'PERSONAL SEARCH' UNDER NDPS ACT-RESOLVING JUDICIAL DILEMMA IN INTERPRETING SECTION 50 THROUGH PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE (original) (raw)
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LEGAL PERSPECTIVE OF BRINGING INTERROGATION UNDER JUDICIARY AND REASONABLE FORCE ON ACCUSED
To protect the innocents from false criminal charges and bring the culprits in the clutches of law it is inevitable making the police true agents of the law and not servants of the party in power 1. To achieve this goal it is necessary, the separation of the 'Law Police' (Investigating police) from the 'order police' (police maintaining discipline) in our country there is no direct association of Judicial wing with the investigation of cases. Eventhough the scheme of chapter XII of Cr.P.C especially Sections 156,157,158,159,164,165,169,170,173 and 174 all go to show that while investigating a case the investigating officer, as a matter of fact, acts, under the control and supervision of the Magistrate. But the undue interference with the statutory duties of police when investigating a case, affects adversely the preliminary step to help the ultimate judicial process before a court of law. The law commission of India (1958) in its 14 th report had observed, " The investigation staff should be separated from the law and order staff to enable the investigating officer to devote undivided attention to investigating work ". To expedite the investigation a reasonable force on accused person for scientific interrogation and examination is much essential. For this section 53 of Cr.P.C. 1973 stands as follows. " Examination of accused by medical practitioner at the request of police officer-when a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence of such a nature and alleged to have been committed under such circumstances that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence, it shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at the request of a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector, and for any person acting in good faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such aexamination of the person arrested as is reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, and use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.