The Rediscovery and Posthumous Influence of Scepticism (original) (raw)
Related papers
Review of R. Bett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism
Philosophy in Review , 2010
Ancient scepticism' is a term that standardly encompasses two philosophical traditions stretching from the third century BCE to approximately the second century CE: Pyrrhonism, named after its eponymous founder Pyrrho of Elis (360-270 BCE), and Academic scepticism, a sceptical movement which arose in the Platonic Academy around 268 BCE, when Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5-241/0) became its head. The positions and arguments of these two traditions were widely discussed and criticized in antiquity, and historians of philosophy sometimes argue that it was the rediscovery of ancient scepticism in the sixteenth century that shaped the course of modern philosophy. Some of their argumentative strategies still occupy an important place in contemporary debates in epistemology (a typical example are the Agrippan modes). This volume is designed to provide a comprehensive view on the main protagonists, the central issues of contention in recent scholarship, and the transformation of sceptical traditions beyond antiquity.
The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2011
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution , reselling , loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Ancient Scepticism And The Contra Academicos
2008
Are we ever justified in being convinced we know something and in acting accordingly? Does our happiness depend upon the possibility or impossibility of certain knowledge? Does the good life require a stable relationship to the truth or can it be had apart from this? Is the desire to apprehend truth our central concern as rational beings, the basis of our authentic existence? Is it rather an impediment to happiness, an illusory desire which we must dispel or condemn ourselves to a life of frustration and anxiety? One might simply dismiss this as a dead issue. After all, is not certainty a discredited concept in our supposedly post-philosophical era? Have not we all learned the finite and contingent character of all human discourse? Yet the signs of discomfort with these conclusions are evident in our culture as well. Certain foundations for our beliefs and actions, whether grounded in reason or the authority of revelation, can seem necessary antidotes to the pervasive loss of meanin...
From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, 2022
This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.
internt.ht.lu.se
In this paper some applications of Pyrrhonean scepticism in the intellectual arena of 17 th century France are briefly explored. These applications belong to a bookprinter (Henri Estienne), a theologian (Pierre Charron), and a scientist (Pierre Gassendi). It is the author's regretful contention that even the proponents of pyrrhonean scepticism seem to think that the inherent destructivity of pyrrhonist doubt needs to be guided according to various principles external to pyrrhonism, whereas in fact pyrrhonism has a fairly good grip on itself. Also, it is noted that with pyrrhonism, the otherwise supposedly disparate natures of science and religion are treated as equally rationally ungrounded.
Is Ancient Scepticism Practically Coherent?
This essay presents some of the key facts of ancient scepticism and what is more important, it tries to respond to the question whether ancient scepticism is practically coherent. It gives a brief description on the historical and philosophical context on that time, what was before that, who are the main leaders of ancient scepticism and what every philosopher intended to say. On that time, there were two big school of scepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian. The paper also discusses the main differences between them and how each one replies to the Apraxia Charge (whether sceptics can act if they do not hold any belief) and other objections.