Aquinas on temperance (original) (raw)
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tr. Sara Switzer, in A Feast for the Senses. Art and Experience in Medieval Europe, ed. Martina Bagnoli, The Walters Art Museum, Baltimore 2016, pp. 85-93.
ProQuest. Emmaus Academic version (with alterations and complete translations) coming soon, 2020
This dissertation, which is to be published in the summer of 2021 as "Conforming to Right Reason" by Emmaus Academic (with translated footnotes, an introduction by Steve Long, and an index, etc.), investigates St. Thomas Aquinas' account of what appoints the end to the moral virtues. Given that the moral virtues are located in the appetites (either in the rational appetite known as the will or in the sensitive appetite), the question that arises is whether the end these virtues point an individual towards are antecedently cognized in virtue of some other habit or power or whether, on the contrary, they are responsible for all virtuous action independent of the intellect. Some renowned theologians have argued that the knowledge the virtuous man has regarding the ends he pursues comes about merely by inclination. There is, on this account, reasoning about means but little to no reasoning about ends themselves. One might think of certain New Natural Law theorists who think that prior to choice, there is no morally significant order of goods to be pursued (because such goods are incommensurable) or of the moral motivation theorists such as Keenan who maintain that "strivings" of the will are "antecedent to questions of intention and choice." One of the reasons their theories are sometimes considered consistent with Aquinas is that he says the moral virtues, which are present in the appetitive part of the soul, provide the ends to prudence, which uses those ends as the beginning of its deliberation. What I intend to show, however, is that the notion the prudent man subjects everything he does to the inclinations of his appetites (even if those appetites have been purified by the presence of grace) is not consonant with St. Thomas' view. This is because in the final analysis, that which appoints (praestituit) the end to the moral virtues is, strictly speaking, a form of understanding or reason that is distinct from prudence. After an initial chapter on the end in general and what it consists in, the second chapter will explore the kind of causality exercised by the intellect while investigating the claim that Aquinas had a somewhat radical progression towards a more voluntarist attitude as he matured. The third chapter turns to the specific way in which synderesis and prudence exercise causality in regard to their appointing of the end and proposes a way of understanding Aquinas to be accurate both when he says in I-II, q. 66 that prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues and in II-II, q. 47 when he denies it does while insisting the natural reason (synderesis) does so instead. In that chapter, both faith and conscience will be discussed as other indispensable elements involved in the appointing of ends.
'On the origin and progress of temperance'
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs 25.1 , 2011
In 1814, the British lawyer Basil Montagu published a collection of writings on drink entitled Some Enquiries into the Effects of Fermented Liquors. Montagu’s goal was to demonstrate that alcohol was harmful in all forms and his collection drew on a wide range of sources from classical myth to contemporary medical discourse. Although it was not widely read, Some Enquiries illustrates the extent to which alcohol use had been identified as a social problem and health risk by the early nineteenth century. It also contains fictional and confessional narratives that foreshadow later temperance literature. This paper argues that many of the ideas and principles conventionally ascribed to organised temperance are clearly set out by Montagu, and that this has important implications for conventional histories of the temperance movement.
The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions
Coakley/Faith, Rationality, and the Passions, 2012
Scholars discussing Aquinas's ethics typically understand it as largely Aristotelian, though with some differences accounted for by the differences in worldview between Aristotle and Aquinas. In this paper, I argue against this view. I show that although Aquinas recognizes the Aristotelian virtues, he thinks they are not real virtues. Instead, for Aquinas, the passions-or the suitably formulated intellectual and volitional analogues to the passions-are not only the foundation of any real ethical life but also the flowering of what is best in it. Passions are constituents of a virtue in so far as they are subject to reason and moved by reason. 5 Adopting a similar view, Peter King says, Aquinas holds contra Hume, that reason is and ought to be the ruler of the passions; since the passions can be controlled by reason they should be controlled by reason. 6
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is the text which had the single greatest influence on Aquinas's ethical writings, and the historical and philosophical value of Aquinas's appropriation of this text provokes lively debate. In this volume of new essays, thirteen distinguished scholars explore how Aquinas receives, expands on, and transforms Aristotle's insights about the attainability of happiness, the scope of moral virtue, the foundation of morality, and the nature of pleasure. They examine Aquinas's commentary on the Ethics and his theological writings, above all the Summa theologiae. Their essays show Aquinas to be a highly perceptive interpreter, but one who also who also brings certain presuppositions to the Ethics and alters key Aristotelian notions for his own purposes. The result is a rich and nuanced picture of Aquinas's relation to Aristotle that will be of interest to readers in moral philosophy, Aquinas studies, the history of theology, and the history of philosophy.
2013
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is the text which had the single greatest influence on Aquinas's ethical writings, and the historical and philosophical value of Aquinas's appropriation of this text provokes lively debate. In this volume of new essays, thirteen distinguished scholars explore how Aquinas receives, expands on, and transforms Aristotle's insights about the attainability of happiness, the scope of moral virtue, the foundation of morality, and the nature of pleasure. They examine Aquinas's commentary on the Ethics and his theological writings, above all the Summa theologiae. Their essays show Aquinas to be a highly perceptive interpreter, but one who also who also brings certain presuppositions to the Ethics and alters key Aristotelian notions for his own purposes. The result is a rich and nuanced picture of Aquinas's relation to Aristotle that will be of interest to readers in moral philosophy, Aquinas studies, the history of theology, and the history of philosophy.
Aquinas on Sin, Self-Love, and Self-Transcendence
Self-Transcendence and Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology, 2018
A longstanding charge against Aristotelian virtue theory is that it is egoist, because it holds that the ultimate aim of anyone’s life is one’s own happiness. In this paper, I attempt to answer this old charge in a new way--by looking not to virtue and good action but to vice and sin. The paper proceeds as follows. In section I, I discuss Aquinas's account of being in order to explain his privative theory of evil. In section II, I discuss sin generally as an act that lacks due order to its end. In section III, I discuss sin in the sense of moral fault, and in section IV I discuss the sources of this kind of sin, with a special focus on malice and vice. I argue that whereas Aquinas understands virtue as a self-transcendent orientation that leads to happiness, vice is a self-centered orientation that prioritizes individual or private over common goods. In section V, I discuss Aquinas's view that vice, like all sin, springs from inordinate love of one's private good to the detriment of the good of others.
Scandinavian Journal for Leadership and Theology, 2015
This article explores how temperance as a virtue relates to organizational leadership. The study begins with a short survey of classical Greek and Christian notions of temperance before proceeding to ex- plore temperance in relation to self-leadership, visionary and strategic leadership, and relational lead- ership. The final part of the article offers reflections on how temperance might be cultivated from a theological perspective. Temperance is understood not only as sound thinking but also as embodied self-control and active patience. On the level of self-leadership, it is argued that temperance enables the leader to establish forms of integrity that protect the leader’s self from chaos and destruction. Moreover, temperance may also nurture focused visionary leadership that accepts ethical limits and has an eye to the common good. The study also suggests that organizations should cultivate a culture of strategic discipline that is capable of realizing such visions. On the interpe...