The peculiar case of Lehrer's lawyer (original) (raw)

Keith Lehrer on the Basing Relation

Philosophical Studies, 2012

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer's account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311-313, 1971). We show that Lehrer's examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer's account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer's own account is more plausible.

Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation

Erkenntnis, 2007

Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly, the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem. A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a ''piling problem'' arises, since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers and properties-a reductionist viewwhich fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious problem, the ''problem of the natural unity of properties''. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal powers and causation.

Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be Well-Founded?

Erkenntnis, 2014

This paper is about metaphysical 'infinitism', the view that there are, or could be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. Its main aim is to show that, contrary to widespread opinion, metaphysical infinitism is a coherent position. On the basis of this, it is then additionally argued that metaphysical infinitism need not fare worse than the more canonical 'foundationalist' alternatives when it comes to formulating metaphysical explanations. In the course of the discussion, a rather unexplored parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about justification is suggested. ''Just as the epistemic foundationalist thinks all warrant must originate in basic warrant and rejects limitless chains of warrant and circular warrant, so the

Logical and Metaphysical Form: Lessons from the Theory of Dependence

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1995

Most philosophers would agree that dependence relations are a key element in any metaphysical system. They agree on this in spite of the fact that they often do not agree on the question of what depends on what: do minds depend on brains, or vice versa? accidents on substances? creatures on God? Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the importance of dependence relations, however, little attention has been paid to the question of what dependence actually consists in; usually, some answer to this question is taken for granted, and consideration is given only to the subsequent questions of which things depend on which. The present paper discusses what dependence is, not for its own sake, but rather as a case study concerning the question of form in metaphysical inquiry. Distinguishing logical from metaphysical form, one can say that certain difficulties in twentieth-century theories of dependence can be traced to the error of trying to answer a metaphysical question by making use of logical form instead of metaphysical form. The paper will proceed in three steps.

On the Metaphysics of Mental Causation

2021

In a series of recent papers, Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald offer a resolution to the twin problems of mental causation and mental causal relevance. They argue that the problem of mental causation is soluble via token monism— mental events are causally efficacious physical events. At the same time, the problem of mental causal relevance is solved by combining this causally efficacious mental property instance with the systematic co-variation between distinct mental properties of the cause and the action-theoretic properties of the effect in question. In other words, their model is an instance of the familiar strategy of yoking token monism with property dualism. MacDonald and MacDonald, however, endorse this nonreductive monism from within a property exemplification account of events. In this paper we argue that nonreductive monism, when yoked with the property exemplification account, faces significant difficulties in resolving the twin problems of mental causation and men...

Defending Mental Causation by Appealing to Grounding

2021

Recently, Clark and Wildman have argued against a thesisabout mental causation, due to Kroedel and Schulz, calledthe causal grounding thesis. A programmatic idea drivingthe causal grounding thesis is that instances of mentalcausation are always grounded by corresponding instancesof purely physical causation. The causal grounding thesisgoes beyond this programmatic idea by providing asubstantial specification of how this occurs. The causalgrounding thesis is of considerable philosophical interestbecause it is instrumental in Kroedel and Schulz’s attemptto develop non-reductive physicalism about the mind insuch a way that the infamous exclusion problem is avoided.This paper extends Kroedel and Schulz’s defense of thecausal grounding thesis and replies to Clark and Wildman’sconcerns

Epistemic Dependence (Penultimate Version)

The goal of this paper is to explore and defend the epistemic dependence of knowledge⎯roughly, the dependence of one’s knowledge on factors outwith one’s cognitive agency⎯and to situate this thesis within a wider framework for thinking about knowledge, one on which knowledge demands both cognitive agency and extra-agential factors. It is argued that the epistemic dependence thesis comes in both positive (knowledge-enabling) and negative (knowledge-precluding) forms, and that properly understood it runs contrary to a number of central movements in contemporary epistemology. Despite appearances, the question of whether one’s epistemology allows for epistemic dependence runs orthogonal to the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. Instead, it reflects a rather different dispute between epistemic individualism and epistemic anti-individualism. A narrow form of epistemic individualism is contrasted with a broader form that allows for extended cognitive processes. While our initial focus is on perceptual knowledge specifically, it is also shown that with this framework in place, the prospects for a distinctively social epistemic anti-individualism are very sound. Furthermore, it is claimed that this result is not specific to a particular social kind of knowledge, but rather reflects a point about knowledge in general. This is brought out by considering epistemic twin earth arguments that demonstrate the general epistemic dependence of knowledge. Social epistemic anti-individualism is thus motivated on more general anti- individualist grounds, reflecting the wider reach of the epistemic dependence thesis. The rationale for this thesis within a broader approach to knowledge that allows for both agential and extra-agential factors to play a role⎯what I call anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯is then explored.

Mental Causation: A Defence

Logic and Philosophy of Science, 2011

If we accept causal exclusion, property dualism and physical determinism, mental epiphenomenalism follows. According to Yablo (1992), we can save mental causation by rejecting causal exclusion and considering the mental/physical relation as an instance of the determinable/determinate relation. In this paper I examine Crane’s argument (2008) against the causal relevance of determinables, and I argue that we still have good reasons to think that determinables may be causally efficacious. As mental properties can be also considered as exhaustive disjunctions of physical realizers, the causal relevance of mental properties is also questioned by the widely shared opinion that disjunctive properties can not be causally efficacious. I consider Clapp’s arguments (2001) in favor of the causal relevance of disjunctive properties, and I conclude that disjunctive properties may survive both Armstrong’s famous objections (1978).

Mental causation and the metaphysics of causation

Erkenntnis, 2007

The paper argues for four claims: (1) The problem of mental causation and the argument for its solution in terms of the identity of mental with physical causes are independent of the theory of causation one favours.