, that the exercise of power is rightful.’ (Reus-Smit 2005: 88). The key concept over here is authority which unlike power or coercion is not rooted in force or threat of force. It is rather established
through a process of building human consciousness through a variety of human connections and by agreeing and establishing social bond (Nisbet 1972: 1). Whilst the analysis of the approach introduced is interested in ‘distributions’ of power it is equally or even more preoccupied with the ‘constitution’ of that power.
During the Presidency of Barack Obama the United States of America, it can be argued, has been bestowed with an opportunity to be a recovered by undergoing a discursive and ideational shift by making foreign policy a basis to vindicate America’s domestic political and spiritual creed on a global scale. Throughout this process the country can be ready to lead once more through a process of resourceful negotiation and collaboration over confrontation and unilateralism in international affairs whilst acting in a constructive dialogue with her partners and members of the international community and accepting the limits of legal and multilateral institutional arrangements.
Such an approach to leadership necessitates that America will lead as well as listen, give as well as take. It requires that all the constituent parties are ready to listen to each other, see what can be learned from each other so that the common position may be reached. In other words, America must be ready to reach out to the world - not to preach about the things Americans do not believe in, but to listen and cooperate with other peoples and when necessary to compel dictatorial regimes in order for them to adopt more democratic systems and accept human rights standards. The underlying premise of the new doctrine is the fact that it is possible to regain the world’s sympathy by acknowledging that whilst the United States is a great nation built on worthy principles, it is not itself perfect. This is based on a simple assumption that America is ready to acknowledge its mistakes whilst the rest of the international community should admit
theirs (Dionne, 2009).
Consistent with this approach, America is performing an active role of a constructive leader as well a social, global pioneer in the interconnected world with a wide range of power centres. When power in the revolutionary age is derived from connectivity, then the focus of leadership should be on making connections to solve shared problems. This approach is not only a different leadership style than that which has prevailed in the United States in recent years but also a fundamentally different concept of leadership (Slaughter 2009:13). This type of leadership requires taking responsibility for dynamic response to international challenges whilst working with other partners in order to build a more just, secure and peaceful world. As Dr. King once said: ‘the arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice’. Peace in this context denotes not only the absence of tension, but above all it is a presence of justice:
“Those who conceive of peace as though it were a purely negative affair are under a serious misapprehension in any case; for genuine peace is rather like the spring, replete with forces and factors that evoke new moods and release a million spontaneities in the world; conjuring out of the bleak hillside a paradise of blossom and song.”
(Butterfield 1953: 78).
The United States of America in this way has been placed on the side of the process of global change in International Politics in order to promote human dignity, individual liberty, equality and opportunity for peoples around the world. Americans including both leaders and the whole nation, have over the half a century demonstrated in some instances a striking ability to learn, adjust and stay adapt to change in the international arena. More specifically, in the modern era change implies meeting today’s threats not just with the power of the military force, but the power of American diplomacy whereby the United States is not afraid to counter dictatorships and once again has the courage
and conviction to lead the free world. Spreading light in the world of darkness and resolving novel, global challenges could define the future of American foreign policy.
At this stage, an enormous emphasis is being placed on the importance of accommodating, community-building and cosmopolitanising process of diplomacy whilst building common, integrating institutions in a globalized, activated world. The hallmark of globalization is acknowledgement of the independent role of transnational entities - corporations and various non-governmental social and political organizations as well as intergovernmental organizations and regimes. The primary focus of globalization is on how states sovereignty as the ordering principle for human activity has been redefined, and in some ways transcendented, by networks of interaction that involve actors of many different kinds and at many different levels, and that feed off the huge technological and social improvements in the capacity for transportation and communication of nearly all types of goods, information and ideas (Buzan & Weaver 2003: 7). The state in these circumstances becomes an active player in these networks, but it does not necessarily control them, and is increasingly enmeshed in and penetrated by them (Ibid.: 7). Whilst the process of globalization gradually limits national sovereignty thereby producing a far-reaching transformation of international affairs international community will have to channel its authority into political institutions and legal regimes that would allow the whole international community to reconcile the interests of all its members. As some authors claim multilevel governance will be “shaped and formed by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework.” (Held 2002: 33).
