Rule-consequentialism and moral relativism (original) (raw)
Rule-consequentialism is usually taken to recommend a single ideal code for all moral agents. Relativized forms of rule consequentialism, which specify different moral rules for different social groups, have been considered before, yet they have not received serious attention until recently. Here I argue that, depending on their theoretical motivations, some rule-consequentialists have very good reasons to be relativists. Namely, rule-consequentialists who find compelling the theory’s coherence with our considered moral intuitions or are moved by consequentialist considerations ought to support a scheme of multiple relativized moral codes.
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