On the Unimportance of Theistic Belief (original) (raw)

Theism Reconsidered: Belief in God and the Existence of God

Zygon®, 2015

This article develops a new perspective on theism that (1) makes the simple juxtaposition of theism and atheism problematic, (2) and helps bridge philosophy of religion and the empirical study of religious phenomena. The basic idea is developed inspired by Terrence Deacon's book Incomplete Nature and its description of "ententional" phenomena, together with some ideas from the cognitive science of religion, especially those related to agency and "theological correctness." It is argued that God should not be understood as a "homunculus" that stops an otherwise infinite regress of arguments.

Experience of God and the rationality of theistic belief

Choice Reviews Online, 1997

We are now in a position to present our argument for the strong ratio¬ nality of the belief that God is really and truly experienced and hence exists, based on alleged experiences of God. There are certain principles about how to connect experience with real¬ ity which we all implicitly recognize as authoritative. We all regularly ap¬ peal to these rules when attempting to rationally determine the connection between experience and reality in contexts other than the experience of God. In our argument here, these principles will simply be assumed to govern correctly the relevant, rational deliberations. Thus, the argument starts with these principles. The principles to which we here are going to appeal do not only give conditions under which a certain kind of belief that p is weakly rational, under which conditions, that is, not only is the belief that p rational, but also the belief that not-p is rational. These principles yield strong rationality, showing that a belief that p is rational while a belief that not-p is not. At the same time, though, at least because of the clause "everything else being equal" which these principles contain, not every reasonable, proper appli¬ cation of them, even when considering the same evidence, need yield the same results. Reasonable, informed human beings could conceivably reach different conclusions from these same principles even though they all agreed on the principles and on the relevant evidence to which the princi¬ ples were to be applied. They could reasonably differ over whether every¬ thing else was equal. Hence, we do not claim that all reasonable, proper applications of these principles would show, with regard to a belief that p, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief 46 ] that it was rational and that the belief that not-p was not. So our principles do not serve to show that a belief possesses "universal" strong rationality.

A Moral Reason to be a Mere Theist

This paper is an attempt to improve the practical argument for beliefs in God. Some theists, most famously Kant and William James, called our attention to a particular set of beliefs, the Jamesian-type beliefs, which are justified by virtue of their practical significance, and these theists tried to justify theistic beliefs on the exact same ground. I argue, contra the Jamesian tradition, that theistic beliefs are different from the Jamesian-type beliefs and thus cannot be justified on the same ground. I also argue that the practical argument, as it stands, faces a problem of self-defeat. I then construct a new practical argument that avoids both problems. According to this new argument, theistic beliefs are rational to accept because such beliefs best supply us with motivation strong enough to carry out demanding moral tasks.

On the Morality of Having Faith that God Exists

Sophia, 2012

Many theists who identify themselves with the Abrahamic religions maintain that it is perfectly acceptable to have faith that God exists. In this paper, I argue that, when believing that God exists will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to forgo attempting to believe that God exists on the basis of sufficient evidence. Lest there be any confusion : I do not argue that it is always wrong to have faith that God exists, only that, under certain conditions, it can be.

Some ruminations about inculpable non-belief

Religious Studies, 2012

ABSTRACTThis article presents a discussion of the concept of ‘non-belief’, focusing on a variety of difficulties it raises for the theist. After considering how the notion of ‘non-belief’ may be construed, I catalogue five major problems facing the theist who insists on maintaining the traditional notion of ‘non-belief’. Those theists who insist on maintaining this traditional notion sometimes appeal to the ‘sin defence’ in an attempt to defend their position. I critique this defence and conclude with a mention of how rejecting the traditional notion of ‘non-belief’ will lead us towards revisionary theologies.

Theistic Replies to the A Priori Argument for Atheism

Philo, 2005

In the central chapter of Can God Be Free?, William Rowe offers what amounts to an a priori argument for atheism. In what follows, I first clarify this argument, and I then defend it against recent criticisms due to William Hasker. Next, however, I outline four ways in which theists might plausibly reply to Rowe's argument.

Cognitive Bias, the Axiological Question and the Epistemic Probability of Theistic Belief

Ontology of Theistic Beliefs, 2018

Some recent work in philosophy of religion addresses what can be called the "axiological question," i.e., regardless of whether God exists, would it be good or bad if God exists? Would the existence of God make the world a better or a worse place? Call the view that the existence of God would make the world a better place "Pro-Theism." We argue that Pro-Theism is not implausible, and moreover, many Theists, at least, (often implicitly) think that it is true. That is, many Theists think that various good outcomes would arise if Theism is true. We then discuss work in cognitive science concerning human cognitive bias, before discussing two noteworthy attempts to show that at least some religious beliefs arise because of cognitive bias: Hume's, and Draper's and Nichols's. We then argue that, as a result of certain cognitive biases that result when good outcomes might be at stake, Pro-Theism causes many Theists to inflate the epistemic probability that God exists, and as a result, Theists should lower the probability they assign to God's existence. Finally, based our arguments, we develop a novel objection to Pascal's wager. I. The Axiological Question and Pro-Theism Analytic philosophy of religion has generally focused on a handful of questions. Of course, much of the literature concerns the question, "does God exist?"; some attempt to defend or refute the traditional arguments for or against Theism (the Cosmological argument, the Ontological argument, the Problem of Evil and so on), while others attempt to devise new arguments for or against the existence of God. Some of the literature concerns the divine attributes; e.g., what properties does God have if God exists? And some of the literature focuses on other questions. But one question that has only recently started to generate discussion is: "would it be good or that has no ruler. Such a world seems incompatible with complete independence, or with complete privacy and genuine solitude…" See Kraay and Dragos (2013) for a discussion of these claims. Another possible response to the axiological question is "Pro-Theism." Pro-Theism claims that whether God exists or not, God's existence would make the actual world significantly better. Regardless of one's position on the existence of God, i.e., whether one is a Theist, Atheist or Agnostic, Pro-Theism is not obviously false. Indeed, one can develop various arguments for it. For example, (1) If God exists, then God is all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful etc. This is simply the traditional conception of God from classical theism. Furthermore, (2) If God is all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful, etc., then our lives are not meaningless, or absurd, or pointless. Presumably, a perfectly good God would not create beings that have a meaningless existence. And (3) follows from (1) and (2) with Hypothetical Syllogism, (3) If God exists, then our lives are not meaningless etc. So, the existence of God would guarantee that our lives have meaning, whatever that meaning might be. This is not to suggest that God's existence is the only way our lives could have meaning; rather, it is simply that God's existence would ensure that our lives have meaning. God's existence might be sufficient, though not necessary, for our lives to have meaning. 4 So, if God exists, then we know for sure that our lives are not meaningless; this seems preferable to not

Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism (Routledge, 2018)

2018

Does God Matter? features eleven original essays written by prominent philosophers of religion that address this very important, yet surprisingly neglected, question. One natural way to approach this question is to seek to understand what difference God’s existence would - or does - make to the value of the world and the well-being of its inhabitants. The first essay sets the stage for the discussion of this topic. The three essays in Section I defend versions of pro-theism: the view that God’s existence would - or does - make things better than they would otherwise be. The four essays in Section II defend anti-theism: the view that God’s existence would, or does, make things worse than they would otherwise be. The three essays in Section III consider the interplay between the existential and axiological debates concerning the existence of God. This book presents important research on a growing topic in philosophy of religion that will also be of keen interest to scholars working in other areas of philosophy (such as metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory), and in other disciplines.