In this new era, globalization highlights a completely new reality of increasing global interdependence, driven largely by the emergence of modern technologies, whilst
national frontiers become more relevant only as demarcating lines on maps rather than real barriers to the free flow of people, goods and financial capital. Thus, for most of the American political and economic elite, globalization has become not only an observable fact, but a historical inevitability. In this sense, it provides an interpretative mechanism as well as a normative prescription. It constitutes not merely a diagnostic tool but also an action program. In a networked world the issue is no longer relative power but rather centrality and the need for legitimacy in a dense global web (Slaughter 2009:5). Together, all these aspects of globalization amount to a doctrine, based on a morally confident assertion of its historical inevitability.
America’s response to the globalized era should entail the politics of both: soft and smart power. That is the ability to get the outcomes wanted by attracting rather than coercing others. That is the power of ideas and principles in order to improve America’s moral standing in the world. This can be achieved, for example, by stimulating a ‘worldwide community sentiment’ as well as common solidarity between peoples and nations of the world. Throughout, this process the most important is restoration of the traditional American ideals which are constitutive for the identity formation of a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in International Politics and definitive for the foreign policy goals formulation.
In other words, Americans confront a necessitity to accept a cultural diversity in the present multicultural. This implies that the interests we share as human beings are far more powerful than the forces than drive people apart. That is to recognize that no matter what the colour of people’s skin, regardless of what faith they practice and no matter what their economic situation or status are they all have a common stake in one
another. To be more precise, ethical standards are to a great extent common - ethics are the same all over the world. In other words, the responsibility to show empathy is essential regardless of national affinity, race or a system of beliefs. Even the Pope has encouraged respect for all individual human beings despite their systems of religion:
“True religious feeling leads…to a perception in one way or another of the mystery of God, the source of goodness, and that is a wellspring of respect and harmony between peoples: indeed, religion is the chief antidote to violence and conflict.”
(John Paul II, January 24, 2002)
It may be argued, therefore that every religion encompasses a kernel of ethical truth. This statement reflects a spirit of true Christianity based on a simple assumption: that all the world’s great religions demand a common requirement: “that we do not do unto others as we would not have them do unto us. Let us be our brother’s keeper, Scripture tells us. Let us be our sister’s keeper” (Barack Obama 2008: “A More Perfect Union”).
The restoration of the identity of the American people initiated by the election of the new President is based to large extent on some commonly established biblical truths as well as trust in traditional American ideals and values. Such confidence is encompassed in the often quoted statement: “the audacity of hope” - with the potential to exert substantial social and political impact across the country throughout the process of reclaiming ‘the American Dream’.
Traditional American values therefore, help to unite the whole nation and ensure that in the struggle for peace and justice, in the struggle for opportunity and equality Americans cannot walk alone. Consistent with this approach, the United States is a country which is negotiating with her enemies as well as with her friends, thereby
reaching across national divisions. America therefore, demonstrates initiative by acting as a constructive leader whilst forging a new, more hopeful future for the whole international community. Extremely important at this stage seems to be understanding of the complexities of power and principle as well as even balance between foreign policy ends with means. In fact, the greatest perils to democracy may arise from the fanaticism of moral idealists who are not conscious of the corruption of self-interest and also it may be noted that a “nation with an inordinate degree of political power is doubly tempted to exceed the bounds of historical possibilities.”
Another element of the recovery of the American identity in Obama’s politics is his pledge that America must demonstrate through deeds as well as words that she stands with those who seek a better life and common security for all nations. From this perspective, America is presented as a country which is acting as "a compassionate nation that seeks a better future for all peoples. " It is America which is acting not only as an advocate of change within her own borders but also as the country which can no longer afford indifference to suffering committed outside her borders. Thus, America must reach out to the world and cooperate as much as possible with other peoples and ethnic groups in order to attempt to enmesh non-western societies and cultures in the multilateral order so that they bind themselves to the institutions and purposes of the new system overall. This marks a beginning of a new journey - to heal a nation and repair the world.
