KANT ON HUMAN DIGNITY: A CRITICAL APPROACH (original) (raw)
Related papers
Kant on the Ground of Human Dignity [Kantian Review, First View, March 2021]
2021
Kant interpreters have contrasting views on what Kant takes to be the basis for human dignity. Several commentators have argued that human dignity can be traced back to some feature of human beings. Others contend that humans in themselves lack dignity, but dignity can be attributed to them because the moral law demands respect for humanity. I argue, alternatively, that human dignity in Kant's system can be seen to be grounded in the reciprocal relationship between the dignity of the moral law and the dignity inherent in the human constitution. The latter includes the dignity of personhood, construed as rational inner purposiveness, and the dignity of giving oneself the law and striving to follow it.
Kant on human dignity: A conversation among scholars
2014
This dissertation aims to examine the notion of ‘human dignity’ in Kant by means of a conversation with three Kantian scholars. One cannot understand Kant’s notion of human dignity without placing it in the context of his moral thought. For this reason we look in Chapter One at the philosopher Roger Sullivan. His major work Immanuel Kant’s moral theory includes a highly detailed treatment of human dignity. I shall present an analysis of his understanding within the context of his methodology and his general approach to Kant’s moral philosophy. We look in Chapter Two at Susan Shell’s ‘Kant on Human Dignity.’ In addition to this, we consider Shell’s methodology and some of her work on the early Kant where we find the roots of Kant’s conception of dignity. Chapter Three addresses Oliver Sensen’s novel interpretation of Kant’s use of the term ‘dignity.’ Utilizing the tools of Analytical Philosophy, he enters into dialogue with Kantian interpreters, suggesting that their understanding of...
Kant's household theory of human dignity as a common feature of all rational beings is the starting point of any intellectual endeavor to unravel the implications of this normative notion. Yet, it is incomplete, as it neglects considering the importance of the singularity or uniqueness of the individual. In a first, deconstructive stage, this paper describes the Kantian account of human dignity as one among many conceptions of human dignity. It reads carefully into the original wording used by Kant in German and its English translations, as well as the works of modern commentators, to identify its shortcomings. In a second, constructive stage, it then draws on the theories of Aristotle, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and Hannah Arendt to try and enhance the Kantian conception, in the sense that these authors give major importance to the singularity of the individual. The Kantian theory can be perfected by including elements from the works of these authors, while at the same time being mindful of the dangers entailed in focusing too much on singularity. The conclusion of this paper is that the Kantian conception of human dignity can be enhanced if it acknowledges that not only morality has dignity, but also the irreplaceable human individual to the extent that she is a narrative, original creature with the potential to act morally.
Moral Dignity and Moral Vulnerability in a Kantian Perspective
Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 2013
According to Kant, a human being has intrinsic value or dignity. In virtue of her or his dignity, a human being has a right to be morally respected. It also has a duty to respect other human beings, at least in so far as it is capable of free and responsible agency. This capacity does not only depend on being human, it also depends on having a healthy mind. Likewise, as Trudy Govier has put it, 'what is involved in showing respect for an entity depends on what kind of entity it is'. The dignity of a human being is an a priori normative status. The attribution of dignity to a human being does not depend on whether and to what extent this being can act as a free and rational agent. People who have dignity include very young children, very old people who have lost their mind as well as mentally handicapped people. All these people have the right to be treated with respect. The attribution of dignity to a human being does not depend on this being's actual (intellectual and emotional) intelligence. Nor does it depend on its moral merit. Human dignity, as an a priori moral status, is not meritocratic. However, when it comes to the question of the dignity of an agent who is accountable for his deeds but fails to respect the moral law nevertheless, Kant seems to introduce an idea of meritocracy into his notion of dignity. An agent who does not respect the moral law thereby causes damage to his dignity. I shall explore the meritocratic implications of Kant's claims about the dignity of a moral offender and discuss whether and to what extent they can be made compatible with his idea of dignity as a non-meritocratic, a priori moral status. When we talk about or hear speaking of human dignity and moral worth of a human being, the philosopher who comes to mind is Immanuel Kant. As for an example, the first sentence of the German Constitution says Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. The constitution is supposed to be of Kantian spiritand inspiration. Now, compare the following two adjectives 'inviolable' and 'unreachable': Unreachable (unerreichbar) is a place where you cannot get, even if you try to reach it. But what is inviolable (unantastbar)? Is it something that is factually impossible to violate? Or is it something you should not violate, even though you could do it? Kant Kongress Pisa 2010: Moral dignity and moral vulnerability in a Kantian perspective / Christel Fricke, CSMN, Oslo 2 The context of the German Constitution makes it quite clear that 'inviolable' is to be understood as a deontic term: Human dignity should not be violated. As it is factually possible to violate human dignity, it needs to be protected by law, by constitutional law. The historical background which inspired the authors of the German Constitution was, as it is well known, the Nazi regime and the Nazi's crimes against humanity, their violations of the dignity of people: torture and killing of innocents who did not represent a danger for anybody. Now, in which sense is human dignity in Kant's sense of the term inviolable? In order to
In this volume Paul Formosa sets out a novel approach to Kantian ethics as an ethics of dignity by focusing on the Formula of Humanity as a normative principle distinct from the Formula of Universal Law. By situating the Kantian conception of dignity within the wider literature on dignity, he develops an important distinction between status dignity, which all rational agents have, and achievement dignity, which all rational agents should aspire to. He then explores constructivist and realist views on the foundation of the dignity of rational agents, before developing a compelling account of who does and does not have status dignity, and of what kind of achievement dignity or virtue we, as vulnerable rational agents, can and should strive for. His study will be highly valuable for those interested in Kant’s ethical, moral and political philosophies.
