Review of Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, David Nickles , eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, Volume E-12 (original) (raw)

The Missed Chance for US-Vietnam Relations, 1975-1979

After the end of the Vietnam War, both the Vietnamese and American governments wanted to normalize relations, and yet they failed to do so until 1995. Why was this the case? This paper focuses on the missed chance for normalization of relations between 1975-79. I argue that domestic economic imperatives rather than pride was the primary driver of Vietnam's insistence on postwar reparations. By the time the Chinese-Khmer Rouge threat had driven Vietnamese leaders to drop this condition, American leaders sought to prioritize normalization of relations with Beijing first. I argue that this decision was taken mainly at National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's own initiative to counterbalance Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa rather than due to Chinese pressure, and that the Carter Administration did not conclusively shelve normalization plans with Vietnam until the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia.

Revisionism Triumphant - Hanoi’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Nixon Era.pdf

In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive of early 1968, Hanoi agreed to dialogue with American representatives in Paris. As it turned out, it used the resulting talks with the Johnson administration not to negotiate in any traditional sense but to probe the intentions of Washington and to manipulate domestic and world opinion. Hanoi continued this charade for approximately one year, after which time domestic and international circumstances forced a meaningful reassessment of its position on a negotiated settlement of the war with the United States. This article explores that reassessment, as well as the evolution of Hanoi’s diplomatic strategy thereafter. Specifically, it considers those factors that conditioned the thinking and policies of Vietnamese communist leaders, including the so-called “balance of forces” below the seventeenth parallel and the behavior of close allies in Beijing and Moscow vis-à-vis the United States. The article proposes that military and economic setbacks in the South and in the North combined with recognition of the limits of socialist solidarity forced Hanoi first to talk secretly and then to negotiate seriously with the Nixon administration and, ultimately, to accept a peace settlement that fell far short of the goals set by the communist leadership at the onset of the Vietnamese-American War.

Vietnam war : A decade of conflict & it’s impact on the United States

2023

The Vietnam War was a protracted conflict that lasted for over a decade, from 1955 to 1975. It was a complex conflict that involved multiple players, including the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and their allies. The war was fought in a guerrilla-style, with the North Vietnamese army using hit-and-run tactics to disrupt the South Vietnamese government and the American troops. The United States entered the war with the aim of stopping the spread of communism, but it soon became apparent that the conflict was more complicated than that. This paper explores the causes of the Vietnam War, the strategies used by the United States and North Vietnam, and the impact of the war on the United States.

Vietnam's Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era : Ideology and Reality