Consequently, America must be ready to talk to her enemies, categorically accommodate oppressive regimes, and if necessary give a second chance to autocracies in order for them to become more democratic although not at the expense of suffering
peoples of the world. Consequently, American leadership emerges as a result of the willingness to listen to others whilst providing inspiring solutions to global and societal problems. As it was often the case in the history of the rise and fall of great powers the legitimacy of the world power is weakened when it stops to hold to its guiding ideals and values. American power will not be recognized by other members of the international community if the country will not take responsibility for the new international arrangement based first and foremost on law and persuasive negotiating discourse and not only on military might. Americans therefore need to be a force of example and be part of the collective learning process so that to stimulate a change of shared mentalities and political cultures involving whole nations and peoples of the world whilst enabling them to adjust to and respect each others.
Consistent with this approach, the role for the country is to connect across national divisions in a less hierarchical, increasingly more horizontal, interconnected and interdependent world, whereby ideas relating to world justice, common security and solidarity have become in particular relevant. America thus, is presented as a country that acts together with other members whilst building common institutions to facilitate improvement of the condition of human dignity around the world. Such an approach necessitates that America is taking dynamic action to advance the well-being of diverse peoples which is what the American nation was about from the beginning of its formation. In other words, this reflects the optimism and willingness of the American people to go out and to do ‘good’ for the rest of the world. This has been historically the symbol of the United States and that is what seems to be needed at present times in order to repair the world. Equally, this message conveys a necessity to be confident about the cherished, historical founding values that have guided the country for
previous three centuries.
Such approach to foreign policymaking process and diplomacy implies putting emphasis on the restoration of America’s soft power in International Politics. This type of power uses an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of these values. The power of values as well as their cultural impact has been an underappreciated facet of American global perception. It cannot be denied at this point that America’s mass culture exercises a magnetic appeal, especially on the world’s youth. Traditionally Americans have been powerful because they could inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film, television and culture whilst at the same time large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies.
Soft power is not only tied to culture and education but it requires as well acting in compliance with international regimes and worldwide accepted multilateral institutions. For example, in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis German ambassador to the United States warned the listeners that ‘for such a superpower, multilateralism, functioning alliances, and strong international institutions are… fundamental components of a foreign policy based on legitimacy and consensus’ (Ischinger 2004: 3).
From the global community perspective soft power implies that America will not only lead the whole international community, but also will attempt to provide global public goods since: ‘they legitimize American power in the eyes of others’ (Nye 2002: 143-4). The most important task for the leadership is to turn power into authority. Thus,
America will have to find ways to restrain and reconnect its power into institutions and partnerships that make up the whole global community of nations. Indeed, American supremacy has got the potential and can only generate consensus and obscure asymmetries in power and influence when it is buttressed by an elaborate and intelligent system of alliances and geopolitical coalitions that literally span the whole globe.
Consequently, it is a necessity based on a conviction that America is able to find some balance between extremes of realism and idealism and invests in improving her moral standing around the world. Such approach would recommend rejection of the temptations flowing from the arrogance of power, restored trust in direct diplomacy, cooperative multilateralism and constructive institution building based on reciprocity, consensus as well as force of example. In the emerging new international arrangement where power seems to be more than ever diffused into multiple networks the ultimate objective of American policy should be both benign and visionary. As Nye (2002: 17) advocated:
“American preponderance is softened when it is embodied in a web of multilateral institutions that allow others to participate in decisions… and that act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of American power.”
Another element of the identity of America as a ‘Responsible Great Responsible’ that has been restored is America’s role in undertaking measures separately or jointly with other Great Powers to promote common interests in avoiding crises involving the danger of war, and possibly controlling them when they occur. Such crises may include nuclear crises of Iran and north Korea. Consistent with the English School, the first and general contribution of the Great Powers to international order is to manage their relations with one another though not at the expense of suffering humanity. As Bull
(1977: 22) put it peoples are: ‘the ultimate units of the great society of mankind … and not states … but individual human beings, which are permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or that sort are not’.