Recovery of Human Diginity; Kantian Consideration
Jurnal Sosialisasi: Jurnal Hasil Pemikiran, Penelitian dan Pengembangan Keilmuan Sosiologi Pendidikan
This paper tends to recover the dignity of human person using Kant’s view point. Human dignity has for long being in a state of pang. It has been in the lowest esteem in the contemporary society; human right abuses, depersonalization of man, and lack of human respect. The researchers adopt expository method in carrying out the work. The researchers conclude that human life is a phenomenon characterized by a high sense of uniqueness. Every human person ought to be properly treated with such uniqueness, bearing in mind that- all are one and the same people.This paper tends to recover the dignity of human person using Kant’s view point. Human dignity has for long being in a state of pang. It has been in the lowest esteem in the contemporary society; human right abuses, depersonalization of man, and lack of human respect. The researchers adopt expository method in carrying out the work. The researchers conclude that human life is a phenomenon characterized by a high sense of uniquenes...
2018
The transhumanist movement has been hailed as optimistic and forward thinking in itsambition to “ascend humanity beyond its biological constraints” and bring it to the next stage of evolution. However, critics such as Nicholas Le Dévédec have claimed that the movement represents a reversal of the Enlightenment project of autonomy, despite claims otherwise. In this paper, we shall adopt the perspective of the moral philosophy of an Enlightenmentthinker important for the democratic thought of the era: Immanuel Kant. With an emphasis on Kant’s conception of Dignity and the second formulation of the categorical imperative, the study shows that Kantianism is irreconcilable with transhumanism. The findings not only expand upon Dévédec’s claims, but also emphasizes the potential of dignity as a concept in delineating the limits and use of enhancement technology.
Kant and the Ground(s) of Dignity
In the Groundwork, Kant famously claims that autonomy is the ground of dignity. However, this claim stops short of actually asserting our autonomy. Moreover, if Kant is correct about the grounding relationship, then doubts about our autonomy entail doubts about our dignity. Here, I attempt to show that Kant is sensitive to this problem, and invokes the 'fact of reason' (Faktum der Vernunft) as the key piece of evidence for our autonomy, and therefore our dignity. But as is well known, Kant's appeal to the fact of reason is controversial. After presenting an exegetical case for the connection between dignity and the fact of reason, I respond to a prominent criticism of the Faktum in order to preserve the relation between the fact of reason and the dignity of humanity. Kant and the Ground(s) of Dignity Andy Britton For there is something in us that we cannot cease to wonder at when we have once seen it, the same thing that raises humanity in its idea to a dignity we should never have suspected in the human being as an object of experience.-Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties 1
Kant on Human Dignity. A Reply to Oliver Sensen.
Kant-Studien, 2015
Sensen’s stimulating and thought provoking book raises a question about whether Kant’s conception of human dignity has been widely misrepresented. The view Sensen criticizes presupposes Moorean value realism, which he thinks leads to the false view that we first perceive that other human beings have value and then infer that we ought to respect them. I agree with Sensen that Kant does not embrace the intuitionist picture. However, I don’t think that this should lead us to conclude that Kant would deny the existence of moral value properties or that Kant is a prescriptivist. Those metaphysical value properties that result from the exercise of our capacity of pure practical reason can be ascribed to our actions or dispositions. In practical cognition, our cognition brings the object into “existence”. The object of pure practical reason is the good. In judging x to be practically necessary we thereby judge x as something that ought to be willed objectively, i.e. as good. In knowing practically, our cognition affects us through the feeling of respect for the moral law. It is this capacity for respect that makes it possible for the moral law to become a sufficient incentive of the will, which then brings the value property into existence. This is not to say that the objectivity of the moral law consists in the existence of its object, the good, but that the moral law determines the existence of the value property. The moral law itself does not exist in space and time, and is nothing but the articulation of the self-consciousness of pure practical reason. To think that objectivity in morality requires that the moral law “exists” independently of rational cognizers is to presuppose a conception of objectivity that Kant’s moral philosophy fundamentally calls into question. I don’t think that the prescriptivism that Sensen wants to ascribe to Kant adequately captures his view. If idealism is the view that the existence of objects depends on the cognition of those objects, I would like to suggest that Kant’s alternative view, which fundamentally departs from other views in contemporary metaethics, is most accurately represented as “moral idealism”.