Consciousness is more than meets the eye: a call for a multisensory study of subjective experience (original) (raw)
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Multisensory processing and perceptual consciousness: Part II
Philosophy Compass, 2017
The first part of this survey article offered a cartography of some of the more extensively studied forms of multisensory processing. In this second part, I turn to examining some of the different possible ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss the significance of research on multisensory processing and multi-sensory consciousness for philosophical debates concerning the modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individua-tion of the senses.
Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia
This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of ordinary multisensory experience that go beyond mere co-consciousness of features (e.g., the experience that results from concurrently hearing a sound in the hallway and seeing the cup on the table). In one case, a sensory experience in one modality creates a perceptual demonstrative to whose referent qualities are attributed in another sensory modality. For example, when you hear someone speak, auditory experience attributes audible qualities to a seen event, a person’s speaking motions. The second kind of multisensory experience attributes features experienced in several sensory modalities to one and the same object via a process of amodal perceptual integration, i.e., integration that occurs separately from processing within the individual sensory modalities. Multisensory experiences arising from holding and seeing a tomato or from seeing the Indian curry boil and smelling it are examples of the second kind of multisensory experience. At the end of the chapter we look at synesthesia, a kind of atypical multisensory experience, and argue that one version of this phenomenon may be able to shed light on the neural mechanism underlying amodally integrated multisensory experience.
Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability
NeuroSci
Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no “unified” theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still “don’t get it” in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private “feeling of being conscious”, despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? “Multistability” refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain “interprets” sensorial input in a “constructive” way. In this perspective paper, multistability ...
Consciousness and Its Descriptors
Journal of Psychophysiology, 2010
The study of visual processing and abnormalities due to lesions of cortical structures sheds light on visual awareness/consciousness and may help us to better understand consciousness. We report on clinical observations and psychophysical testing of achromatopsia/prosopagnosia, visual agnosia, and blindsight. Achromatopsia and prosopagnosia reveal that visual cortices have functionally specialized processing systems for color, face perception, and their awareness, and that furthermore these systems operate independently. Dysfunction is limited to some aspects of visual perception; someone with achromatopsia, although not conscious of color, is aware of the objects' form, motion, and their relationship with sound and other sensory percepts. Perceptual awareness is modular, with neuronal correlates represented by multiple separate specialized structures or modules. Visual agnosia shows that awareness of a complete visual percept is absent, though the subject is aware of single visual features such as edges, motion, etc., an indication that visual agnosia is a disruption of the binding process that unifies all information into a whole percept. Blindsight is characterized by the subject's ability to localize a visual target while denying actually seeing the target. Blindsight is mediated by residual islands of the visual cortex, which suggests that sensory modules responsible for awareness can function only when structurally intact. We conclude (1) that perceptual awareness (consciousness?) is modular, and (2) that perceptual integration is also modular, which suggests that integration among distinct cortical regions is a parallel process with multiple communication pathways. Any hypothesis about consciousness must include these observations about the presence of multiple parallel, but spatially and temporally different, mechanisms.
Visual consciousness and bodily self-consciousness
Purpose of review In recent years, consciousness has become a central topic in cognitive neuroscience. This review focuses on the relation between bodily self-consciousness – the feeling of being a subject in a body – and visual consciousness – the subjective experience associated with the perception of visual signals. Recent findings Findings from clinical and experimental work have shown that bodily self-consciousness depends on specific brain networks and is related to the integration of signals from multiple sensory modalities including vision. In addition, recent experiments have shown that visual consciousness is shaped by the body, including vestibular, tactile, proprioceptive, and motor signals. Summary Several lines of evidence suggest reciprocal relationships between vision and bodily signals, indicating that a comprehensive understanding of visual and bodily self-consciousness requires studying them in unison.
Conscious Sensation, Conscious Perception and Sensorimotor Theories of Consciousness
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 2014
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Cognition, 2018
While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the 'conscious access hypothesis', which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many of the prevailing frameworks. This account holds that consciousness is necessary to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing required by different senses. We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory modalities. First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second. In Experiments 1-4 the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name was paired with a creative ...
The Ins and Outs of Consciousness
Brain and Mind, 2000
Abstract. In Enchanted Looms, Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesis that conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. The positive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, and negative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present an alternative ...