America thus, right through the process of restoration of her identity must recognize that burdens of global citizenship continue to bind diverse peoples of the world together. The country should be ready to build new coalitions that breach old divides whilst trying to legitimise her role by co-opting the major secondary powers (which are by definition major potential rivals), as junior partners in the system of building more just international arrangement. However, as previously stated this should not be done at the expense of suffering peoples and nations of the world. Common sense recommends that even uncivilised regimes can become orderly international citizens if the proper incentives are intelligently aligned and when diplomacy works correctly.
In this sense, it may be noted that President Obama’s foreign policy derives from the middle Jeffersonian wing of the Democrats whilst the strategic goal of foreign policy is to sustain engagement whilst trying to reduce America’s costs and risks overseas by limiting U.S. commitments wherever possible. Such approach necessitates that the United States of America can best spread democracy and support peace by playing a role of a stabilizing power - that is by becoming an example of democracy at home and moderation abroad. Jeffersonians also believe that oversize commitments abroad undermine American democracy at home, thus large military budgets can divert resources from pressing domestic needs; close association with corrupt foreign regimes may shove the United States of America into controversial and cynical alliances. In such circumstances expanding national security expenses do frequently threaten civil
liberties and lead to powerful pro-war, pro-engagement lobbies among corporations nourished on grossly swollen defense budgets.
Such approach to diplomacy brings with it a fundamental promise that the treasured, traditional American values and ideals that guided America over history will be perfected over time and will continue forward whilst serving as a beacon and leading the whole country as well as the whole international community into a more secure future. Leadership in this context requires converting power into legitimacy and it is the art of directing the country further down the road toward the still-distant goal of fulfilling its mission and final destiny. So with confidence in the cause and a commitment to traditional guiding normative principles America can call on all peoples of the world so that to recognize the rights and responsibilities whilst building common security mechanisms. This reveals a hope as well as a deep belief to narrow the gap between the promise of American ideals and the reality of present times. As President Barack Obama states:
“This was one of the tasks we set forth as the beginning of this campaign - to continue the long march of those who came before us, a march for a more just, more equal, more caring, and more prosperous America. I chose to run for the presidency at this moment in history because I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together - unless we perfect our union by understanding that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the direction - towards a better future for our children and our grandchildren.”
(Barack Obama, 2004: Democratic Convention)
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation aimed to explore, discuss and demonstrate that the treasured values and ideals that guided the United States of America from the beginning of its inception are common and are subject to a process of a continued perfection and evolution throughout history. By providing an overview of the traditional American ideals from the historical perspective as well as their constant evolution the evidence has been provided that cultural norms and values are extremely important to foreign policy formulation, to a great extent they are constitutive of the ‘Great Responsible’ identity formation, plus in some measure are definitive of the ‘American Dream’.
Equally, it has been evidenced that traditional American values can be qualified as not just American. In fact, they are truly cosmopolitan, shared and common to the whole of humanity. That is because the essence of the American exceptionalism at its heart envisions a better life for everybody whilst being based on the fundamental idea of human dignity, empathy and respect for other cultures and systems of beliefs. In this sense, traditional, American values and ideals are truly trans-ethnic. They are dormant as well as apt to a spontaneous renewal and restoration after the periods of crisis each time generating a national revival within the United States of America itself as well as stimulating a ‘worldwide solidarity sentiment’ in the midst of the process of a continuous evolution. Whilst the process happens within the country itself it is also prompts progressive transformation of the whole international community ensuring progress and advancement for the planet.
The English School and constructivists normative principles and ideals, in particular
values proffered by solidarists within the English School with stress upon the via media ethics, are parallel to the American values to such a degree that they can constitute a framework of understanding within which America’s leadership as well as her present role as a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in International Relations can be considered, discussed and examined.
The English School theory as a continuation of the Grotian tradition in international relations constitutes a cradle for American ideals not only because of its explicit connection with the political philosophy of constitutional government, but also because of its quality as a via media between extremes.