2014

2.1. Vietnamese studies in the post-Cold War era: General reviews 2.1.1. About the studies' theme and focus 2.1.2. About theoretical approach and research methodology 2.2. Vietnam's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era-Coping with change: Reviews of significant works Chapter 3: Foreign policy formulating and restructuring: Vietnamese mechanism and principle 3.1. Vietnam's policy making mechanism: The asymmetric triangle 3.1.1. The asymmetric power triangle: The Vietnam Communist Party, National Assembly and Government-Primary policy making mechanism in Vietnam 3.1.2. Vietnam Communist Party and Vietnam's foreign policymaking process 3.1.3. Power transition, not generation transition in Vietnamese politics: An analysis of 1986-1991 period 3.2. Fundamental principles and guideline for foreign policy making process 3.2.1. Fundamental principles 3.2.2. Diplomatic guideline and foreign policy Chapter 4: Vietnamese foreign policy of Renovation: International politics and internal politics 4.1. The end of the Cold War and its impacts on Vietnam's foreign policy 4.2. Vietnam's foreign policy of Renovation: Changes and adjustments for survival and development 4.2.1. Historical background: Vietnam foreign policy before Doi Moi (1975-1985) 4.2.2. Vietnamese foreign policy of Renovation: An overview 4.2.3. Looking forward to the future: Vietnam's foreign policy directions 4.3. Initial thoughts about foreign policy changing process in Vietnam Chapter conclusion Chapter 5: Ideology-Reality dilemma: Vietnamese foreign policy in the first stage of Renovation (1986-1991) 5.1. Internal politics and the formulation and implementation of the new foreign policy in the first stage of Renovation 5.1.1. Challenge perception and foreign policy directions in the Politburo Resolution No. 13 5.1.2. The process of formulating new foreign policy directions 5.2. VCP's efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict: Approaching to the new foreign policy direction 5.2.1. External pressures and internal requirements 5.2.2. The "Red Solution": The resurrection of ideological foundation 5.2.3. A comprehensive diplomatic settlement for Cambodian conflict: Initial steps toward the policy of diversification and multi-lateralization 5.3. Vietnam's approach toward normalization with China 5.3.1. Ideology versus realpolitik diplomacy 5.3.2. Obstacles in the negotiation: Normalization or compromise Chapter conclusion Chapter 6: National interest aspect of diplomatic alignment: Realpolitik foundation of Vietnamese foreign policy in the second stage of Renovation (1991-2001) 6.1. The Seventh Party Congress and the restructuring of Vietnamese foreign policy 6.1.1. Inner-party debates on the eve of the Seventh Party Congress 6.1.2. Vietnamese-Sino normalization and impacts on foreign policy directions of the Seventh Party Congress 6.1.3. New foreign policy approaches at the Seventh Party Congress 6.2. National interest and realpolitik calculation: The struggle for foreign policy of strategic independence 6.2.1. National interest and its role in foreign policy decisionmaking process: General perceptions 6.2.2. National interest in the new foreign policy of Renovation: Vietnam's approach 6.2.3. The relation between national interest and foreign affairs in VCP's documents and policies Chapter conclusion Chapter 7: Vietnam's Omni-directional diplomacy: Foreign policy of strategic independence (2001-2011) 7.1. Locating Vietnam in a changing world: Continuing to renovate diplomatic thinkings and maneuvers 7.2. International integration diplomacy: The relative relationship with independence and self-determination policy 7.2.1. Vietnam's international integration process: An overview 7.2.2. Vietnam's international integration in politics and securitydefense fields 7.2.3. Independence, self-determination and international integration: VCP's viewpoints and approaches 7.3. Partner and partnership framework in Vietnam's Renovation foreign policy: The Vietnamese adaptation to foreign policy of strategic independence 7.3.1. Partner and partnership framework in foreign relations: Fundamental issues 7.3.2. Partner, partnership, and partnership framework and the concretization in Vietnam's Renovation foreign policy Chapter conclusion Conclusions

Vietnam. Voices from the Second Republic of South Vietnam (1967–1975) Edited by K.W. Taylor Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2015. Pp. 180. Maps, Illustrations, Tables, Notes, Contributors

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

side of the story is this book's greatest asset, the story of the Americans is no less engaging and revealing. Miller must be commended for locating and presenting fresh US documentary evidence that effectively relates the confusing and divisive nature of the war for Washington policy-makers, those who fought in it, and the American public. As he does for the Vietnamese, Miller offers a balanced mix of sources relating the thinking and sentiments of the key political actors, on the one hand, and the experiences of those impacted by their decisions, namely, armed forces personnel, on the other. There are a few lacunae in this book. Miller could have provided better insights into high-level communist and South Vietnamese decision-making during the war. Also, it would have been a good idea to include either an annotated bibliography or, at a minimum, a comprehensive list of suggested readings as they usually are of great use to students. Most disappointing is the absence of maps, an inexcusable oversight by the publisher for a book of this kind. Ultimately, Miller's book achieves what it sets out to do: offer a sound and effective overview of the multiple perspectives and complexities of the Vietnam War. It should be assigned reading in all college-level courses on that conflict, and on the shelves of every public and university library. This is a remarkable contribution to the constantly expanding body of works on the most consequential and controversial armed conflict of the post-1945 era in world history.