Russian soft power in Ukraine: A structural perspective (original) (raw)
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This article argues that for all its efforts to implement soft power techniques, the Kremlin still fails to grasp the subtle, voluntaristic essence of soft power. This is reflected in a style of public interaction that has practical implications for how Russian soft power overtures are received by the audience. This is demonstrated through the findings of mixed-method empirical research from four Ukrainian regions. Thus, while surveys show that the worldview promoted by Russian public diplomacy resonates to some extent, insights from focus groups indicate that potential attraction is nevertheless limited by Russia's 'hard' and obtrusive approach to cultural influence.
points z z For Russia, maintaining influence over Ukraine is more than a foreign policy priority; it is an existential imperative. Many in Russia's political elite perceive Ukraine as part of their country's own identity. z z Russia's socioeconomic model limits its capacity to act as a pole of attraction for Ukraine. As a result, Russia relies on its national myths to devise narratives and projects intended to bind Ukraine in a 'common future' with Russia and other post-Soviet states. z z These narratives are translated into influence in Ukraine through channels such as the Russian Orthodox Church, the mass media, formal and informal business networks, and non-governmental organizations. z z Russia also achieves influence in Ukraine by mobilizing constituencies around politically sensitive issues such as language policy and shared cultural and historical legacies. This depends heavily on symbolic resources and a deep but often clumsy engagement in local identity politics. z z Russia's soft power project with regard to Ukraine emphasizes cultural and linguistic boundaries over civic identities, which is ultimately a burden for both countries.
Roots of Russian Soft Power: Rethinking Russian National Identity
Comparative Politics Russia
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