Hence, the key academic finding of this dissertation is that there exists a critical need for wider understanding of the intercultural and socially constructed dimensions of international relations among American top policymakers as there is a clear parallel between American cultural magnetism and constructivists’ logic of thinking. Thus, it may be concluded that at least to some extent a hypothesis about the possibility of reshaping U.S. foreign policy around a conception of American identity more closely linked with the idea of the emerging international community as a whole is reasonably feasible and justified. If positive, then the United States has the capacity and the cultural capital to reinvent itself by undergoing an evolutionary process of redefinition of its foreign policy most basic assumptions and goals.
If true, then within contemporary American leadership there should emerge a growing consciousness of the interdependence of the emerging global community which can comprise some ideational elements of a radically different American foreign policy that
may materialize in the future. Such foreign policy presupposes a positive prerequisite that the United States of America can play an active role of a constructive pioneer in the totally new era of great power management which is emerging in international politics. Such novel, complex circumstances stipulate that America is being granted a real opportunity to mobilize the whole international community into an effective action in order to create a more inclusive, ethical and truly mature community of nations with America’s leadership at the forefront of common cause so that to meet its historical responsibility to humanity.
Throughout the dissertation it was also established that during the Presidency of G. W. Bush a vast part of the traditional American values was undermined resulting in a moral decline characterizing American identity and erosion of the American legitimacy in the world as a result of the so-called ‘imperial overstretch’ in the process of which the country has taken on ever more extensive and expensive military commitments (Jervis 2005: 355).
Connected with the last argument is another important drawback of the Bush presidency: the fact that it relied heavily on the premise that state’s foreign policy should be determined by its domestic system whilst neglecting the classical notion that the behaviour of states is most strongly influenced by their international environment. President’s Bush crusade against tyrannies implied that American vital interest required not the maintenance of the status quo, but the transformation of the world politics, and indeed, of the domestic systems of the host of other countries. According to Machiavelli’s famous observation the best prince is the one who is feared and loved at the same time. The most worrying feature of the Bush presidency for the United States
was that it was almost certainly neither. As Jervis (2005: 377) observed:
“Bush’s unilateralism and perceived bellicosity have weakened ties to allies dissipated much of the sympathy that the United States had garnered after September 11, and convinced many people that America was seeking an empire with little room for their interests or values.”
In contrast, the new presidency has initiated a process of continued perfecting of the traditional cherished American ideals deriving in large part from the inspiration of the Framers of the newly created Republic. Values described in the previous chapters bring with them stress upon universal respect for human dignity and renewal of the international system of human rights. Despite being truly global in its reach whilst embracing some established biblical truths, together with more liberal foreign policy rhetoric - it would be negligent if a new approach is accompanied by a foolishly idealist euphoria of the transformation of the world politics as the one proposed by Bush did.
The new approach should rather bring with it an indispensable degree of caution and moral restraint recommending that America’s ends ought to be proportionate to its means in the emerging totally new international political and geopolitical setting. In other words, the new approach conveys a nascent hope that historical American ideals and values can be preserved whilst simultaneously acknowledging a sceptical, realistic and inevitable truth about the nature of human beings and the whole political enterprise. The main aspect of the new doctrine thus should be improvement of human condition globally. If positive, then necessary is adoption of amore encompassing understanding of sovereignty, one that acknowledges the primacy of the individual, while emphasizing the importance of strengthening international legal system and increasing the authority of multilateral institutions including the United Nations.
Is summary, restoration of the traditional American ideals is extremely important at
present politically activated times as these values constitute a considerable part of the American identity both as a nation and as a ‘Responsible Great Power’ in International Politics. Restoration of the American values is necessary since in the midst of ‘the historical change of phase’ and current economic crises, simultaneous revolution in nuclear systems whilst the world’s economic centre of gravity seems to shift towards Asia - the eyes of the whole international community look for a constructive leadership sensitive to the needs of other peoples, minorities and ethnic minorities.
