Some Problems With Rationality as a Replacement for Truth (original) (raw)

If we say that we can't know that we have the truth in science or philosophy, but can know we are being rational, then how do we know our idea of rationality is the true one? Epistemically, we have here not a mere circularity, but a vicious one that undermines itself. It is not even enough to claim that one's idea of rationality might possibly be the true one since this maneuver perpetuates the error initially entered into, namely, that we can never know the truth even if we did in fact espouse it in some particular domain of inquiry. Therefore, it seems we are committed first to espousing that there is one best rationality in any domain and also to espousing that our particular standards of justification are the true standards for that domain. However, one might reply that we need not believe that we hold the finally true standards of justification, but that we hold the best among a current set of alternatives. But it would remain even after this reasoning that we still do not hold the finally true standard of justification and this raises the question of why one standard should be accepted if it is only relatively the best. Let us more directly turn this enquiry in upon epistemic issues themselves. If I claim my externalist or internalist epistemic standard is the best one relative to others currently espoused among philosophers, I state nothing at all that is internally inconsistent. However, if I make my assumptions more explicit, and state that my epistemic standard's superiority is of a purely relative nature to others, then how could I possibly be consistent with this claim when I engage in chastising the moral relativist, the scientific antirealist, or even the Cartesian skeptic? If one doubts the reality of the external world, those who espouse relative rationality instead of final truth, can merely offer some relative reasons why they think that person is wrong, but they cannot consistently claim that the denier of the external world is finally wrong if they make no counter claim to the final truth. The denier's view might be said to be less justified than those who do believe there is a mind-independent world, but both parties agree that it might possibly turn out that the apparently skeptical view is actually the finally true view to espouse. Now concerning truth and rationality, I do not see why any philosophical position is worth holding if it is merely the most rational to hold in an epistemically relative sense. Perhaps an extreme example might jolt philosophers of such dubious relativity out of their stupor. Suppose a husband and wife have been verbally fighting for several years and that the wife accuses her husband of physically beating her recently. Although she can identify no bruises or injuries whatsoever, and indeed only the husband is the one with a black eye, they go to a criminal court where the husband potentially faces 10 years in prison. We all recognize in the law that drawing the best inference relative to others does not satisfy an appropriate, or perhaps a moral standard of epistemic justification. In other words, since we cannot definitively identify the final truth of the matter, we refrain from judgment, which in a criminal case means that the defendant is innocent by default. The case is much different with epistemology, however. A philosopher could conceivably refrain from espousing any regular standard of epistemic justification, but it would not follow that internalism or externalism is more rational or less rational by default. In fact, just who owns the burden of proof in first philosophies is itself an irresolvable debate. On what basis other than one's own circular position could he place the burden of epistemic proof on another's circular position? And when we then conclude that circular positions are perfectly justifiable, we neglect to address the question that constantly concerns us elsewhere: which position is relatively more justified? Having arrived at this stage of the dilemma, Earnest Sosa motions that we adopt a " virtue epistemology, " where we explore the internal fruitfulness, or the " virtues " of one kind of