What seems to be needed is anticipatory, diplomatic engagement and reforms based on an evolutionary process of change in world politics. This approach entails a requisite that America’s security ends should be understood in broader terms as a common security and common prosperity with other members. The revival of the treasured American values and ideals may occur to be critical since these values traditionally have been fundamental for America to contribute to the world “an idea mankind can hold to.”
If possible then this approach requires not merely a transformation of the whole world politics with the sheer power of the military force in order to make everyone else similar to America’s shining image. It rather necessitates active, strategic and preventive engagement in various geopolitical places around the world as well as intelligent foreign policy process based on foresight and consensual diplomacy. It requires a process of a ceaseless, painstaking cultivation of a range of partnerships as well as attention towards common security concerns, plus careful dialogue towards resolution of differences than may often obstruct peace process. Without doubt, American primacy remains an observable fact, but the art of diplomacy is to translate power into a
diplomatic leverage. It is only through cooperation in the more inter-dependant world that a legitimate leader can build a stronger country thereby overcoming problems derived from the state of global anarchy whilst generating a more inclusive, global security community that would be more reflective of American cultural values - a genuine community of nations in the integrated world.
In fact, a structure of legitimated power relations operates in notably different ways than do structures of coercion or self-interest. Even the most powerful states often seek to legitimise their actions by invoking some sort of higher authority of the international law and multilateral institutions. When all the constituent members believe that existing rules are legitimate, the decision whether to comply is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution or by a calculation of self-interest but, instead by an internal sense of rightness, obligation and authority generated among all of the members of the international community. Therefore, the erosion of sovereignty is not generated simply by the outside forces, but more importantly, the evolution of sovereignty is possible at the level of identity formation, thus the whole process becomes more inclusive.
In fact, the ‘process of legitimization’ is a process of internalization that shapes states’ sense of their interests. The operative process in legitimation is the internalization of the actor of some kind of an external standard. This may take place when the actor’s sense of its own interests is partly constituted by an external force outside of itself - for example: by shared standards, rules and normative principles that exist in a 'community of states. ’ Such a community is most likely to crystallize if the idea about some sort of ‘cosmopolis’ is to be accepted - that is the recognition of the process of continuous evolution of a global civil society marked by a multilevel system of authority enshrined
by the equal worth and dignity of each human being in the increasingly globalized, regionalized and interconnected world.
The ultimate positive outcome of this process is that similar to socialization of states that produces congruence between perceived interests and the legitimated rules. Consequently, sovereignty is likely to emerge in multiple locations on the international scene ready to be exercised by supranational institutions - institutions beyond the effective power of the state. A new multilateral international arrangement thus, can only be sustained if the constituent parties have a share not only in building it but also are concerned about securing it. Hence, common actions are natural outcomes of shared convictions, identity and reflection about common human destiny. Such an approach stipulates that diplomacy attains a totally new dimension - it becomes the art of converting power into legitimacy. Legitimacy in turn, is derived from a sense of common purpose and shared system of normative principles.
In brief, American ideals and cultural values are renewable and bring with them a powerful message of hope that transcends traditional divisions of party, economics, religion, race or class. In this sense, American ideals can be classified as truly cosmopolitan. Such values help to establish the spirit of brotherhood, equality and respect for various cultures, peoples and faiths as well as the spirit of common humanity and common bond of human dignity. Being resistant to doubts of various cynics and naysayers, traditional American ideals can be described as everlasting. Most importantly, such ideals imbue in people a strong sense of self-worth and faith leading to empathy and humanitarian compassion towards others. This in turn, opens our eyes to the new ways of thinking about international politics whilst replacing a lack of
commitment with a solidaritarian sense of unity with a potential of turning a moment of crises into an idea about the prospect of building a better future for our children and grandchildren.
“We must dare to think “unthinkable” thoughts. We must learn to explore all the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world. We must learn to welcome and not to fear the voices of dissent. We must dare to think about “unthinkable things” because when things become unthinkable, thinking stops and action becomes mindless.” [From a Senate address, March 27, 1964]
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